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Abstract 
At present, companies rely on information technology systems to achieve their 
business objectives, making them vulnerable to cybersecurity threats. Information 
security risk assessments help organisations to identify their risks and 
vulnerabilities. An accurate identification of risks and vulnerabilities is a challenge, 
because the input data is uncertain. So-called ’vulnerability identification 
errors‘ can occur if false positive vulnerabilities are identified, or if vulnerabilities 
remain unidentified (false negatives). ‘Accurate identification’ in this context means 
that all vulnerabilities identified do indeed pose a risk of a security breach for the 
organisation. An experiment performed with German IT security professionals in 
2011 confirmed that vulnerability identification errors do occur in practice. In 
particular, false positive vulnerabilities were identified by participants. 
 
In information security (IS) risk assessments, security experts analyze the 
organisation’s assets in order to identify vulnerabilities. Methods such as 
brainstorming, checklists, scenario-analysis, impact-analysis, and cause-analysis 
(ISO, 2009b) are used to identify vulnerabilities. These methods use uncertain 
input data for vulnerability identification, because the probabilities, effects and 
losses of vulnerabilities cannot be determined exactly (Fenz and Ekelhart, 2011). 
Furthermore, business security needs are not considered properly; the security 
checklists and standards used to identify vulnerabilities do not consider company-
specific security requirements (Siponen and Willison, 2009). In addition, the 
intentional behaviour of an attacker when exploiting vulnerabilities for malicious 
purposes further increases the uncertainty, because predicting human behaviour 
is not just about existing vulnerabilities and their consequences (Pieters and 
Consoli, 2009), rather than preparing for future attacks. As a result, current 
approaches determine risks and vulnerabilities under a high degree of uncertainty, 
which can lead to errors. 
 
This thesis proposes an approach to resolve vulnerability identification errors using 
security requirements and business process models. Security requirements 
represent the business security needs and determine whether any given 
  
 
 Page 3 of 394  
vulnerability is a security risk for the business. Information assets’ security 
requirements are evaluated in the context of the business process model, in order 
to determine whether security functions are implemented and operating correctly. 
Systems, personnel and physical parts of business processes, as well as IT 
processes, are considered in the security requirement evaluation, and this 
approach is validated in three steps. Firstly, the systematic procedure is compared 
to two best-practice approaches. Secondly, the risk result accuracy is compared to 
a best-practice risk-assessment approach, as applied to several real-world 
examples within an insurance company. Thirdly, the capability to determine risk 
more accurately by using business processes and security requirements is tested 
in a quasi-experiment, using security professionals. 
 
This thesis demonstrates that risk assessment methods can benefit from explicit 
evaluation of security requirements in the business context during risk 
identification, in order to resolve vulnerability identification errors and to provide a 
criterion for security. 
  
 
 Page 4 of 394  
Author’s Declaration 
During work on this thesis, several conference and journal papers were published. 
All of the work presented at conferences, journal papers and in this thesis 
describes original contributions of the author. 
 Taubenberger, Jürjens, Yu, Nuseibeh. “Resolving Vulnerability Identification 
Errors using Security Requirements on Business Process Models” in 
Information Management & Computer Security, 2013, Volume 21, Issue 3. 
This journal paper contains a condensed view of our literature review 
(chapter 3) and the concepts of the approach (chapter 4). The approach 
(chapter 5) as well as its validation (chapter 6) was demonstrated in detail 
in this paper. 
 Taubenberger, Jürjens. “Study on IT risk assessments in practice”. DACH 
Security conference, Oldenburg, Germany, September 2011. In 
proceedings of DACH Security 11, Available at http://www-jj.cs.tu-
dortmund.de/jj/publications/papers/dach11-stefan.pdf   
At this security conference, the results of the survey “IT security risk 
assessments in practice” among German security professionals at a 
security conference were presented. Some of the survey’s results are 
presented in sections 3.4.2 and 6.5 of this thesis. The complete survey 
results can be found in the appendix. 
 Taubenberger, Jürjens. “Durchführung von IT-Risikobewertungen und die 
Nutzung von Sicherheitsanforderungen in der Praxis“, Technical report, 
Fraunhofer Institute for Software and Systems Engineering, 2011. 
  
 
 Page 5 of 394  
In this publication the complete survey „IT security risk assessments in 
practice” is presented which was conducted among German security 
professionals. The complete survey results can be found in the appendix. 
 Taubenberger, Jürjens, Yu, Nuseibeh. “Problem Analysis of Traditional IT-
Security Risk Assessment Methods - An Experience Report from the 
Insurance and Auditing domain”. Future Challenges in Security and Privacy 
for Academia and Industry, 26th IFIP TC 11 International Information 
Security Conference, SEC 2011, Lucerne, Switzerland, June 2011, 
Available at http://www.springerlink.com/content/p587547748274275/abstract/ 
At his conference, the problems and limitations of information security risk 
assessment approaches were presented. This publication covers part of 
the literature review (chapter 3) and the idea of using security requirements 
for risk assessments (chapter 4). 
 Taubenberger, Jürjens. “IT Security Risk Analysis based on Business 
Process Models enhanced with Security Requirements”, Proceedings of 
the Workshop on Modelling Security (MODSEC08) held as part of the 2008 
International Conference on Model Driven Engineering Languages and 
Systems (MODELS). Toulouse, France. 2008. Available at http://ceur-
ws.org/Vol-413 
At this conference, an early version of a business process model and 
security requirements-based assessment approach was presented. This 
work contains early work of chapters 4 and 5.  
  
 
 Page 6 of 394  
Acknowledgements 
Special thanks go to my family - to my wife Katrin for supporting me all the time, 
and my daughters Stefanie and Magdalena. I hope you will excuse me for the time 
I was not available for you, especially in the first years of your life, because of 
working on the PhD. 
 
I wish to thank my supervisors Jan Jürjens, Yijun Yu and Bashar Nuseibeh for 
their invaluable guidance, reviews, and encouragement to finish this thesis. 
Especially, I like to thank Jan Jürjens, because without him, the PhD would not 
have been possible. He supported and encouraged me during the whole project, 
from the end of 2006. His availability and his kindness were prominent and a great 
source of motivation. I thank him for all his trust and support. Furthermore, I would 
like to thank warmly my second supervisor Bashar Nuseibeh. He has always 
supported my PhD; his open-mindedness and his warmth were always a great 
help to me. In addition, I wish to thank Yijun Yu for his excellent ideas and 
discussions we had, specifically on the subject of combining risk management with 
software engineering. His comments were always a great source of inspiration to 
my work. Moreover, I would like to thank Marian Petre for her valuable reviews 
and comments on this thesis. 
 
Finally, I must acknowledge the support of the Computing Department of The 
Open University and the Technical University of Dortmund. Without the 
universities’ departments - as well as other PhD students of both universities 
giving me time, support and encouragement - this thesis would not have been 
  
 
 Page 7 of 394  
completed. Finally, I must thank my employer, especially the Audit and Integrated 
Risk Management department, for supporting my PhD throughout the period of 
time, as well as for being a source for gathering practical experiences and data. 
  
 
 Page 8 of 394  
Table of Contents 
Abstract .......................................................................................................................... 2 
Acknowledgements ........................................................................................................ 6 
Table of Contents .......................................................................................................... 8 
Figures and Tables ...................................................................................................... 11 
Acronyms ..................................................................................................................... 15 
Chapter 1 - Introduction ............................................................................................ 19 
1.1. Motivation 19 
1.2. Problem statement 22 
1.3. Research objectives 24 
1.4. Structure of this thesis 29 
Chapter 2 - Risk Management ................................................................................... 32 
2.1. Areas of risk management 32 
2.2. Standards 36 
2.3. Information security 41 
2.3.1. Risk assessment 47 
2.3.2. Risk assessment vs. analysis 50 
2.3.3. Risk assessment method classification 52 
2.3.4. Security requirements at risk assessments 54 
Chapter 3 - Information Security Risk Management .............................................. 58 
3.1. State of practice 58 
3.1.1. Risk management standards 59 
3.1.2. Risk assessment methods 64 
3.2. State of the art 80 
3.2.1. Risk assessments for organisations 81 
3.2.2. Risk assessment in software engineering 85 
3.2.3. Risk assessment in business process management 90 
3.3. Discussion on risk assessments 94 
3.3.1. For organisations 94 
3.3.2. In software engineering 99 
3.3.3. In business process management 100 
3.3.4. Conclusion 102 
3.4. Problems of risk assessment 103 
3.4.1. Procedural limitations 104 
3.4.2. A survey among practitioner’s 108 
3.4.3. Determing probabilities - An example 113 
  
 
 Page 9 of 394  
3.5. Research questions 120 
3.6. Research methodology 124 
3.7. Chapter summary 130 
Chapter 4 - Security Requirements based Risk Assessment ................................. 131 
4.1. An extended information security model 132 
4.2. Security requirement definition of risk 137 
4.3. Business process model information 139 
4.4. Security requirements and business process models 142 
4.4.1. Determining risk 142 
4.4.2. Correlations 144 
4.4.3. Evaluation 146 
4.4.4. Target of evaluation 148 
4.5. Defining security requirements 151 
4.5.1. Elicitation 151 
4.5.2. Characterisation 154 
4.5.3. (Inter)dependencies 161 
4.6. Chapter summary 163 
Chapter 5 - A Security Requirement Risk Assessment Approach ....................... 165 
5.1. Introduction 165 
5.2. The approach 166 
5.2.1. Phase 1 - Asset identification 169 
5.2.2. Phase 2 - Asset profiling 170 
5.2.3. Phase 3 - Vulnerability identification 173 
5.2.4. Phase 4 – Risk documentation 182 
5.3. Running example 183 
5.3.1. Process Modelling Notation (BPMN) 184 
5.3.2. BPMN process example 185 
5.3.3. Phase 1 - Asset identification 186 
5.3.4. Phase 2 - Asset profiling 187 
5.3.5. Phase 3 - Vulnerability identification 188 
5.3.6. Phase 4 – Risk documentation 196 
5.4. Chapter summary 196 
Chapter 6 - Validation .............................................................................................. 198 
6.1. Validation criteria 198 
6.2. Methods procedure 199 
6.2.1. Analysis of security requirements utilization 199 
6.2.2. Proof of concept – The approach in pseudo-code 205 
6.2.3. Result interpretation and threats to validity 209 
6.3. Result accuracy 210 
6.3.1. Assessments context and procedure 211 
6.3.2. ARA assessments execution and results 221 
6.3.3. SRA assessments execution and results 226 
  
 
 Page 10 of 394  
6.3.4. ARA/ SRA result interpretation and threats to validity 232 
6.4. Method capability 238 
6.4.1. Quasi-experiment design and procedure 238 
6.4.2. Quasi-experiment results 241 
6.4.3. Result interpretation and threats to validity 242 
6.5. Lessons learned 246 
6.6. Chapter summary 250 
Chapter 7 – Conclusions and Future Work ............................................................ 251 
7.1. Research contributions 251 
7.2. Limitations 254 
7.3. Future work 257 
Appendix .................................................................................................................... 261 
A.1. Survey 261 
i. Overall summary 261 
ii. Objective of the survey 263 
iii. Survey design 264 
iv. Survey results 265 
A.2. The approach in UML 297 
A.3. ARA Security checklist – Example 300 
A.4. Company assessments with the SRA and ARA 302 
i. SRA Company 1 results – Assessor one 303 
ii. SRA Company 1 results – Assessor two 314 
iii. SRA Company 2 results 324 
iv. SRA Company 3 results 334 
v. ARA Company 1 results 344 
vi. ARA Company 2 results 348 
vii. ARA Company 3 results 350 
A.5. Security objective ratings – Rule set 353 
A.6. Security objective assessment with Prolog 355 
Glossary ...................................................................................................................... 363 
Index ........................................................................................................................... 365 
Bibliography .............................................................................................................. 369 
  
 
 Page 11 of 394  
Figures and Tables 
Figure 1-1 Vulnerability identification errors ...................................................................... 23 
Figure 1-2 Extended Security Concept Meta-Model from Innerhofer–Oberperfler and Breu 
(2006) ................................................................................................................................... 26 
Figure 1-3 Terminology model from Stølen et al. (2002) .................................................... 27 
Figure 1-4 The ISSRM reference model from Matulevicius et al. (2008) ........................... 28 
Figure 1-5 Structure of the thesis ......................................................................................... 29 
Figure 2-1 Risk management process from ASNZ (2004) .................................................. 38 
Figure 2-2 Risk management framework, principles and process from ISO/IEC 31000 
(ISO, 2009a) ......................................................................................................................... 40 
Figure 3-1 Octave phases from Alberts et al. (2003) ........................................................... 68 
Figure 3-2 OCTAVE allegro from Caralli et al. (2007)....................................................... 69 
Figure 3-3 COBIT process description from ITGI (2007) ................................................... 71 
Figure 3-4 CORAS modelling language elements from Braber et al. (2007) ...................... 72 
Figure 3-5 NIST risk assessment steps from Stoneburner et al. (2002b)............................. 74 
Figure 3-6 EBIOS set of principles from ANSSI (2010b) ................................................... 76 
Figure 3-7 MEHARI steps of risk evaluation from CLUSIF (2010) ................................... 77 
Figure 3-8 LRAM process diagram from Guarro (1987)..................................................... 79 
Figure 3-9 Dependency tree ............................................................................................... 116 
Figure 3-10 Dependency tree with probabilities ................................................................ 118 
Figure 4-1 Extended information security risk model ........................................................ 136 
Figure 4-2 Business process taxonomy from zur Muehlen (2005) .................................... 141 
Figure 4-3 Correlation of concepts .................................................................................... 145 
Figure 4-4 Utilization of concepts ...................................................................................... 147 
Figure 5-1 Security requirements based risk assessment process (SRA) .......................... 169 
Figure 5-2 Security objective rule set table........................................................................ 177 
Figure 5-3 BPMN process model online insurance quotation ........................................... 186 
Figure 5-4 BPMN online insurance quotation with identified EP, PP and CC ................. 189 
Figure 5-5 BPMN online insurance quotation with EP, PP, CC and information assets ... 190 
Figure 5-6 BPMN order process with evaluation information........................................... 193 
Figure 6-1 Comparison of security requirement usage in the assessment approaches ...... 200 
Figure 6-2 Claims evaluation process ................................................................................ 216 
Figure 6-3 Claims notification process .............................................................................. 216 
Figure 6-4 Claims payments process ................................................................................. 216 
Figure 6-5 Accounting claims payments process............................................................... 217 
Figure 6-6 Accounting commission payment process ....................................................... 218 
Figure 6-7 Accounting booking of new premiums process ............................................... 218 
Figure 6-8 Accounting booking of changes in premiums process ..................................... 218 
Figure 6-9 Accounting booking of new and changes in premiums ................................... 219 
Figure 6-10 Insurance/contract request process ................................................................. 220 
Figure 6-11 Contract negotiation process .......................................................................... 220 
Figure 6-12 Broker business process ................................................................................. 221 
Figure 6-13 Customer and broker business process ........................................................... 221 
Figure 6-14 Business process example order process ........................................................ 240 
Figure A-1 Type of risk assessment ................................................................................... 266 
Figure A-2 Extent of risk assessment................................................................................. 266 
Figure A-3 Used standards/ method for risk assessments .................................................. 267 
Figure A-4 Criteria’s used in risk assessments .................................................................. 267 
  
 
 Page 12 of 394  
Figure A-5 Determination of events .................................................................................. 268 
Figure A-6 Determination of vulnerabilities ...................................................................... 269 
Figure A-7 Determination of probabilities ......................................................................... 269 
Figure A-8 Determination of impacts ................................................................................ 270 
Figure A-9 Repository objects ........................................................................................... 270 
Figure A-10 Evaluation of security controls ...................................................................... 271 
Figure A-11 Objectivity of risks ........................................................................................ 272 
Figure A-12 Risk assessments are subjective .................................................................... 272 
Figure A-13 Risk assessments are influenced .................................................................... 273 
Figure A-14 High risks are under-represented ................................................................... 273 
Figure A-15 Low risks are over-represented ..................................................................... 273 
Figure A-16 Measure implementation ............................................................................... 274 
Figure A-17 Adaption of security policies ......................................................................... 274 
Figure A-18 Risk assessment methods .............................................................................. 275 
Figure A-19 Driver for business process modelling .......................................................... 277 
Figure A-20 Business process modelling ........................................................................... 278 
Figure A-21 Information in business process models ........................................................ 278 
Figure A-22 Security requirements for objects (assets) ..................................................... 279 
Figure A-23 Documentation of security requirements....................................................... 279 
Figure A-24 Documentation of security requirements....................................................... 280 
Figure A-25 Usage of security requirements ..................................................................... 280 
Figure A-26 Consideration of security requirements ......................................................... 281 
Figure A-27 Security requirements as basis for risk assessments...................................... 282 
Figure A-28 Maturity und Performance in risk assessments ............................................. 282 
Figure A-29 Information security with security requirements ........................................... 283 
Figure A-30 Measurement of information security ........................................................... 283 
Figure A-31 Representation of risk results ........................................................................ 284 
Figure A-32 Security requirements based risk assessment process (SRA) in UML ......... 299 
Figure A-33 Claims evaluation process ............................................................................. 303 
Figure A-34 Claims notification process ........................................................................... 304 
Figure A-35 Claims payments process .............................................................................. 305 
Figure A-36 Accounting claims payments process ............................................................ 306 
Figure A-37 Accounting commission payment process .................................................... 307 
Figure A-38 Accounting booking of new premiums process ............................................ 308 
Figure A-39 Accounting booking of changes in premiums process .................................. 308 
Figure A-40 Insurance/contract request process ................................................................ 309 
Figure A-41 Contract negotiation process ......................................................................... 310 
Figure A-42 Broker business process ................................................................................ 311 
Figure A-43 Claims evaluation process ............................................................................. 314 
Figure A-44 Claims notification process ........................................................................... 315 
Figure A-45 Claims payments process .............................................................................. 316 
Figure A-46 Accounting claims payments process ............................................................ 317 
Figure A-47 Accounting commission payment process .................................................... 318 
Figure A-48 Accounting booking of new premiums process ............................................ 318 
Figure A-49 Accounting booking of changes in premiums process .................................. 319 
Figure A-50 Insurance/contract request process ................................................................ 320 
Figure A-51 Contract negotiation process ......................................................................... 321 
Figure A-52 Broker business process ................................................................................ 322 
Figure A-53 Claims evaluation process ............................................................................. 324 
Figure A-54 Claims notification process ........................................................................... 325 
Figure A-55 Claims payments process .............................................................................. 326 
  
 
 Page 13 of 394  
Figure A-56 Accounting claims payments process ............................................................ 327 
Figure A-57 Accounting commission payment process .................................................... 328 
Figure A-58 Accounting booking of new and changes in premiums................................. 328 
Figure A-59 Contract negotiation process ......................................................................... 329 
Figure A-60 Customer and broker business process .......................................................... 330 
Figure A-61 Claims evaluation process ............................................................................. 334 
Figure A-62 Claims notification process ........................................................................... 335 
Figure A-63 Claims payments process .............................................................................. 335 
Figure A-64 Accounting claims payments process ............................................................ 336 
Figure A-65 Accounting commission payment process .................................................... 337 
Figure A-66 Accounting booking of new and changes in premiums................................. 338 
Figure A-67 Insurance/contract request process ................................................................ 339 
Figure A-68 Contract negotiation process ......................................................................... 340 
Figure A-69 Customer and broker business process .......................................................... 341 
 
Table 4-1: Comparison of model elements and concepts of risk ....................................... 134 
Table 4-2: Comparison of security requirements usage ..................................................... 135 
Table 4-3: Security requirements characterisation ............................................................. 160 
Table 5-1 Security objectives’ rating ................................................................................. 171 
Table 5-2: Information asset security requirements ........................................................... 173 
Table 5-3: EP, PP and CC rating criteria ........................................................................... 175 
Table 5-4: Risk result documentation ................................................................................ 183 
Table 5-5: Customer data security requirements ............................................................... 187 
Table 5-6: Payment data security requirements ................................................................. 188 
Table 5-7 Evaluation results for EP, PP and CC ................................................................ 191 
Table 5-8: IT security process assessment results.............................................................. 194 
Table 5-9: Overall result documentation............................................................................ 196 
Table 6-1: Usage of security requirements ........................................................................ 204 
Table 6-2: Overview of available and assessed processes at the companies ..................... 215 
Table 6-3: Company 1 assessment results ......................................................................... 224 
Table 6-4: Company 2 assessment results ......................................................................... 225 
Table 6-5: Company 3 assessment results ......................................................................... 225 
Table 6-6: Claims data security requirements .................................................................... 226 
Table 6-7: Accounting data security requirements ............................................................ 227 
Table 6-8: Underwriting data security requirements ......................................................... 228 
Table 6-9: Result presentation company 1 assessor 1 ........................................................ 229 
Table 6-10: Result presentation company 1 assessor 2 ...................................................... 230 
Table 6-11: Result presentation company 2 ....................................................................... 231 
Table 6-12: Result presentation company 3 ....................................................................... 232 
Table 6-13: Result comparison .......................................................................................... 234 
Table 6-14 Quasi-experiment risks identified by participants ........................................... 241 
Table 6-15 Quasi-experiment risk impact evaluation by participants ............................... 242 
Table A-1: Representation of risk results........................................................................... 283 
Table A-2: Overview of identified risks in example A ...................................................... 288 
Table A-3: Overview of identified risks in example B ...................................................... 289 
Table A-4: Overview of identified risks in example C ...................................................... 290 
Table A-5: Control objectives at the ARA ......................................................................... 300 
Table A-6: Claims evaluation results company 1 assessor 1 ............................................. 303 
Table A-7: Claims notification results company 1 assessor 1 ........................................... 304 
Table A-8: Claims payment results company 1 assessor 1 ................................................ 305 
  
 
 Page 14 of 394  
Table A-9: Accounting payment results company 1 assessor 1 ......................................... 306 
Table A-10: Accounting commission payments results company 1 assessor 1 ................. 307 
Table A-11: Accounting booking of new premiums results company 1 assessor 1 .......... 308 
Table A-12: Accounting booking of changes in premiums results company 1 assessor 1 309 
Table A-13: Underwriting contract request and offer results company 1 assessor 1......... 309 
Table A-14: Underwriting contract negotiation results company 1 assessor 1 .................. 310 
Table A-15: Underwriting broker business results company 1 assessor 1......................... 311 
Table A-16: Security process assessment company 1 ....................................................... 312 
Table A-17: Result presentation company 1 assessor 1 ..................................................... 313 
Table A-18: Claims evaluation results company 1 assessor 2 ........................................... 314 
Table A-19: Claims notification results company 1 assessor 2 ......................................... 315 
Table A-20: Claims payment results company 1 assessor 2 .............................................. 316 
Table A-21: Accounting payment results company 1 assessor 2 ....................................... 317 
Table A-22: Accounting commission payments results company 1 assessor 2 ................. 318 
Table A-23: Accounting booking of new premiums results company 1 assessor 2 .......... 319 
Table A-24: Accounting booking of changes in premiums results company 1 assessor 2 319 
Table A-25: Underwriting contract request and offer results company 1 assessor 2......... 320 
Table A-26: Underwriting contract negotiation results company 1 assessors 2 ................ 321 
Table A-27: Underwriting broker business results company 1 assessor 2......................... 322 
Table A-28: Security process evaluation results ................................................................ 323 
Table A-29: Results of company 1 assessor 2 ................................................................... 324 
Table A-30: Claims evaluation results company 2 ............................................................ 325 
Table A-31: Claims notification results company 2 .......................................................... 325 
Table A-32: Claims payment results company 2 ............................................................... 326 
Table A-33: Accounting payment results company 2 ........................................................ 327 
Table A-34: Accounting commission payments results company 2 .................................. 328 
Table A-35: Accounting booking of new and changes in premiums results company 2 ... 329 
Table A-36: Underwriting contract negotiation results company 2 ................................... 329 
Table A-37: Underwriting customer and broker business results company 2 ................... 330 
Table A-38: Security process evaluation results ................................................................ 331 
Table A-39: Result presentation company 2 ...................................................................... 332 
Table A-40: Claims evaluation results company 3 ............................................................ 334 
Table A-41: Claims notification results company 3 .......................................................... 335 
Table A-42: Claims payment results company 3 ............................................................... 336 
Table A-43: Accounting payment results company 3 ........................................................ 336 
Table A-44: Accounting commission payments results company 3 .................................. 337 
Table A-45: Accounting booking of new and changes in premiums results company 3 ... 338 
Table A-46: Underwriting contract request and offer results company 3 .......................... 339 
Table A-47: Underwriting contract negotiation results company 3 ................................... 340 
Table A-48: Underwriting customer and broker business results company 3 ................... 341 
Table A-49: Security process evaluation results ................................................................ 342 
Table A-50: Result presentation company 3 ...................................................................... 343 
Table A-51: Questionnaire with results of company 1 assessor 1 ..................................... 344 
Table A-52: Company 1 results assessor 1 ........................................................................ 345 
Table A-53: Questionnaire with results of company 1 assessor 2 ..................................... 346 
Table A-54: Company 1 results assessor 2 ........................................................................ 347 
Table A-55: Company 1 consolidated results .................................................................... 347 
Table A-56: Questionnaire with results of company 2 ...................................................... 348 
Table A-57: Company 2 results ......................................................................................... 350 
Table A-58: Questionnaire with results of company 3 ...................................................... 350 
Table A-59: Company 3 results ......................................................................................... 352 
  
 
 Page 15 of 394  
 
Acronyms 
ALE - Annual loss expectancy 
APRA - Australian Prudential Regulation Authority 
AS/NZ - Australia/ New Zealand Standards 
BAFIN - Bundesanstalt fuer Finanzdienstleistungsaufsicht 
BPM - Business Process Model 
BPMN - Business Process Modeling Notation 
BS - British Standard 
BSI - Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik 
CAPEC - Common Attack Pattern Enumeration and Classification 
CC - Common Criteria 
CC - Communication Channel 
CCE - Common Configuration Enumeration 
CCTA - Central Computer and Telecommunications Agency 
CERT - Computer Emergency Response Team 
CMM - Capability Maturity Model 
COBIT - Control Objectives for Information and Related Technology 
CORAS - Risk Assessment of Security Critical Systems 
COSO - Committee of Sponsoring Organisations of the Treadway Commission 
CPQRA - Chemical Process Quantitative Risk Assessment 
CRAMM - CCTA Risk Analysis and Management Method 
CRM - Customer Relationship Management 
CVE - Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures 
CVSS - Common Vulnerability Scoring System 
  
 
 Page 16 of 394  
DFD - Data Flow Diagrams 
EBIOS - Expression of Needs and Identification of Security Objectives 
ENISA - European Network and Information Security Agency 
EP - Entry Point 
EPC - Event-driven Process Chain 
EVT - Extreme Value Theory 
FMECA - Failure Mode and Effects Analysis 
FSA - Financial Service Authority 
FTA - Fault Tree Analysis 
GAISP - Generally Accepted Information Security Principles  
HAZOPS - Hazard and Operability Study 
HIPAA - Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act 
IDEF - Integration Definition 
IEC - International Electrotechnical Commission 
IS - Information Security 
ISF - Information Security Forum 
ISMS - Information Security Management System 
ISO - International Organisation for Standardization 
IT - Information Technology 
ITIL - IT Infrastructure Library 
ITSEC - Information Technology Security Evaluation Criteria 
KAOS - Knowledge Acquisition in Automated Specification 
MARION - Méthodologie d'Analyse de Risques Informatiques Orientée par 
Niveaux 
MEHARI - Methode Harmonisée d'Analyse du Risque Informatique 
MTD - Maximum Tolerable Downtime 
  
 
 Page 17 of 394  
NIST - National Institute of Standards and Technology 
OCTAVE - Operationally Critical Threat, Asset, and Vulnerability Evaluation 
OGC - Office of Government Commerce 
PCAOB - Public Company Accounting Oversight Board 
PHA - Preliminary Risk Analysis 
PP - Process Point 
PRA - Probabilistic Risk Assessment  
PROLOG - A logic programming language 
RE - Requirements Engineering 
RM - Risk Management 
SE - Software Engineering 
SEC - Securities and Exchange Commission 
SEI - Software Engineering Institute  
SO - Security Objective 
SOX - Sarbanes-Oxley Act 
SP - Special Publication 
SPICE - Software Process Improvement and Capability Determination framework  
SQL - Structured Query Language 
SQUARE - Security Quality Requirements Engineering 
SR - Security Requirement 
SSE CMM - Systems Security Engineering Capability Maturity Model 
TCSEC - Trusted Computer System Evaluation Criteria 
TR - Technical Report 
UML - Unified Modelling Language 
UMLsec - An extension to the Unified Modelling Language 
VAR - Value-at-risk  
  
 
 Page 18 of 394  
  
 
 Page 19 of 394  
Chapter 1 - Introduction 
In this chapter, the motivation for the research and the problem statement are 
presented, and the research objective is discussed with the aid of information 
security models developed by other researchers. 
1.1. Motivation 
In 2007, two data discs containing 25 million child benefit records were lost in the 
United Kingdom (Hartnett, 2007), and 45.7 million credit card numbers were stolen 
by hackers at TJX, a retailer located in Massachusetts, USA (Brodkin, 2007). 
Information security risk assessments are performed to identify such risks caused 
by vulnerabilities before they occur, and to propose security functions. A risk is 
defined as “the potential that a given threat will exploit vulnerabilities of an asset or 
group of assets and thereby cause harm to the organisation” (ISO, 2004b, p. 7), 
and a vulnerability can be defined as “a flaw or weakness in system security 
procedures, design, implementation, or internal controls that could be exercised 
(accidentally triggered or intentionally exploited) and result in a security breach or 
a violation of the system’s security policy” (Stoneburner et al., 2002b, p. 15). 
However, both the identification of information security risks and the proposing of 
mitigating security functions are dependent on the accurate identification of 
vulnerabilities. Accurate identification in these contexts means that those identified 
vulnerabilities can indeed  result in a security breach and are a security risk for the 
organisation. Vulnerability identification errors do occur when a vulnerability is 
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As a first step in any information security risk assessment, assets, threats and 
vulnerabilities are identified according to standards from the Standards 
Australia/Standards New Zealand Committee (AS/NZS), the International 
Organisation for Standardization (ISO) and the International Electrotechnical 
Commission (IEC), for example: AS/NZS ISO 31000 (ASNZ, 2009) (formerly 
AS/NZS 4360 (ASNZ, 1999) and including ISO/IEC 31000 (ISO, 2009a)); ISO/IEC 
27001 (ISO, 2005d) and ISO/IEC 27005 (ISO, 2011c). The ISO/IEC 13335-1 (ISO, 
2004b) defining basic security concepts was replaced by ISO/IEC 2700x series. 
 
In these standards, procedures and techniques such as brainstorming, checklists, 
scenario-, impact-, and cause-analysis are proposed to identify threats and 
vulnerabilities. Furthermore, the determination of critical business processes 
(Khanmohammadi and Houmb, 2010) and information assets (Stevens, 2005) was 
proposed, in order to establish an asset and its value for an organisation (Stevens, 
2005). Security requirements (Gerber and von Solms, 2001) have also been 
introduced, describing the level of security needed, and identifying the most 
suitable security functions, the criticality and impact of the risks and vulnerabilities. 
However, the knowledge used by security experts at these assessments, such as 
checklists or security-related best practices, is uncertain; often, statistical data for 
threats, occurrence or impact are not available, incomplete or possibly wrong 
(Fenz and Ekelhart, 2011). In addition, vulnerabilities documented in knowledge 
bases are not specific to the company’s activities and security needs (Siponen and 
Willison, 2009), which can lead to ignorance of the vulnerabilities or, in some 
cases, determining too many. Although security requirements help to judge any 
vulnerability from a business perspective, they are not explicitly evaluated for 
discovering and resolving vulnerabilities. 
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Vulnerability identification errors can lead to unwanted losses, or can cause a 
company to invest in security functions that are not required. However, the 
successful and accurate identification of vulnerabilities can make the company 
more cost-efficient with regard to spending on security. It can prevent image 
and/or financial loss (Carg et al., 2003), and can help to demonstrate adherence to 
business security needs as well as any governmental regulations (Luthy and 
Forcht, 2006) and privacy laws, such as the Health Insurance Portability and 
Accountability Act (HIPAA) (HIPAA, 1996). 
 
In this thesis, a new method is proposed that applies existing concepts, such as 
information assets and security requirements, to business process models (BPMs). 
Business process models describe the activities of a process in an organisation to 
achieve an objective. From the BPMs, one can first identify information assets, 
actors and systems for a risk assessment. For each information asset, the 
criticality in the form of security objectives can be determined by business process 
objectives. Thereafter, security requirements refining the security objectives can 
be elicited and used to argue for the correct identification of vulnerabilities. The 
security functions relating to business process activities, where the information 
asset is processed, are compared against the security requirements, so as to 
identify vulnerabilities. The novelty is the explicit evaluation of security 
requirements as against security functions within business process models for 
vulnerability identification, in order to resolve identification errors (false positives, 
false negatives and true positives). However not all vulnerability identification 
errors might be eliminated by applying the approach. 
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1.2. Problem statement 
The protection of information, and identifying risks to information needs adequate 
processes in place. Information security risk assessment encompasses the 
activities used to identify and evaluate risks to information. In information security 
risk assessments, threats and vulnerabilities (representing a risk) are identified by 
security experts using information gathering techniques such as questionnaires, 
checklists, interviews, document reviews, scenario-, impact- and effect-analysis, 
brainstorming, etc. (ISO, 2009b). In addition, they employ scanning tools to identify 
threats and vulnerabilities. These techniques use security and vulnerability 
knowledge bases, where the knowledge base can be the security expert itself, or 
any available best security practices, security advisories or vulnerability lists 
issued by public or private organisations and companies. But these security 
knowledge bases are generic in scope, and are not tailored to the security needs 
of a particular organisation (Siponen and Willison, 2009). Vulnerabilities are 
identified by comparing the content in knowledge bases, or the possible 
scenario/threat as against the actual implementation of security functions. 
Companies’ security processes, systems or security functions are checked as to 
whether the vulnerability exists, and as to whether security functions, described in 
security knowledge bases, are being implemented. The vulnerability identification 
procedure performed is based on the principle “you know one if you see one”, 
which implies an implicit matching process.  
 
Conversely, the accurate identification of vulnerabilities with this procedure is a 
challenge, as it is virtually impossible to verify whether all vulnerabilities have been 
identified correctly in a given environment. This is because the knowledge used by 
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security experts is uncertain and unspecific with regard to the company’s security 
needs; moreover, implicit information is used and can hardly be reproduced. 
However, the required security described by security requirements could be used 
for a more accurate identification of vulnerabilities. Because security requirements 
specify what should be achieved and indicate necessary security functions, they 
can be the baseline for any judgment on a security issue for the organisation. 
Figure 1-1 below illustrates the problem of identifying vulnerabilities accurately (i.e. 
the security needs of an organisation).  
 
Figure 1-1 Vulnerability identification errors 
 
In an information security risk assessment a number of vulnerabilities are identified 
– they are represented by black dots within the black rectangle in Figure 1-1. 
There are some which are not identified at all (outside the rectangle), some to 
which the organisation is not vulnerable (blank area in and outside the rectangle) 
and some to which the organisation is vulnerable (orange and dark grey area) but 
which do not represent a vulnerability (dark grey area). Vulnerabilities within the 
dark grey area or the blank area of the rectangle are false positives. False 
positives are vulnerabilities identified which do not represent an actual vulnerability 
for the organisation (blank area of the rectangle), but where the organisation might 
be vulnerable (dark grey area of the rectangle). Those in the dark grey or blank 
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area outside the rectangle are true negatives not identified as vulnerabilities. The 
vulnerabilities within the orange area of the rectangle represent true positives. 
True positives are correctly identified vulnerabilities (as defined by security needs). 
Vulnerabilities outside the rectangle and within the orange area are false negatives. 
False negatives are not identified but are actual vulnerabilities to which the 
organisation is vulnerable. Recall is the ratio of accurately (defined by security 
needs) identified vulnerabilities and unidentified vulnerabilities out of all the 
accurate vulnerabilities (orange area) of an organisation. Precision is the ratio 
between true positives and false positives - the ratio of accurate identified 
vulnerabilities. As we elaborate in the literature review (chapter 3), in current 
procedures, asset-specific security requirements are not evaluated against 
security functions to identify (positive) vulnerabilities. 
1.3. Research objectives 
The objective of this research is to consider the required security - business 
security needs - in vulnerability identification, in order to enable security experts to 
identify (positive) vulnerabilities accurately, and to validate the method developed 
in this research. Accurate, in this context, means the identification of flaws or 
weaknesses that can result in a security breach or a violation of a security policy 
and which are thus a security risk for the organisation. The difference between the 
proposed method and existing approaches, which already use security 
requirements, is the explicit evaluation of security requirements within the 
business context - at business process models - to identify vulnerabilities 
accurately. Security requirements are used as the foundation for identifying 
vulnerabilities defining the required security (similar to security best practices), for 
comparing the security function implementation and identifying vulnerabilities. The 
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advantage of this proposal is that the security requirement specification defines 
the security of the organisation and and can be used as an overall measurement 
value for security; to identify true positives and help to resolve false positives and 
false negatives. 
 
The foundation of this research is information security models which describe the 
concepts used (e.g. assets, vulnerabilities, and security requirements) in 
information security risk management and assessment. Researchers that have 
defined an information security risk model, like Innerhofer–Oberperfler and Breu 
(2006), use the model to present the basic concepts of information security and 
how they use them in their enterprise architecture risk assessment approach. 
Stølen et al. (2002) use a model to represent the relationships between the risk 
assessment terminologies used in CORAS. Matulevicius et al. (2008) provide a 
reference model defining the concepts of information security risk management, 
which was consolidated from existing security standards and used to improve 
Secure TROPOS. According to their research, risk-related concepts describe how 
risk is defined by concepts such as threats, vulnerabilities and impact. Asset-
related concepts describe important assets and their security, whereas risk 
treatment-related concepts describe the decisions, requirements and security 
functions used to mitigate risks. Hereafter, these models are presented to show 
the relations between concepts such as vulnerabilities, risk and security 
requirements, in order to finally define our research objective. A relationship in 
these models connects elements used in the model and describes their nature to 
others. Text annotations and arrows or associations are used to represent these 
relationships. An element represents a concept (e.g. risk) or part of the concept 
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(e.g. vulnerabilities, threats and events). Mostly, elements are represented as text 
boxes or by modelling notations such as the unified modelling language (UML). 
 
The security concept meta-model of Innerhofer–Oberperfler and Breu (2006) in 
Figure 1-2 shows that a security requirement is derived from a business security 
objective and attached to a model element that is basically an asset. A threat 




Figure 1-2 Extended Security Concept Meta-Model from Innerhofer–Oberperfler 
and Breu (2006) 
 
The terminology model of Stølen et al. (2002) in Figure 1-2 shows that a threat 
may exploit a vulnerability of an asset, thereby causing a risk. Security 
requirements are formulated in the security policies that protect an asset and 
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Figure 1-3 Terminology model from Stølen et al. (2002) 
 
In the information system security risk management (ISSRM) reference model of 
Matulevicius et al. (2008) in Figure 1-3, a control implements a security 
requirement that thus mitigates a risk (defined as a threat that exploits a 
vulnerability that in turn leads to an impact). The impact of a threat harms an asset. 
The different colours of model elements in the model show the content of asset-
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Figure 1-4 The ISSRM reference model from Matulevicius et al. (2008) 
 
The objective of this research is to consider the security required in vulnerability 
identification, and therefore the focus is on the relationship between security 
requirements, assets, vulnerabilities and risks. All the above models show that 
security requirements are attached to assets, and mitigate or reduce a risk in 
respect of vulnerabilities. A risk or vulnerability is mitigated by a corresponding 
security function - e.g. administrative, physical, and technical controls - that 
implements the security requirement. If a security function is not implemented fully 
or correctly, the risk or vulnerability is not mitigated - the asset is at risk - and the 
security requirements are not adhered to. Thus, non-adherence to security 
requirements would indicate a vulnerability, and it is therefore hypothesised that 
the explicit evaluation of security requirements can be used for the resolution of 
vulnerability identification errors (false positives and false negatives), as only 
vulnerabilities with regard to business security needs would be identified. 
Resolving vulnerability identification errors would help to reduce security costs 
spent on inefficient security measures, as well as to demonstrate that business 
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security needs are adhered to (in other words, that the company is secure and 
compliant). 
1.4. Structure of this thesis 
This thesis is organised into various chapters; Figure 1-5 provides an overview.  
 
Figure 1-5 Structure of the thesis 
 
In chapter one, an introduction to the problem is given and the research objective 
outlined. 
 
In chapter two, background information is provided about risk management. The 
main standards for (information security) risk management are presented. 
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Furthermore, the terminology and main activities of information security risk 
assessments are explained. 
 
Chapter three contains the literature review. An overview of information security 
risk assessment standards and methods is provided. The literature is evaluated, to 
demonstrate how security requirements and business process models are utilised 
in current approaches to determine information security risks in the information 
security, security requirements engineering and business process model domains. 
The focus of the literature review is on whether security requirements are utilised, 
and if so, how they are used to determine vulnerabilities in information security risk 
assessments. In addition, a survey was performed of German security 
professionals at a security conference, to identify the limitations of current security 
risk assessments in practice. Finally, based on the literature review, the research 
questions were developed. 
 
Chapter four is about concepts in information security risk assessment and 
management. An extended information security model was compiled from the 
existing models presented in the introductory chapter; it shows how concepts in 
security risk assessments and risk management are related. In addition, a 
definition of risk based on security requirements is provided and how security 
requirements, business process models and information assets can be used for 
resolving vulnerability identification errors is also explained. Furthermore, the 
elicitation of security requirements is discussed and a structure for security 
requirements’ characterisation presented based on business process model 
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In chapter five, the proposed security requirements risk assessment approach 
called ‘SRA’ using security requirements and business process models for 
vulnerability identification is described in detail. By employing an example, each 
step of the proposed approach is explained. 
 
Chapter six is about the validation work. The SRA was validated by method 
comparison, testing and a quasi-experiment. Three validation criteria were defined 
for the validation of the approach, namely method procedure (how systematic 
security requirements are currently evaluated in assessments); result accuracy 
(how accurate the risk results of our proposed approach are); and method 
capability (whether security requirement and business process model information 
can decrease vulnerability identification errors). 
 
Chapter seven concludes with an overview of the research contribution, potential 
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Chapter 2 - Risk Management 
This chapter presents background information about (information security) risk 
management and the risk assessment process as well as defines terminology. A 
definition of terms used in this thesis can be found in the glossary.   
2.1. Areas of risk management 
Risks - the possibility of adverse or unwelcome circumstances - are and have 
always been a part of our daily life. Therefore, risk analysis and risk assessment is 
not a new area of research and has a long tradition. The origin of risk 
management - to identify, analyse, evaluate and treat risk - in the early modern 
and industrial age goes back to the 16th century. The formation of the first fire 
insurance business after the Great Fire of London in 1666 and the foundation of 
marine insurance by Edward Lloyd (today Lloyds of London) in the 1680s formed 
the origin of insurance business. These initial insurance policies covered fire risks 
and transportation risks. Other forms of insurance, like the first social and health 
insurance, were founded in the mid-17th century, only covering disability and 
distressed widows. The main commonalities of insurance policies are that they 
cover risks in class of homogeneous exposure units and concentrate on the 
occurrence of an event causing a measureable financial loss. The price for the 
insurance cover is based on statistical data, market price, or gut feeling if no data 
is available. The insurance business has survived over centuries and nowadays a 
huge range of insurance policies are offered. An important point to note is that 
insurance companies always evaluate for a special portfolio of risks - stated in the 
insurance policy - where they have enough statistical data; they exclude certain 
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risks or events where they do not have enough statistical data or have suffered 
outstanding losses, e.g. for terrorism. This enables them to provide an insurance 
policy and to determine a suitable price for the insurance cover.   
 
In the engineering field, risk analysis methods like the failure mode and effects 
analysis (FMEA/FMECA) (NASA, 1966) were developed by the US Military in the 
1950s to classify failures that could affect the success of mission, personnel or the 
equipment. Also, fault tree analysis (FTA) (Ericson, 1999) was an outcome of a 
military project for a missile launch control system to evaluate the safety of the 
system. FTA is a logical diagram of system failures and their impact on the 
components of the system. The probabilistic risk assessment (PRA) (Stamatelatos, 
2000) was developed by the nuclear industry in the 1960s to determine risks of 
complex engineered entities, especially to assess for reactor safety. In the 1970s, 
the PRA was then adopted by the chemical industry to determine chemical 
process incidents; it was named as the chemical process quantitative risk 
assessment (CPQRA) (Arendt, 1990). In the engineering field, the term safety is 
used to mean the protection against hazards. Hazards are risks or events that 
threaten human lives, the environment, production or materials. Most commonly, 
safety is related to risks that affect human life or environmental health (Lautieri et 
al., 2005). Risk is defined by the severity of adverse events and the probability of 
the occurrence of each event. 
 
In the financial sector, there are two main streams for risk management: firstly, to 
limit losses of financial institutions, and secondly to protect stakeholders from 
material misstatements in financial reports. Methods like Value-at-risk (VAR) 
(Jorion, 2006) or extreme value theory (EVT) (Diebold et al., 1998) have been 
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applied to financial portfolios to limit losses of financial investments; these all use 
statistical theories and data to determine their maximum loss in the case of an 
event. Over the last two decades, risk management standards and regulations 
have been published for stakeholder protection as a result of bankruptcy or of 
fraud in business companies. Standards, such as  the Committee of Sponsoring 
Organisations of the Treadway Commission (COSO, 1994) I and COSO II (COSO, 
2004) defining enterprise risk management activities; the Australian/New Zealand 
Risk Management Standard 4360 (ASNZ, 1999) about risk management, and laws 
like Sarbanes-Oxley (Sarbanes-Oxley Act, 2002) for controls in financial reporting, 
Basel II (Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, 2004) for capital requirements 
for banks or Solvency II (European Commission, 2007) for capital requirements for 
insurance companies were all published. The aim of these regulations and 
standards is to oblige companies to identify, to manage and to inform about risks. 
Nowadays, regulations like Basel II, Solvency II or the Sarbanes-Oxley act are the 
main drivers for companies to determine and manage risks categorised as market, 
reputation, strategic or operational risks within these regulations.  
 
In the computing domain, the first security standards were developed in the 1980s 
to protect information and data. The first of its kind was the Trusted Computer 
System Evaluation Criteria (TCSEC) (US DoD, 1988) for the evaluation of the 
effectiveness of computer security controls - referred to as Orange Book. It was 
developed for the US Department of Defense (DoD) in 1983. Further standards on 
computer security followed at the beginning of the 1990s. For example, the 
German security criteria (ITS) - now the baseline protection manual (BSI, 2008) - 
for evaluation and certifying computers and software in 1989, or the European 
Information Technology Security Evaluation Criteria (ITSEC) (European 
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Communities, 1991) for certifying the functionality and confidentiality of software 
and computer systems regarding data- and system-security in 1991. The British 
Standard 7799 (UK DTI, 1995) was the origin of current information security 
standards, published in 1995, and evolved from the BS 7799 to ISO 17799 (ISO, 
2005b), to ISO 27001 (ISO, 2005d) and then to ISO 27002 (ISO, 2005e) in more 
recent times. In computing, the focus of risks is on security, i.e., threats and the 
protection of information. A threat can be unintended, or deliberate - i.e., someone 
has an intention to get some benefit out of the action (Albrechtsen, 2003). These 
actions are often planned and conducted by malicious users. Therefore, security is 
related to the protection of information against these threats, where information 
may be changed, accessed without authorisation, destroyed, made unavailable or 
disclosed. The protection of information concerns the confidentiality, integrity and 
availability of information and identification of threats and vulnerabilities 
compromising these security objectives. Security investments are closely related 
to the protection of information, but are not the focus of this thesis. Security 
investments - applying cost-effective security functions - should reduce the risks 
threatening assets balanced by costs for security and incidents (ENISA, 2012). 
Return on Security Risk Investment and Annual Loss Exposure (Sonnenreich et al., 
2006), decision support models (Beresnevichiene et al., 2010) and trade-off 
analysis (Loannidis et al., 2012) were also suggested to determine the ‘optimal’ 
amount of investments in security.  
 
To conclude, the analysis and assessment of risks is conducted in various areas 
and focuses on different aspects within these fields. The common baseline of risk 
management approaches is the objective to determine risks and to mitigate them 
to an acceptable level for the organisation. This thesis concentrates on risk 
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assessments in the computing area, determining information security risks for 
businesses. 
2.2. Standards 
In risk management, the first published and acknowledged standard is the AS/NZS 
4360 (ASNZ, 2004) which provides the input in terms of concepts or terminology 
for any other standards. AS/NZS 4360 is a risk management standard published 
by the Standards Australia/Standards New Zealand Committee (AS/NZS). It was 
first published in 1999 and was revised in 2004. In 2009 the AS/NZS 4360 was 
superseded by the AS/NZS ISO 31000 (ASNZ, 2009). The AS/NZS risk 
management standard provides a generic framework for managing risk, as well as 
definitions of terms. Within the standard, risk management activities are described 
that can be applied generally, to any organisation or domain. The objective of the 
standard is to identify opportunities and risks, to provide a basis for decision-
making, to support pro-active management, and to improve compliance and 
corporate governance. The main elements of the risk management process are 
shown in Figure 2-1 and involve establishing the context, identifying risks, 
analysing and treating risk, monitoring and reviewing, as well as communicating 
and consulting. These process activities have not changed from AS/NZS 4360 to 
AS/NZS ISO 31000; therefore, in the following reference is made solely to AS/NZS 
4360. 
(a) Establish the context: “Establish the external, internal and risk management 
context in which the rest of the process will take place. Criteria against which risk 
will be evaluated should be established and the structure of the analysis defined.” 
(ASNZ, 2004, p. 7).  
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(b) Identify risks: “Identify where, when, why and how events could prevent, 
degrade, delay or enhance the achievement of the objectives.“ (ASNZ, 2004, p. 7).  
(c) Analyse risks: “Identify and evaluate existing controls. Determine 
consequences and likelihood and hence the level of risk. This analysis should 
consider the range of potential consequences and how these could occur.” (ASNZ, 
2004, p. 7).  
(d) Evaluate risks: “Compare estimated levels of risk against the pre-established 
criteria and consider the balance between potential benefits and adverse 
outcomes. This enables decisions to be made about the extent and nature of 
treatments required and about priorities.” (ASNZ, 2004, p. 8). 
(e) Treat risks: “Develop and implement specific cost-effective strategies and 
action plans for increasing potential benefits and reducing potential costs.” (ASNZ, 
2004, p. 8). 
(f) Monitor and review: “It is necessary to monitor the effectiveness of all steps of 
the risk management process. This is important for continuous improvement. 
Risks and the effectiveness of treatment measures need to be monitored to 
ensure changing circumstances do not alter priorities.” (ASNZ, 2004, p. 8). 
(g) Communicate and consult: “Communicate and consult with internal and 
external stakeholders as appropriate at each stage of the risk management 
process and concerning the process as a whole.” (ASNZ, 2004, p. 7). 
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Figure 2-1 Risk management process from ASNZ (2004) 
 
 
ISO/IEC 31000:2009 and ISO/IEC 31010:2009  
The ISO/IEC 31000:2009 - Risk management - (ISO, 2009a) issued by the 
International Organisation of Standardisation (ISO) in 2009 provides principles and 
generic guidelines for risk management. The main difference to AS/NZS 4360 is 
that the risk management process is further extended by a risk management 
framework and risk management principles (see Figure 2-2). Furthermore, risk 
was re-defined as “the effect of uncertainty on objectives” (ISO, 2009a, p. V). The 
standard describes the principles for managing risks, and provides a management 
framework for risk as well as the risk management process. It claims to be usable 
by public, private or community enterprises, associations, groups or individuals for 
their risk management activities. The relationship between the principles for 
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managing risk, the framework in which it occurs and the risk management process 
as indicated in ISO/IEC 31000:2009 is shown in Figure 2-2. The principles, shown 
on the left of the Figure, describe high-level principles that should be adhered to 
by all functions in an organisation achieving effective risk management. The 
framework (in the middle of the figure) defines process steps assisting in 
managing risks effectively; these should be integrated in the overall management 
system. At the framework, recurring process activities are defined for identifying 
and reporting risks, as well as the decision-making process on risks. The risk 
management process (to the right of the figure) defines the activities for identifying, 
analysing and reporting of risks. The risk management process is similar to that 
defined in AS/NZS 4360. The ISO/IEC 31000 was adopted by the Standards 
Australia/Standards New Zealand Committee and published as AS/NZS ISO 
31000. 
The ISO/IEC 31010:2009 - Risk assessment techniques - (ISO, 2009b) provides 
guidance on the selection and application of systematic techniques for risk 
assessment. This standard provides no specific criteria for risk identification but 
describes activities for identifying risks along the risk management process 
defined in ISO/IEC 31000. It also provides a comparison of risk assessment 
techniques and their strengths/limitations. The standard contains a list of methods, 
a description of the method and indicates the area of applicability. Both standards, 
the ISO/IEC 31000 and 31010, provide the foundation of principles and techniques 
for risk management and assessment. 
  
 
 Page 40 of 394  
 
Figure 2-2 Risk management framework, principles and process from ISO/IEC 31000 
(ISO, 2009a)   
 
ISO Guide 73:2002  
The ISO Guide 73:2002 (ISO, 2002) issued by the International Organisation of 
Standardisation (ISO) provides basic and generic definitions of terms associated 
with risk management. The aim of this guide is to promote a coherent approach to 
the description of risk management activities and the use of risk management 
terminology. It primarily assists in the communication process, in that it defines a 
basic terminology for risk management. Although the ISO Guide 73 is about risk 
management, it is frequently referenced to in information security literature. The 
ISO Guide 73:2002 is superseded by the ISO/IEC 27000:2009 (ISO, 2012). 
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2.3. Information security 
Organisations use information that is created and processed by persons and 
systems in processes in order to achieve their business objectives. For an 
organisation, it is critical to protect and to secure this information, which presents a 
value. In the past, security was mainly associated with data and systems and not 
with information. However, the understanding of security changed from a systems 
view to an information view in computer science, over time.  
“Data security became computer security, and computer security became IT 
security and IT security became information security because of the better 
understanding of the business impact and associated risk of not properly 
protecting a company’s electronic resources” (von Solms and von Solms, 
2005, p. 272).  
The expression ’data security’ evolved over time to ‘information security’ because 
of the closer alignment of computer systems with business operations and 
financial accounting processes requiring the protection of business information. In 
the ISO 17799:2005 (ISO, 2005c), information security is defined as the 
“preservation of confidentiality, integrity and availability of information … other 
properties such as authenticity, accountability, non-repudiation, and reliability can 
be involved” (ISO, 2005c, p. 1). Because of the closer alignment of business 
processes and computer systems, any loss of confidentiality, integrity and 
availability of information can now cause more severe adverse effects to an 
organisation and their business objectives. Therefore, information has to always 
be adequately protected. The protection of information, identifying security needs 
as well as risks to information, needs adequate processes in place. Information 
security risk management is about the processes taken to identify, evaluate and 
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mitigate risks, with the objective to protect and to manage the security of 
information within the organisation. The different process activities in information 
risk management are: establish the context, risk assessment, risk treatment, risk 
communication and risk monitoring (ISO, 2011c). In this thesis, the focus is on risk 
assessment - identifying and evaluating risks with regard to the specific 
information of an organisation. Before the risk assessment process activities for 
information security are explained, definitions for confidentiality, integrity, 
availability and risk are provided.  
 
Confidentiality 
Confidentiality ensures that information is not made available to unauthorised 
entities (ISO, 2005c) and is concealed (Bishop, 2002). It is the prevention of 
unauthorised disclosure (European Communities, 1991).  
“Confidentiality ensures that computer related assets are accessed only by 
authorised parties. That is, only those who should have access to 
something will actually get that access. By ‘access’, it is meant not only 
reading but also viewing, printing, or simply knowing that a particular asset 
exists. Confidentiality is sometimes called secrecy or privacy” (Pfleeger and 
Pfleeger, 2002, p. 10). 
 
Availability 
Availability ensures that resources are accessible and usable on demand by 
authorised entities (ISO, 2004b).  
“Availability means that assets are accessible to authorised parties at 
appropriate time. In other word, if some person or system has legitimate 
access to a particular set of objectives, that access should not be prevented. 
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For his reason, availability is sometimes known by its opposite, denial of 
service” (Pfleeger and Pfleeger, 2002, p. 10).  
It is the safeguarding that information or resources are not obtained by 
unauthorised entities (European Communities, 1991).  
 
Integrity 
Integrity is the protection of the accuracy and completeness of assets (ISO, 
2004b).  
“Integrity means that assets can be modified only by authorised parties or 
only in authorised ways. In this context, modification includes writing, 
changing, changing status, deleting and creating” (Pfleeger and Pfleeger, 
2002, p. 10).  
It is about protecting information of unauthorised or improper modifications 
(European Communities, 1991; Bishop, 2002).  
 
Risk definition 
Any threats that affect the confidentiality, integrity and availability of information 
are a risk for an organisation. Generally in risk management, risk is defined as “the 
chance of something happening that will have an impact upon objectives. It is 
measured in terms of consequences and likelihood” (ASNZ, 1999, p. 3). This 
definition has changed, in AS/NZS ISO 31000, to “the effect of uncertainty on 
objectives” (ASNZ, 2009, p. 1). In information security, risk is defined as “the 
potential that a given threat will exploit vulnerabilities of an asset or group of 
assets to cause loss or damage to the asset (i.e. an impact)” (Ciechanowicz, 1997, 
p. 225).  
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This definition has changed a little in relation to assets. In the National Institute of 
Standards and Technology’s (NIST) special publication (SP) about risk 
management, risk is defined as “a function of the likelihood of a given threat-
source’s exercising a particular potential vulnerability, and the resulting impact of 
that adverse event on the organisation” (Stoneburner et al., 2002b, p. 8). In ISO 
27000 (ISO, 2012, p. 4) information security risk is defined as the “combination of 
the probability of an event and its consequence”. Information security risks are 
defined by threats, vulnerabilities and their impact to an asset. A risk is therefore 
characterised by a threat that uses a vulnerability of an asset which has an impact 
to the organisation. The severity of a risk is dependent on the impact. In this thesis, 
the term risk is understood as defined in ISO 31000: “the effect of uncertainty on 
objectives” (ISO, 2009a, p. 1).  
 
Risk assessement process activities 
The risk assessment process activities as defined in standards like AS/NZ 4360 
(ASNZ, 2004) or ISO 31000 (ISO, 2009a) are also applicable for information 
security, as the objective is to identify and assess risks. The single activities in a 
risk assessment are risk identification, risk analysis and risk evaluation (ISO, 
2004b) analogous to the risk management processes of AS/NZS 4360. In the 
following, these activities are described with specific regard to information security. 
 
Establish the context 
Establish the context is a prepatory step for a risk assessment. Assets such as 
physical assets (hardware), software, data, people and intangibles (e.g. goodwill) 
are the basis of every risk assessment. An asset can comprise of anything that 
has value to an organisation (ISO, 2004b). In information security, assets can be 
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hardware, software and information to be protected against threats. These assets 
have to be identified in the ‘establish the context’ phase of a risk assessment, as 
do their value and their sensitivity for the organisation. Therefore, the business 
objective - the organisation’s mission - has to be considered to value assets and to 
evaluate risks. Some approaches have introduced security requirements and/or 
risk measurement criteria that are identified in the ‘establish the context’ phase, 
and then used in later phases of the risk assessment. These security requirements 
and/or risk measurement criteria can be seen as constraints affecting the 
organisation and determining its information security orientation. They can also be 
used as criteria for determining the impact of vulnerabilities or risks.  
 
Risk identification 
In the risk identification phase, risks are identified by questions like “what can 
happen?”, “what could go wrong?” or “how it can happen?”. Therefore, events, 
threats and vulnerabilities that can have a negative impact or lead to security 
breaches are identified for an asset. A threat can be defined as “a potential cause 
of an incident that may result in harm to a system or organisation” (ISO, 2004b, p. 
3). In other ISO standards, a threat is described as either “of natural or human 
origin, … accidental or deliberate.” It “may arise from within or the outside of the 
organisation” (ISO, 2011c, p. 14). Breu and Innerhofer-Oberperfler (2005, p. 4) 
define a threat as “any event that can result in the violation of a security 
requirement.” A vulnerability can be defined as “a flaw or a weakness that can be 
exercised and results in a security breach” (Stoneburner et al., 2002b, p. 15), or as 
“a weakness of an asset or group of assets that can be exploited by one or more 
threats” (ISO, 2004b, p. 3). In this thesis a threat is defined as defined in ISO 
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(2012) as a potential cause of an unwanted incident (exercising a vulnerability), 
which may result in harm to a system or organization. 
The identification of threats and vulnerabilities is conducted by the security expert 
using information gathering techniques, for example, questionnaires, on-site 
interviews, document reviews, scenario analysis or scanning tools. The 
identification of vulnerabilities is based on the matching of knowledge bases to the 
security control implementation. These knowledge bases are the security expert, 
security best practices or vulnerability lists. Such lists include vulnerability 
databases like CVE (known vulnerabilities of systems), scoring systems like CVSS 
(rating an identified vulnerability), attack patterns like CAPEC (descriptions of 
common methods for exploiting software) and secure system configuration lists 
like CCE (unique identifiers to security-related system configuration issues).  
 
Risk analysis 
After vulnerabilities have been identified, the impact and probability of being 
utilised by a threat for each is estimated. Vulnerabilities which are classified as low 
may be removed from this analysis. To determine the impact as well as the 
probability of being utilised by a threat not an easy task. Possible sources of 
information for estimates can be publications, internal data, market investigations 
and expert estimations. Qualitative and quantitative methods can be used to 
evaluate impact and probabilities of vulnerabilities and threats. 
 
Risk evaluation  
The estimated level of risk for threats and vulnerabilities that was determined in 
the process activity before, should now be compared against measurement criteria. 
The output of this process activity is the risks that should be reduced and treated. 
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In the main, qualitative measurement criteria such as high, middle and low are 
employed, which were already used in the risk analysis. After all risks have been 
evaluated, decisions have to be made as to which risks are treated by developing 
security functions or risk mitigation strategies. A security function is a 
countermeasure or a control that avoids, reduces, transfers or retains risks to a 
defined level. Countermeasures or controls can be selected from available 
information security standards or can be designed to meet specific requirements. 
A countermeasure or control can be a policy, a procedure, a guideline, practices or 
organisational structures; it can be of administrative, technical or legislative nature 
(ISO, 2005c). A security policy is a description, or a set of policies, that defines 
how organisations’ assets are protected with regard to information security. 
Security policies are further refined by security procedures, guidelines or practices.  
2.3.1. Risk assessment  
The academic community, as well as businesses and governmental organisations, 
have developed numerous approaches for information security (IS) risk 
assessment. Existing IS risk assessment approaches were developed in general 
and for specific domains. That is to say, there are approaches for special domains 
or single aspects like project management (Luqi and Nogueira, 2000), operation 
systems/networks (Manadhata and Wing, 2005), health-care (Warren, 2001), e-
commerce, business process reengineering (Herrmann and Herrmann, 2006), 
different phases of the risk management process (Bandyopadhyay et al., 1999), 
lifecycles (Bernard, 2007), considering specifics of the domain or a specific 
problem. But business and governmental organisations have also developed a 
broad range of IS security risk assessment approaches. These approaches differ 
in the abstraction level and in the proposal of security functions. Some of these 
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approaches formulate high-level security policies or general security requirements, 
whereas others specify detailed technical solutions or parameters for IT systems. 
In these approaches, a catalogue of basic protection measures (BSI, 2008) is 
provided, or best practices for security control objectives and processes (ISSA, 
2004); the information security risk management process (ISO, 2011c) is 
explained, or guidance on risk management activities for IT systems (Stoneburner 
et al., 2002b) provided. Sometimes, even the settings for IT infrastructure 
components are stipulated (Stoneburner et al., 2002a). A discussion and review 
on these approaches can be found in Ralston et al. (2006) who reviews 
approaches for critical infrastructure systems, Mayer (2009) who reviews 
information security risk management standards and methods, and Hogganvik 
(2009) on security risk analysis methods and techniques. A comprehensive list of 
public available risk assessment methods can be found in the publication of the 
ENISA ad-hoc working group on risk management and assessment (ENISA, 2006), 
at ENISA’s website (ENISA, 2013) and that of the Information Security Working 
Group of the US House of Representatives (Putnam et al., 2004). 
 
However, this diversity of the developed approaches causes the problem of how to 
classify these approaches according to both their extent, as well as their objectives. 
This classification problem is discussed and clarified in section 2.3.3. ‘Risk 
assessment method classification’. A commonality of all approaches in the 
academic, business and governmental field is that they rely on quantitative or 
qualitative methods, or on both (Rainer et al., 1991). In the following, the key 
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Quantitative risk assessment methods use numeric probability, where the 
probability expresses the knowledge that the event occurs. With quantitative 
approaches, risk is determined by the probability of an event and the likelihood of 
a loss. Examples of the use of quantitative methods are: normal probability, 
Bayesian probability, fuzzy theories and Dempster Shafer theory, Monte Carlo 
simulation, annual loss expectancy (ALE), and stochastic dominance. The 
advantages of such methods are that assets are identified most likely for damages 
(Rainer et al., 1991), measures can be used for the impact magnitude and they 
can thus be directly compared (Feather and Cornford, 2006). The disadvantages 
are that there are no exact probability values of loss at the time when they are 
estimated, and half of the estimates are statistically either too high or too low 
(Rainer et al., 1991). Furthermore, the probability function that usually follows a 
normal distribution may be deformed, because values recorded may represent the 
average of a few extremes and many low values (Rainer et al., 1991). Additionally, 
a scale has to be provided for what the value of “x” percent means (Stoneburner et 
al., 2002b) and these values have to be given a literal meaning. 
 
Qualitative risk assessment methods use non-numeric values or number 
ranges to express risk as a descriptive value (Rainer et al., 1991). Examples for 
qualitative methods are: scenario analysis, fuzzy metrics, questionnaires, 
preliminary risk analysis (PHA), hazard and operability study (HAZOPS), and 
failure mode and effects analysis (FMEA/FMECA) (see Rausand, 2004). The 
advantages of qualitative methods are that they are time- and cost-efficient, 
because no exact value has to be determined and they are valuable in estimating 
risk approximately (Rainer et al., 1991); areas of improvement can also be easily 
identified (Stoneburner et al., 2002b). However, their key disadvantage is that they 
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are not precise - the value is expressed within a spectrum that has to be 
understood by all involved parties (Rainer et al., 1991). Additionally, methods 
provide no measurement for the impact and therefore, it is difficult to conduct a 
cost-benefit analysis (Stoneburner et al., 2002b). Although quantitative and 
qualitative methods can be combined and used in conjunction (Zhang et al., 2010), 
the combination of results and their interpretation become more difficult because 
of different rating scales, underlying assessment principles, or the variances in risk 
weighting. 
2.3.2. Risk assessment vs. analysis 
In many publications regarding IT security risk assessment, the terms risk analysis 
and risk assessment are often used simultaneously, to express the identification of 
events and the evaluation of impact and probability. For example, Aagedal et al. 
(2002) refer to risk assessment as “incorporating risk analysis and risk 
management, i.e., it combines systematic processes for risk identification and 
determination of their consequences, and how to deal with these risks”. In the 
paper of the ENISA ad-hoc working group on risk management and assessment 
(ENISA, 2006), the authors distinguish only between risk assessment and risk 
management methods. For example, the CCTA Risk Analysis and Management 
Method (CRAMM) (CCTA, 1987) was classified as a risk assessment method 
whereas Warren (2001) refers to it as a risk analysis method. According to Gerber 
and von Solms (2001), the main objective of risk analysis is “to identify and assess 
all risks and then to suggest a set of controls that will reduce these risks to an 
acceptable level”. Stelzer (2002) defines risk analysis as the identification and 
evaluation of endangering events, as well as their causes and consequences. 
Rainer et al. (1991) refer to risk analysis as “the process managers use to 
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examine the threats facing their IT assets and the vulnerabilities of those assets to 
the risks”. Risk analysis, meanwhile, “consists of identifying IT assets, identifying 
threats to those assets, and determining the vulnerability of asset(s) to threat(s)” 
(Rainer et al., 1991, p. 133). 
 
In all the papers of the paragraph above, the authors do not distinguish between 
risk analysis and risk assessment. They either use risk analysis or risk 
assessment for identification and evaluation of threats and impacts. Sometimes 
they include activities of risk management - e.g. the mitigation and control of risk - 
in their definitions. However, there are differences in the activities associated with 
the terms risk analysis, risk assessment and risk management. In 1987, Guarro 
had already distinguished between risk assessment and risk analysis; he defined 
them as follows:  
“This term [risk assessment] is today mostly used to indicate the analytical 
activities by which the nature of the threats potentially affecting a system, 
and the severity of the consequences that may result from them, are 
investigated and evaluated. The closely related term risk analysis is 
employed in a more technical context, usually to indicate the more detailed 
procedures employed by specialists to dissect risk into its more specific 
constituents, e.g. the relations among threats, assets, damage or loss 
consequences and countermeasures.” (Guarro, 1987, p. 494).  
Rausand (2004) distinguishes between risk analysis, risks assessment and risk 
management in the following way. Risk analysis includes scope definition, hazard 
identification and risk estimation; on the other hand, risk assessment incorporates 
risk tolerability decisions and analysis of options. Risk management is about risk 
reduction/control and involves decision-making, implementation and monitoring.  
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In the ISO/IEC Guide 73:2002 (ISO, 2002), they distinguish between risk analysis, 
risk assessment and risk management. Risk analysis is defined as the systematic 
use of information to identify sources and to estimate the risk; risk assessment as 
overall process of risk analysis and risk evaluation; and risk management as 
coordinated activities to direct and control an organisation with regard to risk. In 
the ISO 31000 (ISO, 2009a), risk assessment is the overall process of risk 
identification, risk analysis and risk evaluation. Risk analysis is the process to 
comprehend the nature and level of risk. 
 
In this thesis, the term risk assessment is used as defind in the ISO 31000 (ISO, 
2009a), to identify, analyse and evaluate risks.  
2.3.3. Risk assessment method classification 
In general “published work related to risk assessment is very difficult to categorise” 
(Ralston et al., 2006, p.6), and “there are more than 200 risk management 
methods making it a challenge to select the most adequate one” (Matulevicius et 
al., 2008, p.1). These difficulties to categorise and select an appropriate risk 
assessment approach arise because the risk management process consists of 
different activities: risk identification, risk analysis, risk assessment (evaluation and 
ranking) and risk management (treatment and mitigation) and approaches cover 
different activities. Furthermore, they concentrate on different aspects, problems or 
business areas - for example, one issue in classifying approaches is to determine 
how much of the risk assessment activity is covered by the developed approaches. 
Another is the great variety and profundity of the approaches. Campbell and 
Stamp (2004) developed a classification scheme - a matrix - for risk assessment 
methods, which revolves around their complexity and usability. The matrix consists 
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of two dimensions (level and approach) divided further into subcategories. With 
their matrix, the scope (abstract, mid-level, concrete) and the approach 
(comparative (e.g. best practice), functional (e.g. assistant) and temporal (e.g. 
exercise)) can be assessed, but it lacks a classification regarding the elements of 
the risk assessment approach. Siponen (2005) analysed the current IS security 
approaches and research regarding underlying assumptions and features of IS 
methods; previously, Dhillon and Backhouse had done the same (1996) in regard 
to key characteristics of research efforts in information systems security. Siponen 
(2005) classified the approaches in checklists, standards, maturity criteria, risk 
management and formal methods. These five basic classes miss out on any 
further distinguishing characteristics and are therefore not expedient for a 
classification. Dhillon and Backhouse used the categories: checklists, risk analysis 
and evaluation. Even if their aim was to promote research in the security domain 
for interpretive and empirical studies, a clear distinction between the approaches 
(apart from a basic categorisation into checklists and approaches) is not provided 
by either. Sunyaev et al. (2009) also provides a classification scheme with five 
categories: checklists, assessment approaches, risk analysis approaches, IT 
security management approaches, and legislation accommodations. This method 
provides distinguishing attributes for the classification of approaches in one of 
these categories, but the subcategories used are not further annotated. 
Furthermore, there are overlaps between the categories (like assessment and risk 
analysis approaches) in their description, which are unexplained. These overlaps 
make it difficult to classify an approach according to the given, basic classification. 
In a paper of the ENISA ad hoc working group on risk assessment/risk 
management (ENISA, 2008) as well as in Pöttinger (2009), risk exposure, risk 
impact and impact segment are used to determine the most appropriate risk 
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assessment methodology. Spider diagrams are used to compare the methods with 
organisational requirements.  
 
To summarise, currently there is no general accepted and proven classification 
scheme for existing risk assessment approaches. Further, developed or criticised 
approaches are typically not classified or categorised, which makes it hard for 
researchers to apply the approach in the correct setting or to select the most 
appropriate one. For the literature review in this thesis, information security risk 
assessment standards and security risk assessment methods are the only 
distinguishing factors made - as by other researchers (Mayer, 2009). Standards 
represent high level references for risk management and assessment, and 
describe the risk management process from a procedural perspective. These 
standards contain the definitions for risk assessment and are the basis for any 
developed methods by researchers or organisations. Security risk assessment 
methods define and describe risk assessment activities in detail, how to assess 
risks in a particular area or situation by proposing a procedure of activities to be 
performed. Only these two categories are used in the literature review in chapter 3 
to distinguish between the approaches found in the literature. 
2.3.4. Security requirements at risk assessments 
The assessment and protection of information of an organisation is not only about 
considering concerns of confidentiality, integrity and availability by identifying 
threats and vulnerabilities. It is also about the security required - business security 
needs - to address these concerns (Gerber et al., 2001). The required amount of 
security can be defined by security requirements. However, to use security 
requirements for risk assessments (especially for identifying vulnerabilities and 
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risks based on the required security), a definition is needed of security 
requirements.  
 
In information security risk assessments, security requirements are defined as the 
level of protection needed in regard to the security concerns of confidentiality, 
integrity, availability, auditability and authenticity (Bishop, 2003), or types and 
levels of protection to meet the security policy (Brinkley and Schell, 1995). The 
security requirements definition of Gerber and von Solms (2001) - to consider also 
the required security from a business perspective, regulatory or statutory 
requirements and applicable laws as well as risk to infrastructure - was not 
adopted in other security definitions. In another paper of Gerber et al. (2001), a 
security requirement is defined as the combination of security concerns 
(confidentiality, availability, integrity, accountability and authentication) and 
intensity level.  
Innerhofer-Oberperfler and Breu (2005) define a security requirement as “a 
detailed description of security properties of a specific model element. Depending 
on the model element type, it can be a detailed technical specification of a high 
level description of security properties at the business level. A Security 
Requirement must be derived from a Security Objective.” A security objective is 
defined as “a high level, abstract definition of the goal of security management” 
(Breu and Innerhofer-Oberperfler, 2005, p. 4). In another paper of Breu et al. 
(2008), regarding risk analysis of health care networks, they redefine the 
definitions of security objective and security requirements. “A Security Objective 
describes the overall security goals of the system, in particular, general legal 
requirements, specific availability and integrity requirements of various institutions 
and privacy requirements of patients” and “a Security Requirement is a detailed 
  
 
 Page 56 of 394  
context-dependent explication of a Security Objective. It breaks a Security 
Objective down into several more detailed descriptions. The context of a Security 
Requirement is derived from the model element for which it is defined. Security 
Requirements are linked to Security Objectives to depict paths of inheritance. 
Security requirements may be described informally by text…” (Breu et al., 2008, p. 
4). 
Herrmann and Herrmann (2006) also distinguish between security objectives and 
security requirements but in their work, security objects are security requirements 
concerning the element of a business process. They use a predefined list of 
security requirements, such as confidentiality, integrity, availability, anonymity, 
pseudonymity, privacy and authenticity, that are assigned to business process 
elements. 
Siponen and Oinas-Kukkonen (2007) defines four security requirements - namely, 
integrity, confidentiality, availability and non-repudiation - that are relevant for 
information security.  
The ISO 17799 (ISO, 2005c) states that the sources relating to the determination 
of security requirements for assessing risks are business objectives, legal and 
regulatory requirements, and principles and objectives of an organisation to 
support operations. However, an exact definition of security requirements is not 
given. In another paper of Gerber and von Solms (2008), where they examine the 
legal sources to derive security requirements, they refer to the security 
requirements definition of ISO 17799. 
 
In the software engineering field, security requirements describe the necessary 
security for systems to protect against threats. Firesmith defines a security 
requirement as “typically a detailed requirement that implements an overridden 
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security policy” (Firesmith, 2003, p. 54). Moffett et al. (2004) define security 
requirements as “constraints on functional requirements that are needed to 
achieve security goals”. In contrast, Matulevicius et al. (2008) define it as “the 
refinement of a treatment decision to mitigate the risk”. In a publication of Haley et 
al. (2008), security requirements are also defined as a function of constraints. 
Based on a survey of different security requirements definitions in the software 
engineering domain, Tondel et al. (2008) argue that there is no current agreement 
on what a security requirement is, as well as whether security measures should 
describe a security requirement. But, they recommend the description of 
requirements in respect of what should be achieved - not how it should be done. 
 
This (as well as the survey of Tondel et al. (2008)) shows that a generally 
accepted definition of security requirements is not available. The differences in the 
definitions of security requirements derive from the main focus of both domains. 
Software engineering is concerned with the development of systems based on 
requirements, whereas information security risk assessment is concerned more 
with the identification and mitigation of risks of an organisation. As there is no 
generally accepted definition in the literature, the perspective of the software 
engineering domain is followed. In this thesis a security requirement represents 
constraints on the functions of the system, where these constraints operationalize 
one or more security objectives (Haley et al., 2008). The definition, elicitation and 
characterisation of security requirements for information security risk assessment 
with business processes are described in section 4.5. 
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Chapter 3 - Information Security Risk 
Management 
The literature review focuses on journal articles, conference proceedings, specific 
books, theses and technical reports in the computing area with regard to 
information security (IS) risk assessments for an organisation. IS risk assessment 
standards and methods are presented, as developed by organisations and 
researchers. Those methods are discussed which use security requirements and 
business process models in the information security, security requirements 
engineering and business process model fields, and how the security 
requirements are used there. Furthermore, limitations of security risk assessments 
are discussed with an example, as well as with the results of a survey performed 
among security professionals. This chapter concludes with the research questions 
to be answered and the validation methods used. 
3.1. State of practice 
In the following information security risk management standards are distinguished 
from information security risk assessment methods. Besides risk management 
standards, like AS/NZ 4360 (ASNZ, 2004) and ISO 31000 (ISO, 2009a) described 
in section 2.2, these standards describe the concepts of information security risk 
management, define risk terminology, and form the basis of any developed 
methods. Methods describe activities to be performed and techniques used for the 
risk assessment activities defined in the standards.  
  
 
 Page 59 of 394  
3.1.1. Risk management standards 
Information security standards act as the reference point and foundation for any 
developed methods, as well as providing the basis for the terminology and 
concepts used therein. The standards were mainly developed or supported by 
public or governmental organisations and finally resulted in an ISO/IEC standard, 
as described below. 
 
ISO/IEC 13335-1:2004 
The ISO/IEC 13335-1:2004 (ISO, 2004b) standard, issued by the International 
Organisation of Standardisation (ISO), “deals with the management aspects of 
planning, implementation and operations, including maintenance, of information 
and communications technology (ICT) security” (ISO, 2004b, p. 5). The standard 
explains risk concepts and provides advice on organisational aspects of 
information security management. The ISO/IEC TR 13335 part 1 (of 1996) and 
part 2 (of 1997) were combined into the revised ISO/IEC 13335-1:2004. The parts 
ISO/IEC TR 13335-3:1998 and the ISO/IEC TR 13335-4:2000 were superseded 
by the ISO/IEC 27005:2008 (ISO, 2011b), revised in 2011, which is specifically 
about information security risk management. ISO/IEC 13335-1:2004 was 
withdrawn in 2010 with the release of the ISO/IEC 2700x series, which is about 
information security. 
 
The ISO/IEC 2700x series  
The ISO/IEC 2700x series issued by the International Organisation of 
Standardisation (ISO) consists of a number of standards to do with information 
security management. “An information security management system (ISMS) 
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provides a model for establishing, implementing, operating, monitoring, reviewing, 
maintaining and improving the protection of information assets. [The aim of this is] 
to achieve business objectives based upon a risk assessment and the 
organisation's risk acceptance levels, designed to effectively treat and manage 
risks” (ISO, 2012, p. 7). These standards cover information security management 
broadly, starting with basic vocabulary, and continue to define specific guidelines 
and processes for implementing and monitoring security concepts. The following 
standards were published: 
 ISO/IEC 27000:2012 — Information security management systems — 
Overview and vocabulary (ISO, 2012). This standard describes the 
overview and the vocabulary of information security management systems 
and defines related terms. 
 ISO/IEC 27001:2005 — Information security management systems — 
Requirements (ISO, 2005d). This standard specifies the requirements for 
establishing, implementing, operating, monitoring, reviewing, maintaining 
and improving a documented Information Security Management System. 
The standard specifies requirements for the implementation of security 
controls customised to the needs of the organisation and designed to 
ensure the selection of adequate and proportionate security controls that 
protect information assets. 
 ISO/IEC 27002:2005 — Code of practice for information security 
management (ISO, 2005e). This standard establishes guidelines and 
general principles for initiating, implementing, maintaining, and improving 
information security management in an organisation. The standard contains 
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 ISO/IEC 27003:2010 — Information security management system 
implementation guidance (ISO, 2010). This standard focuses on the critical 
aspects needed for successful design and implementation of an information 
security management system (ISMS). It also describes the processes of 
specification, design and implementation of an ISMS. 
 ISO/IEC 27004:2009 — Information security management — Measurement 
(ISO, 2011a). This standard provides guidance on the development and 
use of measures and measurement to assess the effectiveness of an 
implemented information security management system (ISMS) and controls, 
or groups of controls. 
 ISO/IEC 27005:2011 — Information security risk management (ISO, 2011c). 
This standard provides guidelines for information security risk management. 
It supports the general concepts specified in ISO/IEC 27001 and is 
designed to assist the satisfactory implementation of information security 
based on a risk-management approach. 
 ISO/IEC 27006:2011 — Requirements for bodies providing audit and 
certification of information security management systems (ISO, 2011d). 
This standard specifies requirements and provides guidance for bodies 
providing audit and certification of an information security management 
system (ISMS). It is primarily intended to support the accreditation of 
certification bodies providing ISMS certification. 
 ISO/IEC 27011:2008 — Information security management guidelines for 
telecommunications organisations based on ISO/IEC 27002 (ISO, 2011e). 
This standard is about guidelines supporting the implementation of 
information security management in telecommunications organisations.  
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 ISO/IEC 27031:2011 — Guidelines for information and communications 
technology readiness for business continuity (ISO, 2011f). This standard 
describes the concepts and principles of information and communication 
technology (ICT) readiness for business continuity, and provides a 
framework of methods and processes to identify and specify aspects (such 
as performance, design and implementation) for improving an 
organisation's ICT readiness. 
 ISO/IEC 27033 — Network security (ISO, 2011g). The first part of this 
standard provides an overview of network security and related definitions. It 
defines and describes the concepts associated with, and provides 
management guidance on, network security. The second part gives 
guidelines for organisations to plan, design, implement and document 
network security. The third part describes the threats, design techniques 
and control issues associated with reference network scenarios. 
 ISO/IEC 27035:2011 — Security incident management (ISO, 2011h). This 
standard provides an approach to detect, assess, report, respond to and 
manage information security incidents. Moreover, it provides guidance to 
detect, to assess and to manage information security vulnerabilities; it helps 
to  continuously improve information security and incident management. 
 ISO 27799 — Information security management in health using ISO/IEC 
27002 (ISO, 2011i). This standard provides guidelines for specifying a set 
of detailed controls for managing health information security and security 





 Page 63 of 394  
ISO/IEC 15408:2009 
The ISO/IEC 15408:2009 “Information technology -- Security techniques -- 
Evaluation criteria for IT security” is a revision of ISO/IEC 15408:2005, also known 
as Common Criteria (CC) (CC, 2006). The common criteria consist of: ISO/IEC 
15408-1:2009 (Part 1 - Introduction and general model), ISO/IEC 15408-2:2008 
(Part 2 - Security functional components) and ISO/IEC 15408-3:2008 (Part 3 - 
Security assurance components). The ISO/IEC 15408:2009 describes the IT 
security evaluation of a technology product. By the ISO/IEC 15408:2009, security 
requirements are used to evaluate the security of a product or system. The 
security requirements are divided into two groups: security functional and security 
assurance components. The functional components describe the requirements for 
the system. These security requirements are described by protection profiles (PPs) 
and security targets (STs). A protection profile is a set of implementation-
independent security requirements, aiming to express IT security needs in general. 
A Security Target (ST) is a set of security requirements specifying the functional 
and assurance security measures for a target of evaluation (e.g. a product). The 
security assurance components, subdivided into classes, families, components 
and elements, help to verify whether the functional requirements were 
implemented correctly and securely. Security assurance components can be used 
to express PPs’ and STs’ requirements, and to evaluate them. Security assurance 
components describe requirements with regard to the security of a system. An 
assessment according to ISO/IEC 15408 can only be conducted by authorised 
entities. The CC consists of three main parts (see CC, 2006, p.12): 
Part 1 is the introduction to the CC and defines general concepts and principles of 
IT security evaluation. It presents constructs for expressing IT security objectives, 
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for selecting and defining IT security requirements, and for writing high-level 
specifications for products and systems.  
Part 2 is about security functional requirements as a way of expressing the 
functional requirements for the target of evaluation. 
Part 3 is about security assurance requirements as a way of expressing the 
assurance requirements for the target of evaluation. Part 3 also defines evaluation 
criteria for protection files (PPs) and security targets (STs) and presents evaluation 
assurance levels for the assurance rating of the target of evaluation. 
3.1.2. Risk assessment methods 
In this section, information security assessment methods are presented, which 
have become best practices. 
 
IT Grundschutz  
The ‘IT Grundschutz’ or baseline protection manual (BSI, 2008), issued by the 
German Federal Office for Information Security (BSI - Bundesamt für Sicherheit in 
der Informationstechnik), contains a set of implementation guidelines, basic 
protection measures and guidance on system configuration. The baseline 
protection manual consists of standards, catalogues and tools to support 
information security. The following standards are included: 
 BSI-Standard 100-1: Information Security Management Systems (ISMS) 
This defines general requirements for ISMS and is compatible with ISO/IEC 
27001 (ISO, 2005d). It provides an easy and systematic introduction and 
instructions on how to meet the requirements of ISO/IEC with IT baseline 
protection.  
 BSI Standard 100-2 IT-baseline protection methodology  
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This standard describes, step-by-step, how an information security 
management system can be built and operated in practice. The 
establishment of organisational structures for information security, and for 
security management activities, is an important issue. It provides detailed 
guidance on how a security policy can be created in practice, how 
appropriate security measures can be selected and what to consider when 
implementing the security concept. 
 BSI Standard 100-3: Risk Analysis based on baseline protection 
The IT baseline protection catalogues contain standard security measures 
in the areas of organisation, personnel, infrastructure and technology. 
These measures are generally reasonable and adequate for the protection 
of typical business processes and information networks. This standard 
describes risk analysis on the basis of IT baseline protection. 
 BSI Standard 100-4: Business Continuity Management 
This standard defines a systematic approach to build a continuous 
management process in a government organisation, or business, to ensure 
continuity of business operations. 
 
In the “IT Baseline Protection Manual” standard, security measures for typical 
business processes, applications and IT systems are proposed. The aim is to 
provide adequate protection for all of an institution’s information. The standard 
contains a brief description of the considered assets, procedures and IT systems, 
and an overview of security concerns and safeguards. Through the application of 
security measures for a system described in the standard, a proper security level 
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Standard of Good Practice  
The “Standard of Good Practice” for information security from the Information 
Security Forum (ISF) was designed to help any organisation - irrespective of 
market sector, size or structure - to keep the business risks associated with its 
information systems within acceptable limits (ISF, 2005). The standard covers five 
major areas: security management, critical business applications, computer 
installations, networks and system development. In each area, further subareas 
are defined, which are then subdivided into sections. For each section, the 
corresponding principles and objectives are set, all the while describing what 
needs to be done and why with regard to information security. According to the 
ISF, the standard can be used to improve the level of security in an organisation in 
a number of ways: by assessing the performance of information security, by 
supporting security audits/reviews, and by checking compliance. The ISF standard 
claims to be the international benchmark on information security. 
 
CCTA Risk Analysis and Management Method (CRAMM) 
CRAMM was developed by the British government organisation, Central 
Communication and Telecommunication Agency (CCTA), which has since been 
renamed the Office of Government Commerce (OGC) (CCTA, 1987). CRAMM has 
three stages: identifying the scope of review, assessing threats and vulnerabilities 
and proposing countermeasures for risk. In the first stage, physical assets are 
determined and valued by “what if” questions. Secondly, assets are grouped and 
threat/vulnerability questionnaires performed. The responses to the questionnaires 
are scored and used to determine the level of risk. In stage three, 
countermeasures are proposed based on a list of safeguards. CRAMM provides a 
framework to calculate risks from asset values and vulnerabilities. The idea is that 
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the potential damage of an event can be identified by the value of the asset. The 
event is assessed on the likelihood and impact based on the three categories: 
integrity, confidentiality and availability. The necessary data for the assessment is 
collected via interviews.  
 
Operationally Critical Threat, Asset and Vulnerability Evaluation 
(OCTAVE) 
OCTAVE (Operationally Critical Threat, Asset and Vulnerability Evaluation) 
(Alberts et al., 2003), developed by the Carnegie Mellon Software Engineering 
Institute (SEI), is a framework to identify and manage information security risks. 
The assessment has three major phases: building security requirements, 
identifying infrastructure vulnerabilities and determining a security risk 
management strategy. Assets and risks are identified with structured interviews. 
OCTAVE focuses on organisational risk and security practices rather than on 
specific technology or system evaluations. In the first phase, the critical assets of 
the organisation are identified by business and IT personnel, along with the current 
measures in place to protect these assets, security requirements and threats. 
Then, the related information technology components of the assets are identified 
and evaluated as to whether they are vulnerable to attacks. Finally, the risks to the 
critical assets of the organisation are identified, whereafter strategies and plans for 
mitigation are developed. OCTAVE uses security requirements to determine how 
an information asset is to be protected. Security requirements for confidentiality, 
integrity and availability are described verbally for critical assets and used for 




 Page 68 of 394  
 
Figure 3-1 Octave phases from Alberts et al. (2003) 
 
OCTAVE Allegro  
OCTAVE Allegro (Caralli et al., 2007), developed by the Carnegie Mellon Software 
Engineering Institute (SEI), is a streamlined and fine-tuned version of the OCTAVE 
framework; it is said to be improved in terms of ease of use, resource 
requirements, risk results and compliance requirements. The goal of OCTAVE 
Allegro is to produce more robust results without extensive risk assessment 
knowledge and resource requirements. The focus of OCTAVE Allegro is on 
information assets and the context in which the information is used. OCTAVE 
Allegro consists of four phases and eight steps. These phases are as follows, and 
as shown in Figure 3-2:  
 Phase 1 - develop risk measurement criteria. Here, a qualitative set of 
measures has to be defined against the risks and evaluated. 
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 Phase 2 - create a profile for each critical information asset. The most 
important assets are noted, as well as technical containers, physical 
locations and people. 
 Phase 3 - identify threats to each information asset. These areas of concern 
are then expanded into threat scenarios (situations where the information 
asset can be compromised). 
 Phase 4 - identify and analyse risks to information assets and develop 
mitigation measures. The threat scenarios created in phase 4 are evaluated, 
and the consequences are determined and rated against the measurement 
criteria of phase 1. For risks that were evaluated as ‘high’, an appropriate 
mitigation approach is defined. 
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Control Objectives for Information and Related Technology 
(COBIT) 
COBIT version 4.1 (ITGI, 2007) is a control framework for IT governance to link 
business goals with IT goals and the effective management of IT. The framework 
consists of 34 processes in four different domains, namely: plan and organise, 
acquire and implement, deliver and support, and monitor and evaluate. Within 
each domain, processes are defined with corresponding control objectives and 
controls, which can then be used to evaluate the current situation in an 
organisation. The adherence to these defined controls should provide assurance 
that business objectives will be achieved and undesired events will be detected, 
prevented or corrected. For each COBIT process, key goals and metrics are 
provided to measure the performance and outcome deviations. Figure 3-3 shows 
the structure of a security control objective description in COBIT. At the top right of 
the figure, the domain is shown (e.g. Plan and Organise). On the left, the process, 
requirements and control objectives and metrics are described for the process in a 
kind of waterfall. At the top left, the information criteria to be followed are defined. 
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Figure 3-3 COBIT process description from ITGI (2007) 
 
CORAS 
Within the CORAS project (Stølen et al., 2002) - a research and technology project 
funded by the EU (2001 - 2003) - a framework for risk assessment of security-
critical systems was developed. The CORAS risk management process is mainly 
based on the risk management standard AS/NZS 4360 (ASNZ, 2004) and the 
information security standard ISO/EC 17799 (ISO, 2005c). CORAS has five main 
phases based on AS/NZS 4360: (1) identify context; (2) identify risks; (3) analyse 
risks; (4) evaluate risks; and (5) treat risks. Each is supported by models that 
should be constructed, as well as advice on how they should be expressed. At 
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every phase, different methods of risk analysis are adapted, extended or 
combined - for example, Event-Tree-Analysis, Markov, HazOp and FMECA are all 
used. The platform uses open-source technologies like Java, XML and UML 
profiles for a model-based risk analysis of security-critical systems. Figure 3-4 
shows the symbols for model elements which can be used to model risks.  
 
Figure 3-4 CORAS modelling language elements from Braber et al. (2007) 
 
Information Security Management Maturity Model (ISM3)  
The Information Security Management Maturity model (ISM3, 2007) is a 
framework for security management developed by an industry consortium. The 
framework describes common information security processes with underlying 
performance targets and metrics. The ISM3 handbook describes the security 
processes for each of the four categories - general, strategic management, tactical 
management and operational management - and the rationale behind choosing 
these processes. For each of those described, parameters such as output, input, 
activities and responsibilities are defined. These can be used to evaluate the 
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NIST Risk Management Guide SP 800-30 
The National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) Risk Management 
Guide for Information Technology Systems Special Publication (SP) 800-30 
(Stoneburner et al., 2002b) provides a foundation for developing an effective risk 
management programme. NIST, founded in 1901, is an agency of the U.S. 
Department of Commerce. Its goal is to promote competitiveness by advancing 
measurement science, standards and technology. The main focuses of NIST SP 
800-30 are the risk assessment and risk mitigation processes. Therefore the 
guideline, through several steps, describes how to identify, determine, mitigate 
and document risks. For each process step, the inputs, outputs, and the activities 
to be performed are defined. The activities primarily describe the risk assessment 
procedure, suggesting how to perform these activities. The risk assessment has 
nine steps as shown in Figure 3-5: 
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Figure 3-5 NIST risk assessment steps from Stoneburner et al. (2002b) 
 
IT Infrastructure Library (ITIL)  
The IT Infrastructure Library (ITIL) (CCTA, 2007) is a set of best practice 
processes and concepts published by the UK Office of Government and 
Commerce (OGC). The main focus of ITIL is on IT service management; it 
provides descriptions of processes to help implement and manage IT services. 
The two key building blocks of ITIL (version 2) are service delivery and service 
support, the former of which is about the proactive management of the service 
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provided - it contains sub-processes such as capacity management, availability 
management and continuity management. Service support, meanwhile, 
concentrates on the user and the support of business functions. Within service 
support, there are also sub-processes such as service desks, problem 
management, change management and configuration management. Another 
separate aspect of ITIL is security management, where the organisational 
involvement of information security is described. The content of this set of best 
practice processes is mainly based on the ISO 17799 (ISO, 2005c) standard, and 
describes how service support and delivery are affected by security management. 
ITIL version 3 is a further development and is now based on a life-cycle approach. 
This life-cycle approach is reflected by new building blocks such as service 
strategy, design, transition, operation and improvement. 
 
Expression of Needs and Identification of Security Objectives (EBIOS) 
EBIOS (ANSSI, 2010b) stands for “Expression des besoins et identification des 
objectifs de sécurité” (French). EBIOS was published in 1995 and developed by 
the DCSSI (Direction Centrale de la Sécurité des Systèmes d'Information), the 
French Ministry of Defense. The most recent version was published in June 2010. 
The EBIOS method consists of a set of principles - analysis of the context, 
expression of security needs, threat study, identification of security objectives and 
security requirements - as shown in Figure 3-6.  
Firstly, the context has to be analysed with regard to general requirements, the 
owner of systems as well as further information about the assessment. Then, the 
security needs and the threats are identified in two separate activities. Security 
needs are expressed in terms of availability, integrity and confidentiality by the 
system users. Threats are identified by spotting attack methods and the 
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corresponding vulnerabilities of the system. Within the next activity, “identification 
of security objectives”, risks are determined by combining threats and their impact 
on security needs. Security objectives of the system are evaluated with regard to 
the risk identified, and whether there are any conflicts between them. In the final 
activity, the necessary and sufficient security requirements are determined and the 
security controls contributing to the requirements are checked. Any residual risks 
are shown by comparing the security requirements and controls to the risks. 
 
Figure 3-6 EBIOS set of principles from ANSSI (2010b) 
 
Harmonised Risk Analysis Method (MEHARI) 
MEHARI (Méthode Harmonisée d'Analyse de Risques — Harmonised Risk 
Analysis Method) (CLUSIF, 2010) is a risk assessment method developed by 
CLUSIF (Club for the Security of Information in France, or Club de la Sécurité de 
l'Information Français). MEHARI was, like EBIOS, last updated in 2010. The 
MEHARI risk assessment is based on a knowledge base that has to be developed 
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before the risk assessment. The knowledge base contains assets and potential 
damages to these assets (including vulnerabilities and threats), which form the 
basis for the risk scenarios (events or threats impacting upon an asset, with a 
rating of likeliness of any impact for the company). Based on the risk scenarios 
that were determined, the risks and their corresponding parameters are evaluated, 
bearing in mind the likelihood and impact of the risk. Figure 3-7 shows the 
knowledge base creation, the assessment process and their subsequent activities. 
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Generally Accepted Information Security Principles (GAISP) 
GAISP (ISSA, 2004) - the Generally Accepted Information Security Principles - 
contains a set of security principles that were proven and accepted in practice. 
GAISP is published by the Information Systems Security Association (ISSA) but 
was originally drafted by the Information Security Forum (ISF). Its principles are 
subdivided into pervasive, broad functional, and detailed. Pervasive principles 
provide general governance-level guidance to establish and maintain the security 
of information. The broad functional principles describe what to do at a high level 
of the pervasive principles, allowing a definition of the basic units of those 
principles. The detailed principles describe the methods of achieving the broad 
functional principles, with reference to the specific environment and current 
technology. In this publication, the description of the broad functional principles, 
e.g. education and awareness, accountability, takes up most space. 
 
Livermore Risk Analysis Methodology (LRAM)  
The Livermore Risk Analysis Methodology (LRAM) - developed by Guarro et al. 
(1987) at the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory - uses risk scenarios, which 
they call “risk elements”. Firstly, in the information gathering phase, the data of 
systems are identified. Then risk scenarios are created containing the data 
systems, determining their monetary value, loss consequences, and possible 
threats. The evaluation of the risk scenario is conducted, both with no controls, 
and all controls applied, in order to determine the level of security. Figure 3-8 
shows the phases of LRAM - planning, risk analysis and management decision 
support - and the stages of each phase, ending with the prioritisation and selection 
of the proposed control sets. 
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Figure 3-8 LRAM process diagram from Guarro (1987) 
 
Security Process Maturity Models 
A process maturity model is a method for assessing implemented processes 
including the process objective, best practices and improvements over time. The 
objective of a process maturity evaluation is to determine any improvements over 
time, to compare with peers or best practices, and to improve the performance 
with regard to cost, schedule, productivity, quality and customer satisfaction, 
among others (Paulk et al., 1993). Mostly five levels are defined to measure the 
process maturity (Woodhouse, 2008) and how the process is conducted and 
controlled. In the following, only the two predominant maturity models (CMM and 
SPICE according to Wendler (2012)) are presented. 
 
Capability Maturity Model Integration (CMMI) 
The first process maturity framework to be designed was the capability maturity 
model (CMM) for the software engineering institute (SEI-CMM) in 1987 (Paulk et 
al., 1993). The initial SEI-CMM model was applied to different domains, and 
therefore variants were developed, such as the capability maturity model for 
software (SW-CMM), the software acquisition capability maturity model (SA-CMM) 
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and the people capability maturity model practices (P-CMM). The SEI-CMMI is a 
further development of the SEI-CMM, and provides a set of 16 core areas to 
improve processes. The objective of CMMI is to provide guidance to develop or 
improve processes around the business objectives of an organisation. CMMI 
covers areas like development, acquisition and services. 
 
Software Process Improvement and Capability Determination 
framework (SPICE) 
The Software Process Improvement and Capability Determination framework, 
called SPICE (ISO 15504) (ISO, 2004a), is an assessment method developed by 
the International Organisation of Standardisation (ISO) for the evaluation of 
products and services. SPICE is mainly used in the software engineering domain. 
The assessment is based on a process reference model defined in ISO 12207 
(ISO, 2005a), and consists of primary (e.g. acquisition, engineering, and 
operation), support and operational processes (e.g. management, process 
improvement) as well as the maturity levels defined in the ISO 15504. 
3.2. State of the art 
In the following the information security risk assessment approaches developed by 
researchers from different fields in the computing area are presented. Approaches 
from information security which use security requirements and business process 
models for risk assessments, software engineering and business process 
management are presented and organised by area. The identified information 
security risk assessment approaches in these areas were examined, with specific 
regard to how security requirements are used and vulnerabilities determined. 
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3.2.1. Risk assessments for organisations 
In the following, the information security approaches are presented that use 
business processes, organisational models or security requirements for the 
assessment of information security risks within an organisation. 
 
Business processes 
In early risk assessment approaches, the idea of using business processes was 
introduced. Rainer et al. (1991) were among the first to align qualitative and 
quantitative risk analysis methods with the value chain of a company to determine 
risks based on assets. The value chain was used to enumerate critical business 
activities and IT components, as well as the linkage between them. 
 
In 1996, Halliday et al. (1996) proposed the consideration of business issues, 
instead of comparing vulnerability checklist against systems. They suggest 
conducting the risk analysis on critical business processes of the organisation, 
based upon the continuity and availability of business operations. They use risk 
scenarios - defined as “undesirable situations” - where risks are classified based 
on their primary effects on confidentiality, integrity and availability, as well as their 
probability and potential impact. The risk scenarios are ranked and 
countermeasures proposed for high risks. 
 
Suh and Han (2003) proposed an IS risk analysis method on a functional business 
model. A business function is defined as a business activity that supports one 
aspect of the organisation. Business objectives and their relative relevance are 
determined for functions and sub-functions. The Analytic Hierarchy Process (AHP) 
is used on the functions to evaluate the criticality of risks for operation. This 
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approach considers income loss, replacement costs and the importance of 
business functions, and is based on business functions (a process model is not 
used). It assumes that assets contribute directly to the business objectives. 
 
Neubauer et al. (2005) proposed to connect business processes with IT processes. 
They compare the unavailability costs of core business processes with the IT 
security costs of different security levels, in order to determine the most cost-
efficient solution. Security levels to be achieved are used to evaluate the cost 
benefit for IT security.  
 
Khanmohammadi and Houmb (2010) centre on business goals, and the processes 
that support them. They identify the relevant business processes for business 
objectives and the control processes responsible for security. Then, vulnerabilities 
are identified by best practices or security bulletins and assigned to specific control 
processes. The ability of the control processes to protect against vulnerabilities is 
measured. To calculate the risk for a process, the exposure degrees of a 
vulnerability - as well as threat frequency and impact - are used. The difference of 
their approach is that vulnerability and risks are determined for processes, rather 
than for single assets. 
 
Organisational models/frameworks 
The TOPM (Target Optimum Portfolio Approach) approach, developed by 
Badenhorst and Eloff (1994), is an approach based on a life-cycle model with the 
main objective to optimise the risk management process. Matrix theory, 
transaction routes, and different domains - organisation, technology, people and 
systems - are considered to determine risks. 
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Bandyopadhyay et al. (1999) proposed a framework for IT risk management which 
offers managers a comprehensive view of their risk situation. This involved 
considering different levels (inter-organisational, organisational, and application) in 
risk identification, analysis, reduction and monitoring, and their work thus focuses 
on the linkage of the risk management processes at inter-organisational, 
organisational, and application levels. 
 
Innerhofer–Oberperfler and Breu (2006) use an enterprise model that combines 
and reflects the organisational unit, the business processes and the applications 
and systems used. They use security objectives (for the process) and security 
requirements (for sub-processes and activities) to define the required security. The 
enterprise model with its dependencies is then evaluated, considering threats, 
vulnerabilities and the defined security requirements. The impact and probability of 
the risk is then evaluated on a qualitative scale.  
 
Sun et al. (2006) use the Dempster-Shafer Theory of Belief Functions to model 
uncertainties involved in the information security assessment process. The focus 
of their approach is to model and consider uncertainties that are present in every 
risk assessment. Therefore, this theory is used to express the degree of belief in 
the evidence that is available for either the presence or absence of risk. The model 
uses evidences and assertions and links them. For each assertion, the degree of 
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Security requirements/metrics 
Information technology risks of a company are determined not only by events or 
vulnerabilities of a system, but also by the required security from a business 
perspective, regulatory or statutory requirements and applicable laws (Gerber and 
von Solms, 2001; ISO, 2005c). Therefore, security requirements of the company 
should be specified to determine risks not only by technical vulnerabilities.  
 
The approach of Thoben (1997) with regard to an IT system risk analysis specifies 
security requirements (static and procedural) for IT system elements based on a 
threat and vulnerability examination. Threats, vulnerabilities and their 
consequences are modelled and then compared against the system configuration, 
with regard to the security requirement. Then, the validity of the security 
requirement is determined. The focus of this work is on the modelling and 
checking of security requirements with a risk analysis. 
 
Gerber et al. (2001) suggest specifying security requirements by security concerns 
and their intensity level (level of protection needed). In their work, they use a 
qualitative classification scheme - a matrix of impact and business relevance - for 
the rating of each security. However, their work stops at the identification of 
security requirements.  
 
Chung et al. (2005) propose security risk vectors for evaluating assets 
quantitatively. Therefore for servers, application and data, the security objectives’ 
confidentiality, integrity and availability are rated by a metric value. Then a vector 
value is calculated for each asset, as well as for those related to it. With the 
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security vector value, a comparison of the criticality and importance of an asset 
can be determined. The focus of their work is on asset evaluation. 
 
Manadhata and Wing (2005) present a metric - the attack surface - that expresses 
the security of a system in comparison to different versions of the same system. 
The metric is based on the “attack surface”, i.e., the system’s attackability, along 
three dimensions: method, data and channel. In comparison to other security 
metrics, such as number of bugs found (code-level) and number of times a system 
version is mentioned in CERT advisories (system-level), their proposed metric lies 
between both - on the design-level of a system. The attack surface is expressed 
as a triple value; it bears in mind the attackability of methods, data and channel of 
the system.  
3.2.2. Risk assessment in software engineering 
In software engineering, it is widely acknowledged that one should address 
security from the beginning. This is because reacting to security issues is time-
consuming and expensive. Therefore researchers in software engineering have 
proposed modelling notations and frameworks to consider security already in the 
system development phase. Modelling notations are used to capture information, 
make it explicit, and act as a repository of knowledge. Frameworks are used to 
derive and analyse security requirements. Security requirements describe the 
necessary security for systems to protect against threats. Below, modelling 
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Modelling notations 
Several modelling notations have been developed for security aspects. One can 
distinguish between two categories: the modelling of attacks and vulnerabilities 
and capturing countermeasures and security requirements. Modelling notations 
are used for analysis and visualisation of information and requirements. 
 
For attack and vulnerability modelling, methods like misuse cases (Sindre and 
Opdahl, 2005), abuse cases (McDermott and Fox, 1999) or the malicious actor in 
the enhanced i* framework (Liu et al., 2002) have been developed to describe 
unwanted behaviour. A misuse case is the opposite of a use case, where a use 
case describes the function the system should perform (Cockburn, 2001). 
Therefore, it can be said that a misuse case describes the function a system 
should not allow. The misuse case can be used in the representation of relevant 
information and the elicitation of security requirements. Abuse cases describe the 
interaction between a system and one or more actors that result in harm to the 
system (McDermott and Fox, 1999). They are specified in natural language or in a 
tree and modelled in the Unified Modeling Language (UML). Abuse cases can be 
helpful in the requirements, design and testing phases of a system.  
 
In the work of Liu et al. (2002), they use an actor in the i* framework to determine 
vulnerabilities, by assuming malicious intentions of the actor. Actor dependency 
analysis is used to identify attackers and threats. The i* framework (Yu, 1997) was 
developed to model and reason about the organisation and information systems; it 
consists of the strategic dependency and strategic rationale model and supports 
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For identifying vulnerabilities and specifying attacks, attack trees (Schneier, 1999) 
and attack graphs (Phillips and Swiler, 1998) have been developed. Attack trees 
describe the different ways in which a system can be attacked. The root of the tree 
represents the goal of the attack, while leaves and branches describe the ways to 
achieve the goal. Attack graphs are based on attack templates, where the 
conditions and activities of known attacks are described. Threat modelling (Mockel 
and Abdallah, 2010) is similar to attack modelling but focuses instead on threats 
and their mitigation. Threat modelling is about identifying threats for system 
components and mitigating them by proposing security concepts. Threat modelling 
starts by defining security objectives, then decomposes the system into functional 
areas and data flows and then identifies threats by threat categories and their 
effect to the decomposed system. After that, mitigation concepts are elaborated to 
secure the system. For threat modelling, often data flow diagrams (DFD) and 
Unified Modeling Language (UML) are used to represent data flows, system 
components actors and actions.   
 
In addition, problem frames (Jackson, 1999) have been used to compose threat 
descriptions (Haley et al., 2004). With problem frames, larger problems are 
decomposed into smaller ones, describing the interaction of domains with the real 
world. Concerns surrounding assets or objects of the problem context are used to 
specify threats. 
 
For the modelling of security relevant information, countermeasures and security 
requirements methods, like UMLsec (Jürjens, 2005), secure TROPOS (Giorgini 
and Mouratidis, 2005) or the work of Matulevicius et al. (2008) can be used. These 
methods were developed to capture security specific concepts to protect against 
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malicious actions. UMLsec (Jürjens, 2000; 2002; 2005; Jürjens and Wimmel, 2005) 
is an extension to UML, used for integrating security related information into UML 
diagrams. With UMLsec, one can express security relevant information in UML 
and then use that information for the formal evaluation of design and specification. 
Secure TROPOS (Giorgini and Mouratidis, 2005) is an extension to TROPOS 
used for considering security issues during the software development process. 
TROPOS is a software development method that uses the concept of agents to 
model and analyse security requirements and their software design. In secure 
TROPOS, the concept of constraints was introduced and extended, with regard to 
security. Constraints are restrictions regarding actions or achieving goals, and 
have been defined as a new model element. Matulevicius et al. (2008) align 
Secure TROPOS to the security risk management process. They suggest a 
number of improvements for Secure TROPOS to model business assets, IS 
assets, threats and security requirements. With all these notations, specific 
security aspects such as attacks, malicious actions, vulnerabilities and 
countermeasures can be modelled. 
 
Frameworks 
Several security requirement frameworks were proposed for eliciting, modelling 
and analysing security requirements. The main objective of these frameworks is to 
provide a list of feasible security requirements for “good enough” security for a 
system. The foundations of developed frameworks used are mostly goals or anti-
goals, trust or trust assumptions, and threats and vulnerabilities. Frameworks such 
as the i* framework (Yu, 1997), KAOS (van Lamsweerde and Letier, 2000), 
SeDAn (Chivers and Fletcher, 2005), TROPOS (Giunchiglia et al., 2002) or the 
Security Engineering Framework (Haley et al., 2008) have been developed. They 
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should help to identify security requirements and evaluate the system design 
satisfying these security requirements. The i* framework (Yu, 1997) was 
developed to model and reason about the organisation and information systems. It 
consists of the strategic dependency (SD) and strategic rationale model (SR). The 
SD model describes dependencies between actors in an organisation; the SR 
model focuses on stakeholder interests and concerns, and how they might be 
addressed by a system configuration. The KAOS (Knowledge Acquisition in 
Automated Specification) approach is about identifying goals and refining them 
into system requirements and objects. A KAOS model includes a goal, object, 
agent and operation model. The goal model describes the system-to-be, the object 
model describes the objects of the system, the agent model the responsibilities of 
agents for goals, and the operation model the interaction of objects. SeDAn 
(Chivers and Fletcher, 2005) uses an information flow graph to determine whether 
there is a path for an attacker to information assets. Information asset flows are 
modelled as services, and an attack model used to determine exploitable paths. 
TROPOS (Giunchiglia et al., 2002) is a methodology which helps to describe the 
organisational environment of a system, as well as the system itself. TROPOS is 
based on the i* framework using the concepts of actors, positions, goals and 
dependencies. The framework of Haley et al. (2008) is about security requirement 
elicitation and analysis. Assets are identified; security goals and requirements are 
determined. Satisfaction arguments are then used to validate the security 
requirements. 
 
Other more practitioner-oriented methods for security requirement elicitation are 
SQUARE, SIREN and CLASP. The SQUARE (Security Quality Requirements 
Engineering) (Toval et al., 2002) methodology was first published in 1995. It is 
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primarily about eliciting, categorising, and prioritising security requirements for 
systems. The elicitation of security requirements is based on vulnerabilities and 
risks of artefacts having security goals - identified beforehand. SIREN (SImple 
REuse of software requiremeNts) (Toval et al., 2002) is a requirement-reuse 
approach where requirements are stored in a repository, drafted by applying 
Magerit (MAGERIT, 2006) - a risk assessment approach - and reused for system 
development. CLASP (Comprehensive, Lightweight Application Security Process) 
(Viega, 2005) is a software development method to address security based on 
best practices. CLASP claims to be the first structured method to build security 
requirements for systems, and comprises a set of process activities that should be 
conducted before and during the development process by those involved.  
3.2.3. Risk assessment in business process management  
Business process management is about the workflows and processes of an 
organisation. In the following, approaches of the workflow management and 
business process modelling field are presented, considering information security 
risk (assessment).  
 
In the workflow management field, security requirements are used to design/verify 
workflow systems or business processes. A business process model can be 
described as a set of activities to reach an objective. “A business process is widely 
defined as a structured flow of activities which supports business goals, and is 
facilitated by data and resources” (zur Muehlen, 2005, p.3). These activities are 
performed by actors using resources such as systems, materials or information 
and may be dependent on other activities. Workflow management builds on the 
business process models and implements the defined processes with regard to 
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automated execution. Workflow management includes the execution, organisation, 
controlling and monitoring of work sequences (Janssen, 1998). Workflow 
management is a level between the process model and the technical 
implementation with systems. There are some approaches which focus on 
creating secure business processes or workflows based on security. Security 
requirements are defined for business process activities or workflows that have to 
be adhered to - in so much as having a secure process/system. Backes et al. 
(2003) proposes a guideline to integrate security requirements into the business 
process modelling, Atluri (2001) proposes to consider security requirements for 
workflow systems, and Herrmann and Pernul (1998) propose enforcement of 
security requirements in workflow management. Other approaches do also attempt 
to analyse security requirements of business processes (Roehrig, 2003; Roehrig 
and Knorr, 2004), and question which security measures should be implemented. 
Other researchers attempt to verify the consistency of workflow implementations 
against security policies (Ribeiro and Guedes, 1999). The aforementioned 
approaches focus on the creation or analysis of security requirements within 
business processes or workflows to define or implement secure processes. 
However, these approaches omit an assessment component and do not consider 
already implemented security measures. 
 
Approaches in the business process modelling field use business process models 
to represent and analyse risks (including information technology risks). Zur 
Muehlen (2005) proposes a framework of four interrelated risk models - namely a 
risk structure, risk goal, risk state and extended Event-driven Process Chain (EPC) 
model (a flowchart used for business process modelling) - to present risks of a 
business process. With these four models, risks of a business process are 
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intended to be captured and modelled, for the purpose of risk management. The 
proposed risk models of Zur Muehlen should help to document process-related 
risks and increase risk-awareness. 
 
In another paper of Zur Muehlen and Ting-Yi (zur Muehlen and Ho, 2005) the 
authors provide an overview of the risks of business process management 
projects with regard to the life-cycle. For each of the different phases of the project 
life-cycle - analysis, design, implementation, enactment, monitoring and evaluation 
- risk factors were identified. These risk factors describe risks closely related to the 
life-cycle process, and the work is focused on business process management 
projects and risk factors for such project phases. 
 
Neiger et al. (2006) further develop and promote the idea of Zur Muehlen (2005) 
by determining risks with business process models. They propose a four-step 
approach for risk identification in business processes: to decompose business 
objectives, to identify risks by value-focused thinking, to determine alternative 
process configurations and then to compare alternative processes. Risks are 
determined by business values and fundamental business objectives to be 
achieved by the process. Then, alternatives for the business process and business 
objectives are considered and compared, in order to reduce the identified risk. 
 
Lambert et al. (2006) enhanced the business process notation, Integration 
Definition (IDEF), with the value “sources of risk” being used to describe risks at 
the activity level. Identified risks are modelled and linked to the corresponding 
process activities, thus helping to visualise risks in the process. The process 
sequence and the risks of the process activities can then be analysed to allocate 
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resources and prioritise activities accordingly, with regard to the risks and process 
objectives. 
 
Rodriguez et al. (2007) extend the Business Process Modelling Notation (BPMN) 
to specify security requirements within business process models. The security 
requirements consist of five attributes - non-reputation, attack harm detection, 
integrity, privacy and access control. The security requirements are indicated as 
locks over message flows, roles or data. This approach is essentially an extension 
of the BPMN to model security requirements in business processes.  
 
Jallow et al. (2007) propose a framework for assessing operational risk in business 
processes on the basis of time, cost and performance/quality relative to process 
activity level. They identify risk factors (events) of a process and determine their 
respective probabilities. With a triangular probability density function, they thus 
determine the overall impact on costs. 
 
Herrmann and Herrmann (2006) use MoSSBP - a framework to specify security 
requirements and analyse business processes’ fulfilment - and object-oriented 
security analysis in order to facilitate the automated realisation of business 
processes’ security requirements. Security requirements are assigned to business 
processes. For each, corresponding security measures from a repository of 
safeguards that adhere to security requirements are proposed. 
 
Islam et al. (2009) suggest a risk management approach based on vulnerability 
and criticality on an organisational level, mitigated at the business process stage. 
The i* framework out of the software engineering domain is used, looking at the 
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strategic relationships between process participants. Actors and their 
dependencies are modelled in i* and the actors’ incoming/outgoing dependencies 
are used to indicate vulnerability and criticality. Monitoring of tasks of vulnerable 
actors is used to mitigate risk and then modelled in the business process. 
However, Islam et al. consider only actors; they do not assess systems or 
activities of processes. 
3.3. Discussion on risk assessments 
In this section, the current state of risk assessment methods in the different 
research fields within the computing area is reflected upon; how vulnerabilities are 
determined in these methods and whether an asset’s security requirements are 
used for vulnerability identification are answered - firstly based on information 
security risk assessment methods for organisations which represent the majority 
and main research object, secondly on approaches in software engineering, and 
thirdly on approaches in business process modelling. 
3.3.1. For organisations 
Risk assessment approaches utilising business processes or business functions 
use, for example, annual loss expectancy (Suh and Han, 2003), loss of disruption 
(Neubauer et al., 2005) or business goals (Khanmohammadi and Houmb, 2010) to 
determine the criticality and importance of threats and vulnerabilities. With these 
approaches, the reasonable level of security and a risk estimate for assets within 
the value chain should be determined. But approaches that use business 
processes base their valuation of assets and risks on the impact of vulnerabilities 
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A few approaches use risk scenarios, defined as “undesirable situations”, like 
Mehari (CLUSIF, 2010) or LRAM (Guarro, 1987), to determine the risks faced by 
an organisation. A risk scenario comprises a threat, frequency and impact and is 
constructed by determining what could befall a system. The risk scenario is then 
evaluated against the security control implementation with regard to its respective 
likelihood. Risks are then classified against security objectives - confidentiality, 
integrity and availability. Risk scenarios can be described and applied specifically 
to an organisation, but vulnerabilities are determined upfront, independently of the 
security control implementation and security needs. In addition, threat lists or 
security best practices are used for describing vulnerabilities and risk scenarios. 
 
Some approaches propose frameworks or modelling for risk assessment. Sun et al. 
(2006) use the Dempster-Shafer Theory of Belief Functions to model uncertainty in 
risk assessments; Bandyopadhyay et al. (1999) consider the inter-organisational, 
organisational, and application level in the risk identification process; Badenhorst 
and Eloff’s (1994) approach is about risk management process optimisation based 
on a life-cycle model; and Thoben (1997) models security requirements for 
developing secure systems. In addition, metrics are proposed by researchers to 
evaluate assets quantitatively. For example, security risk vectors (Chung et al., 
2005) are used for the ranking of risks; or the attack surface (Manadhata and Wing, 
2005) for the comparison of different versions of a system. These approaches 
focus on optimising the risk assessment process and considering further 
information for risk valuation or the quantitative ranking of risk, while threat lists or 
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There are several approaches - COBIT (ITGI, 2007), ISF (ISF, 2005), Baseline 
protection manual (BSI, 2008), GAISP (ISSA, 2004), ISO/IEC 27002 (ISO, 2005e) 
- that all describe best practices of security solutions to be implemented, security 
principles to be applied and common threats and vulnerabilities. In CORAS 
(Stølen et al., 2002), structured brainstorming and security best practices are used 
to identify risks. Any identified threats and vulnerabilities are documented in a 
threat diagram supported by a modelling language. These approaches can be 
seen as knowledge bases, or security best practices, and can be used to 
determine vulnerabilities. However, the vulnerabilities and proposed security 
solutions used to identify vulnerabilities are unspecific to an organisation and 
name only universal procedures. 
 
Security requirements were proposed (Gerber et al., 2001) for determining security 
controls with regard to the security needs of the business. In several approaches, 
security requirements for assets are defined and used to determine the criticality 
and impact of vulnerabilities, as well as for the selection of security solutions. But 
for vulnerability identification, knowledge bases or security best practices are still 
used. For example, Innerhofer-Oberperfler and Breu (2006, p. 9) state that, to 
identifying possible threats that can violate a security requirement, “existing 
security checklists or standards like the Baseline Protection Manual or EBIOS can 
be used”. In OCTAVE Allegro (Caralli et al., 2007), the risk identification begins 
with “brainstorming about possible conditions or situations that can threaten an 
organisation’s information asset” (Caralli et al., 2007, p.18). Then, threat scenarios 
are identified out of the brainstorming session or on the basis of a predefined 
threat tree. For each threat scenario, “how this threat would affect the security 
requirements that have been set for the information asset” is documented (Caralli 
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et al., 2007, p.59). In NIST 800-30 (Stoneburner et al., 2002b), vulnerability 
knowledge bases, system security testing and a security requirement checklist are 
used for vulnerability identification. The security checklist specifies high-level 
security criteria for IT systems using a knowledge base - for example, government 
regulation or security directives. The security requirements of this checklist can be 
described as the control objectives and can then be used to determine 
vulnerabilities of assets. This security requirement checklist is not specific to an 
asset, and how to apply the checklist is not further elaborated. In EBIOS (ANSSI, 
2010a), threats and security requirements are identified and defined in two parallel 
process steps. Threats are identified based on attack methods on (and 
vulnerabilities of) systems. Then, threats and security requirements are combined 
to determine the impact on the security caused by the threat for identification. In 
the Common Criteria (CC, 2006), security requirements are used to evaluate a 
product or specification, and to provide assurance that it meets any requirements. 
But the CC is product-oriented, not IS-oriented, and therefore is not suitable for 
assessing the information security risks of a company. 
 
Security risk assessment methods, like COBIT (ITGI, 2007) providing security 
objectives and a maturity assessment component, or ISM3 (ISM3, 2007) providing 
an information security management process model, are a mixture between a 
security maturity assessment and a security risk assessment - generally with 
particular emphasis on one of the two areas. A linkage between security maturity 
models and security risk assessment methodologies could be beneficial, as not 
only the current risks but also the capability of the organisation to react to risks or 
events are of interest. This benefit results from the fact that risks change over time 
due to underlying conditions (Kinney, 2003), the problem space (Jackson, 2007) 
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and environmental changes; therefore, security risk results should not be 
dependent on the point of time of the assessment. But current security maturity 
assessment approaches are checklist- and best practice-driven. This means that 
the assessor has to choose the security objectives or security controls that apply, 
unspecific to the organisation. Furthermore, these approaches miss an 
assessment component - how to determine the adherence of these security 
objectives, or how to determine any vulnerabilities. 
 
To conclude, all the approaches and concepts used to identify vulnerabilities and 
risks are closely aligned to the definition of risk: occurrence of an event with a 
certain probability of causing an impact (a positive or negative one) (ISO, 2005c). 
The approaches start with the identification of events, threats and vulnerabilities or 
defining a scenario, and then determine probabilities and impacts, following risk 
management standards like AS/NZ 4360 (ASNZ, 2004). Security requirements are 
only used to determine the impact of vulnerabilities or as a justification for a risk - 
not for identifying vulnerabilities or risks. The few approaches that use security 
requirements for vulnerability identification use them as a generic checklist or do 
not specifically evaluate them with regard to the security functions applied at the 
organisation. For example, in NIST SP 800-30 (Stoneburner et al., 2002b) the 
security checklist is compiled by referring to government regulatory and security 
best practices, which does not reflect the specific asset’s security needs. In 
Innerhofer-Oberperfler and Breu (2006) as well as OCTAVE Allegro (Caralli et al., 
2007), threats and vulnerabilities are compared to security requirements and it is 
determined whether they have been violated, but they are not evaluated. Common 
Criteria (CC, 2006) specifies security requirements only for a product, not for an 
organisation, and therefore it is only suitable for the evaluation of a system. 
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To summarise, in all these risk assessment approaches, security requirements of 
information assets are not analysed to identify vulnerabilities with regard to the 
security functions implemented in the organisation. They concentrate on the 
presence of vulnerabilities, but not on determining whether security requirements - 
business security needs - are fulfilled and vulnerabilities absent. No analysis 
method or guidance is proposed for evaluating security requirements with regard 
to the current implementation to identify only (true positive) vulnerabilities. 
3.3.2. In software engineering 
The main focus of security requirement frameworks and modelling notations is on 
the design and development of a system. These approaches support (either partly 
or fully) the software engineering phases - early and/or late requirements; 
architectural and detailed design. The goal of these approaches is to identify, 
specify and verify security requirements for systems for the design and 
implementation of security functions. Within modelling notations, security aspects 
like attacks, malicious actions, vulnerabilities and countermeasures are modelled 
to determine “good enough” security for systems in the form of security 
requirements. The focus of modelling notations is on security issues that can occur 
through use or abuse of the system. The output of security requirement 
frameworks is a list of feasible requirements for a “good-enough” system's security 
against potential attacks. Security requirements are then evaluated, to examine 
whether a certain system design can satisfy the requirements. 
 
Security requirement frameworks and modelling notations are helpful in the 
elicitation and modelling of security requirements, identifying countermeasures 
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and determining the security design, but they cannot identify and represent risk 
from an organisational risk management perspective. This is because these 
languages mostly lack of constructs for representing risks (Dubois et al., 2010) 
and make no use of a risk-based approach (Mayer, 2009). Furthermore, they 
focus on the software engineering phases and are not designed to identify 
vulnerabilities of already existing systems based on security requirements at the 
current organisation in which they operate. This is because security requirement 
frameworks and modelling notations focus on the system-to-be, not the system-as-
is. The focus of these approaches is on the modelling and analysis of attacks and 
vulnerabilities, relating them to security requirements, or capturing and analysing 
security goals and countermeasures. The organisational context and the current 
system implementation are not considered - often they are only considered for a 
specific system. Equally, the operation and change of systems is not taken into 
account. Therefore, no software engineering approach addresses vulnerability 
identification of existing systems in an organisational context based on security 
requirements for the assessment of information security risks. 
3.3.3. In business process management 
In the workflow and business process modelling field, the principal idea is to 
integrate or assign risks to business process models to identify risks and evaluate 
their impact. In this field, the tight relationship between risks and business process 
models is indeed recognised, as risks endanger the achievement of business 
objectives. So far, researchers have taken three different directions to align risks 
and business process models:  
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1) Create separate models out of the original business process for risk 
modelling, with regard to aspects like goals, structures and data of the 
process; 
2) Enhance existing business process modelling notations and link risks to 
process elements; 
3) Align risk factors or any other elements used for risk management to 
business process elements. 
All the proposed approaches base themselves on risk management standards, like 
AS/NZ 4360 (ASNZ, 2004), and use threats and vulnerabilities for all kind of risks - 
not solely for information security risks. Some of the developed approaches 
conclude by proposing methods for identifying risks, but propose no method for 
evaluating and monitoring. Mostly, risks are determined by business values or risk 
factors and as a subsequent activity, existing business process models are 
enhanced, duplicated or rebuilt. 
 
The few approaches in the business process modelling and workflow management 
field that use security requirements are focused on determining the best security 
solutions based on requirements, rather than on analysis of the current security 
situation. They define the security requirements for a process or process element, 
and then determine a security solution. Others integrate security requirements into 
the business process model. The principal issue of security requirement 
approaches - such as Herrmann and Herrmann (2006) facilitating security 
requirements specification and implementation, or Roehrig and Knorr (2004) 
analysing security requirements and identifying security measures - is that they 
provide no procedure or method to evaluate, assess or monitor existing security 
functions (the current state) regarding the adherence to security requirements and 
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information security risks. These approaches start by considering the business 
process and determining security requirements for the processes; they then 
propose the best security controls. Security functions that have already been 
implemented are neither considered nor evaluated. Furthermore, most of these 
proposed approaches start from scratch and do not consider the available security 
functions or re-engineer processes in order to propose the best security solutions 
to adhere to the security requirements. 
3.3.4. Conclusion 
In risk assessments for organisations, security requirements are used only to 
determine the impact; in risk assessment in business process management and 
software engineering, security requirements are used for the purpose of creating 
secure systems or processes. This difference in the usage of security 
requirements is due to the focus of the approaches in the different fields.  
In business process management, security requirements are mainly used to 
determine best solutions for processes or to analyse process security. In this 
context, security requirements are used as references to determine the best 
security solution for a process, or are compared with proposals for security design 
and security mechanisms to design the process securely. 
In software engineering, frameworks and modelling notations have been 
developed that support requirement extraction, analysis or visualisation. The 
objective of these approaches is to produce a set of security requirements that 
provide “good enough” security against potential attacks. Security requirements 
are evaluated to discover whether the design or security mechanism of a system 
to be developed can meet the security requirements.  
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In risk assessments for organisations, security requirements are used for 
determining the impact of vulnerabilities or to determine whether vulnerabilities are 
a risk for the organisation. The starting point for risk evaluation is threats and 
vulnerabilities. Vulnerabilities are determined based on the existence of (identified) 
threats and the potential violation of security requirements. Only three approaches 
were identified - NIST SP 800-30 (Stoneburner et al., 2002b), Common Criteria 
(CC, 2006), and the approach of Innerhofer-Oberperfler and Breu (2006) - that use 
security requirements as a basis for security evaluation in risk assessments. In 
NIST SP 800-30, asset-unspecific security standards are used as security 
requirements; the CC evaluates only the security requirements of a product; and in 
Innerhofer-Oberperfler and Breu security requirements are used for impact 
determination but not evaluated.  
In current approaches found in the literature in practice and research security 
requirements and their implementation are not explicitly evaluated to determine 
vulnerabilities in a risk assessment for an organisation. Therefore with these 
approaches, one cannot be sure of having identified only true positive 
vulnerabilities with regard to the business security needs of the organisation. 
3.4. Problems of risk assessment 
The main three activities of a security risk assessment are risk identification, risk 
analysis and risk evaluation (ISO, 2009a). Uncertainty is a general problem among 
these activities. In section 3.4.1 the general limitations regarding risk assessments 
are presented, categorised into the three key steps of any risk assessment: 
identification, data collection and assessment. In section 3.4.2, a view on the 
current practice of risk assessments - in particular, whether security requirements 
can or are already used and whether vulnerability identification errors do occur are 
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discussed, based on a survey among security professionals. Section 3.4.3 is about 
the concrete issues an assessor faces with regard to vulnerability identification 
and probability estimations. 
3.4.1. Procedural limitations 
In internationally accepted standards about risk management (e.g. ISO/IEC 31000 
(ISO, 2009a)) and specifically in information security risk management (e.g. 
ISO/IEC 27005:2011 (ISO, 2011c)), the principal steps to determine risks are 
asset identification, event/threat identification, vulnerability/control identification, 
likelihood determination and impact analysis. Within the literature, many limitations 
of risk assessment approaches are provided. All this critique can be categorised 
into three activities of any risk assessment: identification, data collection and 
assessment. 
 
(1) The identification category is about activities undertaken to determine, for 
example, an event. A threat that uses vulnerabilities is defined as an event (ISO, 
2011c). The identification of threats and vulnerabilities is challenging, as 
underlying conditions change constantly, through development of new 
technologies, new competitors, new laws, etc. (Jackson, 2007). Therefore, threats 
and vulnerabilities are not static; their behaviour and seriousness can change 
rapidly, often within days. Threats and vulnerabilities are identified based on 
security expert knowledge, usage of security scanning tools and publicly available 
data. Security experts use implicit knowledge and experience, as well as explicit 
data such as vulnerability lists, for risk identification. But how does one know and 
how can one verify whether or not all threats and vulnerabilities have been 
identified correctly and completely? Furthermore, events within associated 
  
 
 Page 105 of 394  
companies (e.g. outsourcing partners or inter-company process chain partners) 
cannot necessarily be discovered; they are beyond company boundaries. However, 
these events could potentially negatively affect a company, as business processes 
and systems are heavily interconnected nowadays (Kinney, 2003). 
 
(2) The data category is about the data needed for the evaluation of risks. For the 
impact and probability assessment of a risk, data regarding the impact and 
probability of an event in a given situation is needed. The major issues here are 
that exhaustive public data of events, impacts and their respective probabilities are 
not available (Stewart, 2004), and internal historic data are not available for the 
estimation of the impact of possible changes on the company. For example, the 
event may not have occurred in this type of industry yet, within the company or 
within the scope of the particular situation. If no comparable data is available, best 
guesses must be used for determining the change’s impact and probability. But 
how to make such a best guess in an environment where one knows little about 
the population, to determine the occurrence rates, effects or impact of the events? 
In case the event data is available, internal data about events in companies can 
still be incomplete, or may represent a “lucky” history (Frachot and Roncalli, 2002) 
and thus quickly become obsolete. In addition, internal historic event data may not 
represent a true view, and the number of events recorded could be lower than the 
true number (Frachot and Roncalli, 2002). For example, the claims data recorded 
regarding the occurrence rate and extent of loss, are often below the average of 
the reference industry or of competitors. Another issue is that probability 
distributions become incorrect as they are based on historic data, not representing 
modern event behaviour changes (Stiglitz, 2008). For example, 100-year events 
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reoccur nowadays every 10 years in fat-tailed distributions. How can one verify 
that the data used for the assessment are still correct? 
 
(3) The assessment category is about activities or models to evaluate the 
change’s impact. Risk assessment is based on the impact and the probability of 
the event. The models used to determine risks and dependencies are poor, 
because co-occurrence of risks, uncertainty between event relationships and 
different assessment scales are not considered. Co-occurrence of events leads to 
indeterminable impacts and damages, because the events might occur in 
associated companies; that, in turn, may have an impact on other risks that are not 
considered when they are evaluated in isolation. In the current methods, the 
assessments are performed on decomposed model elements but do not consider 
the organisation as a whole. Furthermore, there is uncertainty between the 
relationship of an event and its impact. For example, where the impact of the event 
is not known, or is dependent on other conditions/parameters. However, side 
effects (multiple impacts or dependencies) or parameters are not considered, and 
uncertainty is assessed by gut feeling, or by subjective security expert knowledge 
(Stewart, 2004). Although safeguards put in place are considered in the impact 
assessment, they are evaluated for a particular threat/vulnerability, and the side 
effects of other events are not considered. How does one determine that 
safeguards are implemented and operated as intended? A systematic assessment 
of the safeguards regarding secure operation, secure design and effectiveness is 
currently missing. Furthermore, probabilities are measured by different techniques 
- by both quantitative and qualitative methods. But the comparability of qualitative 
and quantitative assessments of risks or probabilities within an assessment 
method is not validated. Furthermore, assessments are influenced by perceptions 
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(Stewart, 2004). Behavioural biases as a result of the educational background, 
organisational level or positive/negative attitude of the assessor may also affect 
the assessment of events, probabilities of occurrence or the impact estimation - 
assessments always involve subjective judgement (Redmill, 2002). In addition, 
current risk assessment procedures lead to simplification, and are focused too 
strongly on technical issues rather than on information or business issues (Gerber 
et al., 2001). For procedural reasons, the assessor will usually simplify, otherwise 
he will be lost in detail and forget the objectives (Halliday et al., 1996). Additionally, 
methods follow the waterfall model and therefore are not capable of considering 
changes during the lifetime of the assessment (Vidalis, 2004). 
 
The limitations of information security risk assessments are related to uncertainty 
about the occurrence of threats and vulnerabilities (Kinney, 2003), as well as 
future or unknown events (Pieters and Consoli, 2009). Questions which arise 
include: how likely are events? What is the impact of events? Can one anticipate 
risk? Basically, for the risk assessment, one does not have reliable and accurate 
data on events’ probabilities and their impact on the company (Stewart, 2004). 
Another problem is the complexity of the real world, considering all its variables, 
where models are likely to fail. Risk assessments are mainly based on estimations, 
assumptions, simplifications and causal dependencies (McKenna, 2001), and the 
objectivity of risk and security are often implicitly assumed (Pieters and Consoli, 
2009). An additional aspect is risk perception influencing people’s behaviour 
(Sjöberg et al., 2004) - that’s to say, the subjective assessment of an event and its 
(negative) impact. Risk perception is not only about individuals. It also has a social 
and cultural component, reflected in values, symbols or the history of a group of 
people. Risk perception is not discussed in detail in this thesis, but subjectivity 
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caused by perception is also a problem of risk assessment results. However, no 
matter how objective or subjective risk assessments are, they are necessary to 
determine risks and to apply the appropriate security functions. But an attempt 
should be made to identify vulnerabilities and risks accurately to reflect the current 
risk situation for an organisation. 
3.4.2. A survey among practitioner’s 
In a lecture at an information security conference on February 25th 2011 the 55 
participants, all security professionals, were interviewed in the form of a 
questionnaire and a quasi-experiment regarding IS risk assessments and the 
application of security requirements. The objective of the survey was to examine 
the current practice of risk assessments - in particular, the procedures and 
concepts used in risk assessments, the trust in risk assessment results, the 
evaluation of security controls and the usage of security requirements, as well as 
the availability of process models. One further aspect examined was whether 
security requirements and business process models positively support the 
identification of vulnerabilities and risks. The survey consisted of three parts; parts 
1 and 2 were made up of a questionnaire with multiple-choice questions where 
participants were able to tick multiple answers and able to add own answers. Part 
3 formed a quasi-experiment, where participants had to perform a risk assessment 
task and to document their risks identified. The questionnaire was verified in a test 
run beforehand, to ascertain to what extent the questions are understood and the 
responses can be evaluated. The design of the quasi-experiment (part 3) was also 
tested, in a trial, by an individual with the same background as the conference 
participants with regard to understandability, time required and the results 
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generated. In the following, a description of the content and aims of parts 1, 2 and 
3 is provided: 
 
Part 1 contained questions about IT risk assessment, in particular, about what 
criteria are used and how risk results are valued. This part of the survey mainly 
dealt with what methods are used, the purpose of risk assessments and what - 
and to what extent - concepts are used by practitioners. The questions were based 
on the security risk assessment concepts, methods and procedures identified in 
the literature review. The aim of these questions was to determine the current 
practice regarding risk assessments in the industry, as well as how familiar 
practitioners are with security risk concepts. 
Part 2 concerned the use of business process models, classification of data in 
enterprises and the use of security requirements in risk assessments. Here, the 
questions were about the availability of business process models, as well as about 
risk identification with security requirements. The questions were based on the 
hypothesis that security requirements and business process models can be 
(re)used for vulnerability identification and could resolve identification errors. 
Basically, the aim was to get to know whether process models and security 
requirements are available, whether risks identified by security requirements are 
perceived as being more accurate, whether security requirements are used, and to 
what extent they are used in assessments. 
Part 3 contained a risk assessment task. The survey’s participants had to carry 
out a risk assessment based on different sets of information given. The example 
used for this task was a real world business process model, a risk analysis 
describing the business case and risks identified, and a security requirements 
description relevant to the business case. Participants had to identify and 
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document on a blank page the vulnerabilities/risks, and determine their probability 
and impact. The objective was to verify whether vulnerabilities are identified more 
accurately by participants if information such as security requirements or a 
business process model is available. This part of the survey was used for 
validation; to determine that security requirements and business process models 
can help to resolve vulnerability identification errors (see section 6.4 for details), as 
a higher accuracy and precision might be achieved.  
 
The survey took place in a closed room under supervision. The participants had 
approximately 30 minutes’ time to answer the questionnaire. Out of all 55 
participants, 45 answered part 1 and 46 answered part 2. Part 3 of the 
questionnaire was performed by 36 participants. Multiple answers were allowed for 
some questions. In the following, a brief overview of the results is presented. The 
detailed survey results can be found in the appendix. 
 
Survey results - Parts 1 and 2  
The aim of the survey was to investigate the following hypotheses at part 1 and 2 
from the perspective of security specialists in the field, and to what extent these 
hypotheses can be confirmed or denied based on the answers of the 
questionnaire. The hypotheses were drafted as a result of the literature review in 
order to determine whether security requirements and business process models 
can be - or are already - used for vulnerability identification.  
 
Hypothesis 1: Risk assessment procedures are considered as inadequate by 
security experts due to the subjectivity of results, insufficient data for assessments, 
the accumulation of risk and inadequate consideration of frequencies. 
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Risk assessment procedures are considered in practice as procedures with 
shortcomings, but not completely rejected because of their deficiencies. It was 
confirmed that risks cannot be determined objectively and vulnerability 
identification errors do occur because of insufficient data. However, risk 
assessments are not considered to be subjective by the participants, even when 
they are influenced by external events. The accumulation of risk results, e.g. of 
medium or high risk, was not identified as a problem or recognised as such in 
practice. Furthermore, the frequency of events is often not considered in risk 
assessments as reported. Participants specified that assessment procedures 
should improve, particularly in the integration and combination of compliance and 
risk management, and in the efficiency of the assessment process. The existing 
assessment procedures are largely considered to be adequate by the participants. 
 
Hypothesis 2: All security controls are reviewed in risk assessments as proposed 
by best practice standards. 
The survey reflects a mixed picture. Security controls are partially not evaluated, 
or possibly only for assets with weaknesses. Another group of the participants 
evaluates security controls for assets which are assessed in the context of risk 
assessment. However, a systematic assessment of security controls for all assets 
is not conducted. 
 
Hypothesis 3: Business process models are available and up-to-date in practice. 
The survey has confirmed that business process models for critical and important 
processes at companies are both available and up-to-date. Mainly actors, activities 
and IT systems are represented in the business process models. Risks, security 
controls and security requirements are not modelled. As drivers for business 
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process modelling, efficiency gains and cost reduction (as well as regulatory 
requirements) are seen by the participants. 
 
Hypothesis 4: Security requirements are in part considered in the risk assessment, 
but not systematically used for the assessment of risks. 
Security requirements are defined for IT systems and data, and are usually 
described in the relevant security policies/guidelines. Security requirements are 
usually considered in risk assessments. To what extent security requirements are 
systematically used in risk assessments (especially for vulnerability identification) 
could not be verified in the survey. However, due to the fact that best practice 
methods are used based on threats/vulnerabilities, and that survey participants 
had often not mentioned security controls and security requirements as criteria in 
risk assessments in part 1 of the survey, it is assumed that security requirements 
are not systematically used for vulnerability identification. 
 
Hypothesis 5: Security requirements are used in risk assessments; they are 
defined for assets and used to measure risks. 
Security requirements are used in the risk assessment for assets (IT systems and 
data) as well as for assets defined. There is no active measurement of risk, but 
security requirements are used to verify data security. 
 
Hypothesis 6: Data is classified throughout the company. 
At 90 percent of the participants’ companies, IT systems and/or data are classified 
according to confidentiality, integrity and availability. Data classification is 
considered in the description of security requirements and, as such, the 
classification is available in risk assessments. 
  
 
 Page 113 of 394  
 
To conclude, the participants of the survey consider a risk assessment as a 
procedure with shortcomings, but do not completely reject the concept. 
Participants report that risks cannot be determined objectively and vulnerability 
identification errors occur. Mostly, security best practices and checklists are used. 
Security functions are not completely evaluated for all assets in assessments and 
security requirements are partly used - but not systematically to identify 
vulnerabilities. 
3.4.3. Determing probabilities - An example 
In general in a security risk assessment, after having identified the assets, the 
assessor begins by determining threats that could occur, and then cites any 
existing vulnerability. For the identification of threats and vulnerabilities, the 
assessor uses security best practices, a list of threats and vulnerabilities or 
security controls, and his own experiences. Different sources of information are 
used to identify threats and vulnerabilities. The problems start with the fact that 
one cannot determine whether the threat, vulnerability or security control lists used 
are complete and comprehensive. These lists are compiled by governmental or 
business organisations, without making a claim of being complete; they are 
updated sporadically. In addition, these security control practices - as well as 
threat and vulnerability lists - are based on past experience. This may not present 
a true view; as a result, these sources do not contain all threats or vulnerabilities 
which could occur and thus have a negative impact. Threats/vulnerabilities that 
have not occurred yet or were deemed as negligible - as well as specific security 
controls - are not necessarily seen as best practice. It is not only that these lists 
may not contain negligible threats, but also that the assessor tends to omit 
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irrelevant or very unlikely threats like earthquakes or espionage, as these do not 
happen very often, based on his experience. Furthermore, to determine the 
likelihood and impact of threats and vulnerabilities, there is no detailed guidance 
available - only general advice. Risk assessment approaches like, for example, 
NIST SP 800-30 (Stoneburner et al., 2002b) do not describe how to link threat 
sources with vulnerabilities, or how to derive and rate any probabilities. Further 
questions arise: Does the probability estimation represent a true view? How does 
one validate the estimations? If you use qualitative or quantitative thresholds for 
ratings, these limits have to be reasonable in the context of all vulnerabilities and 
risks identified, in order to compare them among each other. These limits are likely 
to be too high or low for some of the risks identified, as they have to be suitable 
across the organisation. In addition, the aggregation of probability values causes 
problems; it might pervert the probability to a minimum and the effects to systems 
(and whether they are single or multiple effects) cannot be reliably estimated. If the 
maximum value is used, this may be an overrepresentation and an average may 
be an underestimation. It is also dependent on the number of estimates. A joint 
probability calculation of independent events leads to a decreased value, as the 
lowest value determines the probability. Furthermore, the consequences and the 
existence of misestimating are not considered. Misestimating, as well as the 
existence of ambiguity and the aggregation of risk, creates a measurement risk not 
indicated in the assessments. Another issue is psychological phenomena; the 
assessor can be influenced by emotional factors. These can be based on 
experience or social groups, negative media on technology or commercials, as 
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There is a lot of uncertainty in the estimation of probabilities to determine which 
might be a ‘real’ risk for a company. In order to showcase the issues of estimating 
probabilities in an uncertain environment, a probability calculation of a hypothetical 
encryption vulnerability at a web server is conducted. In the following, the 
probabilities of the following outcomes for the web server will be outlined:  
 A criminal exploits the encryption weakness in the webserver; 
 A hacker exploits the encryption weakness in the webserver; 
 A hacker or a criminal exploits the encryption weakness in the webserver; 
 The likeliness that a hacker or criminal is not able to exploit any weakness. 
 
To determine the probabilities of the identified web server threats, further data is 
needed and parameters that are associated with this scenario must be considered. 
The following data were identified to be considered for the probability evaluation 
and evaluated as to whether they were available:  
 The number of known exploits for the webserver version: the number of 
exploits should be determinable by publicly reported bugs/vulnerabilities;  
 The number of unsecured exploits for the webserver version: the number of 
unsecured exploits should be determinable by a security analysis; 
 The criticality of exploits: this is determinable, as exploits are rated by 
security organisations; 
 The detection rate of all vulnerabilities by a malicious user: this ratio is not 
determinable as the ratio is dependent on the knowledge, available tools 
and number of exploits/vulnerabilities available;  
 The ratio of successful exploiting: this is also indeterminable - it is 
dependent on the knowledge of the malicious users, the complexity of 
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vulnerability as well as the motive, resources and available time of the 
malicious user; 
 The number of users of the web server application: this can be determined 
by page views and IP-address matching; 
 The relation of friendly and malicious users accessing the webserver: again, 
not determinable and dependent on popularity of the company, fame for 
successful breach, monetary gain, etc.; 
 The impact of controls: this is not considered explicitly, as a firewall 
prevents an attack. Implicitly, controls are considered in the ratio of 
successful exploiting; 
 
Out of the data that was considered as necessary to determine the probabilities, a 
tree diagram was created to show the dependency between the parameters (see 
Figure 3-9). Furthermore, this is useful for the probability estimation.  
 
 
Figure 3-9 Dependency tree 
The malicious users accessing the website are separated into two groups - 
hackers and criminals - as identified in the threat analysis previously. The sub-
levels below hackers and criminals are the same. Each has been assigned a 
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detection ratio for vulnerabilities - i.e., the probability that they are successful 
detecting the vulnerabilities. Next follows the ratio of exploitable vulnerabilities; 
only a few vulnerabilities are exploitable as they were not secured. The next level 
is about whether the hacker/criminal is capable of exploiting unsecured 
vulnerabilities. The last level of the tree is the probability that this vulnerability is 
exploited; some are likely to be more exploited than others. In this example, the 
independency of variables (e.g. hacker, criminal, the encryption and SQL 
vulnerability) is assumed. However, it is often hard to determine whether 
parameters are independent, because knowledge is necessary about intentions 
(e.g. that’s the difference between a hacker and criminal), technical details of 
vulnerabilities (e.g. details about the encryption and SQL issue) and the 
environment (e.g. applied administrative and technical security functions) of the 
parameters and their relationship to each other. 
 
The following figure shows the assigned probability values of the security expert 
for each parameter of the tree. Most of the probability values in the dependency 
tree are only an expert judgement, with no claim of being valid. Rather, these 
artificial values are used to showcase how the overall probability is affected by 
single values, as well as being able to provide a probability statement about the 
hacker and criminal exploiting the webserver to help answer the questions posed 
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Figure 3-10 Dependency tree with probabilities 
 
Before presenting the detailed probability estimation results for the hacker and 
criminal, one would expect that the webserver is a medium risk. The results for the 
probabilities from the start of this analysis are as follows: 
 A criminal exploits the encryption weakness in the web server = 0.144 percent 
of malicious users (nobody); 
 A hacker exploits the encryption weakness in the web server = 0.384 percent 
of malicious users (nobody); 
 A hacker or a criminal exploits the encryption weakness in the web server = 
0.528 percent (nobody); 
 The likeliness that a hacker or criminal does not exploit any weakness = 97.36 
percent. 
 
One can notice that there is a discrepancy between the expectation of the risk 
(rated as medium) and the detailed calculation (not very likely). Even if you change 
the obviously small exploitable ratio (Exploit (5%) and Non exploit (95%) in the 
tree) for the hacker and criminal from 5 percent to 50 percent, the results change 
for the hacker by 3.5 percent, for the criminal by 1.3 percent and the combined 
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result by 4.7 percent. The likeliness that both do not exploit any weakness 
decreases by (only) 24 percent. Based on the results and the experiences when 
changing some ratios, the following can be noted: 
 
Dependencies: There is a direct dependency of the result to single parameters, i.e., 
a reduction/increase of one parameter leads to a reduction/increase of the result 
by the same percentage. Therefore the percentage of misestimating is relevant, 
not the absolute amount. For example, if the single value of the exploitable ratio 
changes from 5 to 10 percent (100 percent increase) then the results change in 
the same ratio (100 percent). Especially changes of low probability values have a 
huge impact on the overall result. 
Baseline: The base of the probability has to be specified. A probability of, say, 12 
percent has no significance without knowing the total population. This is especially 
true when populations are further linked - like the malicious-to-normal users ratio. 
Probability: The total probability (the result) tends towards 0 or 100 percent in a 
chain of parameters, as the total probability is below/above the smallest/largest 
single value and small/large values are always existent. Therefore the significance 
of the result is disputable; it may be perceived as negligible because of the total 
probability value. Furthermore, results are blurred by the use of estimates; there is 
also no knowledge whether the base for the estimates follows any probability 
distribution, and one does not know the standard deviation. 
Tree diagram: Determination of the dependencies of the different factors is partly 
difficult as dependencies are not precisely known. This makes the construction of 
a correct tree diagram difficult, which, in turn, has an impact on the probability 
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Perception: The perception of the results is dependent on the probability statement 
and the size of the result value. For example, do you class the likelihood of an 
event as 95 percent unlikely or 5 percent likely? A higher percentage is assumed 
to provide more confidence (perception), and the perceived significance of the 
result can be higher if negative probability statements are used, e.g. likeliness that 
a malicious user does not exploit a weakness.  
 
Even if the probability ratios in the example might be incorrect, the example shows 
that vulnerability identification and probability estimation are both processes of 
high uncertainty. To identify and to determine events, probabilities and impacts 
correctly we must have comprehensive knowledge about the environment of the 
risk, the company and outside world. This would require that associated 
parameters, corresponding probabilities, the basic population, and correlations are 
known, immediately updated, based on enough statistical data and can be 
modelled. But this data is often not available, may be compromised, cannot be 
reliably verified and modelled; the real world is too complex and unpredictable. 
From that perspective, using probabilities in a risk assessment in an uncertain 
environment where these data are not available leads to over- or under- 
representation of the risks of an organisation. 
3.5. Research questions 
Different risk assessment methods have been developed in business and 
governmental areas. They have been applied to specific problems but using the 
same concepts, which are described in information security standards. Events, 
threats and vulnerabilities are the starting points, along with security requirements, 
of any risk assessment method. In business process management, as well as in 
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software engineering, security requirements are analysed to ensure the secure 
design and security functions of a system to be developed, but not to verify 
implemented security functions (the current state) and to identify vulnerabilities. 
These approaches are helpful to define the best security functions for systems, but 
are not suitable for determining the organisation’s information security risk. 
However, in business process management and software engineering, security 
requirements provide the starting-point for any analysis of the security system 
design and security function implementation; and therefore they could help to 
determine vulnerabilities more accurately and provide a measurement criterion for 
security. In risk assessments for organisations, security requirements are used to 
determine the impact of vulnerabilities and the presence of vulnerabilities or 
security functions. However, security requirements of (information) assets are not 
explicitly analysed to identify vulnerabilities with regard to the security design or 
security functions. Usually, brainstorming, security testing, security and 
vulnerability checklists as well as best practices are used to determine events and 
the vulnerabilities of single assets. But these data are uncertain – they are asset-
unspecific - and they do not consider (inter-)organisational differences and their 
security requirements (Siponen and Willison, 2009) seriously enough. There is a 
risk that inefficient security solutions are applied, substantial threats are ignored 
(false negatives) and companies may believe in inaccurate results (Fenz and 
Ekelhart, 2011). This uncertainty in the assessment procedure was also shown in 
section 3.4 through the discussion on procedural limitations of approaches, the 
probability estimation example and the survey among security professionals. 
Furthermore, with the methods used in current approaches like security testing, 
only the presence of vulnerabilities can be proved - not their absence (Wang, 2005) 
- as only security issues are identified. The true value - the security needed, 
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represented by security requirements - is not evaluated. One cause for the lack of 
consideration of security requirements in risk identification lies in the definition of 
risk - based on threats, vulnerabilities and impact. Another reason is that security 
requirements tend to come after identifying vulnerabilities. This means that 
security requirements are drafted after identifying risks, and after the decision on 
risk treatment has been taken. However, this neglects the fact that risk 
assessments are recurring activities and security requirements are usually already 
available and drafted for assets, for example, in security policies and procedures 
as reported by the survey participants of section 3.4.2.  
Because vulnerability identification errors (false positives and negatives) can 
cause a company to invest in security functions that are not required and that are 
not compliant to any governmental regulations, or can lead to unwanted losses, 
resolving vulnerability identification errors would help to reduce the security risks 
of a company. Therefore, the research objective of this work is to utilise security 
requirements and business context-dependent information at the vulnerability 
identification phase of security risk assessments for the purpose of resolving 
vulnerability identification errors (false positives) and help to resolve false 
negatives. The following research questions have been formulated to achieve the 
research objective as defined in section 1.3. The results of this work enhance the 
understanding of security requirements within information security risk 
assessments for vulnerability identification. Question 1 was already answered with 
the discussion of the current state of the literature in section 3.3 and the 
discussion of the problems of risk assessment in section 3.4. 
1) Are security requirements already used for vulnerability identification in risk 
assessments in current approaches? Do vulnerability identification errors 
occur and are they reported by security practitioners? 
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The discussion of the literature (see section 3.3) shows that, in current 
security risk assessment approaches, security requirements are used to 
determine the impact of vulnerabilities, but not for their identification. Asset-
specific security requirements are not evaluated to identify any vulnerability. 
Furthermore, from the discussion of the limitations of risk assessment 
approaches (section 3.4.1), it can be concluded that vulnerability errors 
occur because of uncertainties about current and future events and threats. 
In addition, the probability assessment example (see section 3.4.3) shows 
that there is uncertainty in determining probabilities; this also causes errors 
in vulnerability occurrence rates. Survey participants (see section 3.4.2) 
also report that risk assessment results are subjective and vulnerability 
identification errors can occur; assessments are valued as error-prone. 
2) How are vulnerabilities, risks, security requirements and security controls 
related and can risks be determined by evaluating security requirements, 
as a risk is defined by vulnerabilities and impact? How should risk be 
defined in order to use security requirements for identifying risks and 
vulnerabilities through their evaluation in business process models? 
Concepts of security risk management and assessment, and their 
relationships to each other, are described by information security models 
as shown in section 1.2. These models define the elements, terminology 
and their relationships, as well as forming the basis for security risk 
assessment and management. One contribution of this thesis is an 
extended information security model showing the relation between risk-, 
asset- and security-related concepts (see section 4.1). It also provides a 
security requirements definition of risk. The extended information security 
model provides the foundation for determining vulnerabilities and risks by 
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security requirements in information security risk assessments - besides 
using events, probabilities and impact for risk identification. The model also 
helps to understand the relations between risk-, asset- and security-related 
concepts. 
3) Can a security requirements and business process model based approach 
help to resolve vulnerability identification errors (false positives and false 
negatives)? Does the accuracy of identified vulnerabilities increase (true 
positives), and vulnerability identification errors decrease (false positives), 
by explicitly evaluating security requirements by means of business 
process models?  
With the proposed security requirements risk assessment approach called 
‘SRA’ (chapter 5) and validation work (chapter 6), evidence is provided that 
vulnerability identification errors can be resolved by explicitly evaluating 
security requirements in the business process context. Within the validation, 
a best practice security risk assessment approach and the proposed 
approach are both applied to several real-world examples within an 
insurance company, and the results’ accuracy compared. In addition, the 
quasi-experiment results of the survey are used for validation, to show that 
vulnerability identification errors can be reduced by using security 
requirements and business process models. 
3.6. Research methodology 
The validation and verification of results is a well-recognised activity in the 
scientific community to test hypotheses. Verification surrounds the truth or 
accuracy of the theory, methods or model developed, whilst validity is about 
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relevance and significance. In applied research, experiments are used to validate 
and test hypotheses. According to Wallace and Zelkowitz (1997), experimentation 
in computer science can be grouped into one of three methods:  
 Observational methods collect data on an ongoing activity (e.g. project 
monitoring, case study, assertion and field study); 
 Historical methods collect data on already finished activities (e.g. literature 
searches, legacy data, lessons-learned and static analysis); 
 Controlled methods are about collection of statistical data to prove validity 
(e.g. replicated experiments, synthetic environment experiments, dynamic 
analysis and simulation). 
An overview and explanation of research methods in computer science can be 
found in Holz et al. (2006), and in computer science, observational methods like 
lessons learned, assertion and case studies are most often used (Wallace and 
Zelkowitz, 1997). Therefore, in the following paragraphs, observational methods 
are discussed and considered for the verification and validation of the security 
requirements risk assessment approach in this thesis. To validate work in 
computer science the following methods are most often used:  
1) Case study; 
2) Constructed examples; 
3) Testing on real examples; 
4) Controlled experiment. 
 
1) Case study  
This method for verification and validation would be based on an existing case 
study containing business process models. The proposed approach would be 
applied to the case study and the results of the two would then be compared. Such 
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a case study must provide details about the business processes, systems, 
underlying conditions (technical, economic and behavioural), the risk assessment 
results and procedure of the applied risk assessment approaches to be reused. 
 
After an extensive search of both the published literature and publicly available 
information, a case study complying with these requirements was not found. Case 
studies or papers about current practices on business process models are rarely 
available (zur Muehlen, 2007), because research mostly focuses on enhancing of 
business process models and their effects, e.g. modelling languages (zur Muehlen, 
2007) or project outcomes (Eikebrokk et al., 2008). There are some other business 
process management case studies to which process models were applied, as for 
instance in organisational change (Mendes et al., 2003) or in healthcare (Becker et 
al., 2007). But these studies do not provide models or enough details to use them 
for validation and verification. 
 
2) Constructed examples 
This method for verification and validation would use a constructed example of a 
problem. The proposed approach would be applied to that example and the results 
then interpreted. This method has the advantage that: 
 the examples can be illustrative regarding the contribution; 
 examples can be changed to lead to alternative results; 
 the approach and results can be properly depicted. 
However, constructed examples have the disadvantage that they may mask 
problems which would have occurred in the real world, or that they may merely 
reflect the theory. In addition, these examples may be too focused on one specific 
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problem; key parameters that influence the results may be accidentally or 
deliberately omitted. 
 
Constructed examples are used in the problem domain, for example, by 
Innerhofer–Oberperfler and Breu (2006) to discuss and showcase the developed 
approach. Matulevicius et al. (2008) also use a real world running example to 
demonstrate the applicability of their approach. But the examples used by them 
could not be used for validation, as details are missing or are too specific to the 
applied problem. In this thesis, constructed examples are used only for the 
presentation of the security requirements risk assessment approach (as in section 
5.3) because of the disadvantages mentioned previously.    
 
3) Testing 
This method for verification and validation would use an example taken from the 
real world. The proposed approach would be applied to the real world example 
and the results then compared to the results of an applied alternative approach. 
This requires that the work should be conducted twice and the underlying 
conditions be the same for both approaches. To use this method successfully, 
some conditions also have to be met:  
 The assessed real world example should be complex, but not too complex 
and not too large; 
 two different teams have to apply one of the approaches with people with 
the same skills and information on the environment; 
 the assessments have to be conducted in the same time period to 
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Testing is often used by researchers to verify their developed methods. For 
example, Mayer (2009) and Haley (2007) both validate their model- and security-
requirements-based approaches by testing at companies. However, the validation 
cases used cannot for the most part be reused, as the test environment has 
technically, organisationally or socially changed and cannot be re-established. 
This is also because the specifics are not described in every detail. The security 
requirements risk assessment approach in this thesis will also be validated and 
verified by testing at a global insurance company. The proposed approach and an 
existing alternative approach are applied to the same real world examples, and the 
results and differences compared regarding their accuracy. The difference in this 
thesis - compared to other works - is that two different approaches are applied 
three times and results compared, while others only apply their approach to the 
real world once and interpret their results from that.     
 
4) Controlled experiment 
This method for validation would use reference groups where the results from one 
experimental sample are compared against the control sample. The difference 
between the two groups (the control and experiment group) would be the only 
effect to be tested. The two groups should be probabilistically equal, which means 
that the groups should act in the same manner with the information provided, and 
the measurement of the effects should be performed in the same way. With a 
controlled experiment, the security requirement risk assessment approach and a 
best practice risk assessment approach would be performed by two groups and 
the results compared against each other. But this would require that the group 
applying the security requirement assessment approach has enough knowledge of 
the approach, the risk situation is described without interpretation, and assessors 
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have similar risk knowledge, which might not be achievable in practice. Such an 
experiment would have too many variables (e.g. individuals’ knowledge about 
security risk assessments, or about threats and vulnerabilities, or the learning 
curve of the approaches) on which the result is dependent. Therefore, to apply two 
different approaches in an experimental setting - and to compare results and 
determine the effects - would not lead to meaningful results. 
 
In published computer science and software engineering articles, experiments are 
used only in about 2-3% of works, as reported by Wallace and Zelkowitz (1997) 
and Sjoeberg et al. (2005) for the years 1985, 1990, 1995 and in the decade from 
1993 to 2002. None of the work related to the proposed approach identified in the 
literature review uses experiments to verify their proposed procedures. These 
could therefore not be used as reference points. In this thesis, a quasi-experiment 
is performed to demonstrate that vulnerability identification errors can be resolved 
by providing additional sets of information on the same risk description (the 
grouping variable). In the quasi-experiment, individuals were not randomly 
assigned (which would be the case in an experiment), but rather the experiment 
was embedded in a survey at an information security conference. However, the 
participants were randomly provided with different sets of information (all 
participants got a risk description, two-thirds also got a business process model, 
and one-third a security requirements description) to identify risks and 
vulnerabilities. The effect to be tested was whether predefined risks included in the 
risk description were identified with different accuracy by the additional information 
provided, and whether vulnerability identification errors occurred (the dependent 
variable). The design of the quasi-experiment had been tested previously in a trial 
run by an individual with the same background as the information security 
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conference participants, to assess its comprehensibility, time required and the 
results generated by the different sets of information. 
3.7. Chapter summary 
Risk assessments are conducted in various fields, and focus on different aspects 
of different areas. Therefore, different risk assessment methods were developed in 
both business and governmental areas, applying to specific problems but building 
on the concepts of threat and vulnerabilities defining a risk. These concepts and 
the associated terminology are described in information security standards and 
form the basis of any risk assessment method. Events, threats and vulnerabilities 
are the starting point to determine risks, along with security requirements. Current 
information security risk assessment approaches for organisations use only 
security requirements to determine the impact and consequence of a vulnerability: 
however, they are not explicitly evaluated to identify them. Furthermore, current 
risk assessments have limitations in identifying vulnerabilities as well as in 
estimating probabilities accurately - all are related to uncertainty, causing false 
negatives and positives. Security requirements could help to determine 
vulnerabilities more accurately, as they specify the necessary security and provide 
a measurement criterion. Therefore, the research objective of this work is to utilise 
security requirements and business context-dependent information at the 
vulnerability identification phase of security risk assessments for the purpose of 
resolving vulnerability identification errors (false negatives). This would help to 
reduce security risks for a company; thereby, they could invest more efficiently in 
security. A security requirements risk assessment approach called ‘SRA’ will be 
developed, to resolve vulnerability identification errors. It will be validated by 
testing and a quasi-experiment. 
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Chapter 4 - Security Requirements based 
Risk Assessment 
In this chapter, the fundamental concepts for security requirements risk 
assessment approach called ‘SRA’ are illustrated. In order to understand why and 
how security requirements and business process models can help to resolve 
vulnerability identification errors, the underlying concepts are presented in general, 
before details of the SRA are given in chapter 5. Therefore, this chapter first 
explains the fundamental principles of concepts, the rationale as to why these 
concepts can be used, as well as how they are used in a security requirement risk 
assessment approach. An extended information security model describing the 
relationships between risk and vulnerability, and between security requirements 
and assets, is presented. The connection between risk, vulnerability and security 
requirements is re-defined, thereby allowing a risk definition based on security 
requirements. Using this definition of risk as well as business process model 
information, it is then illustrated how security requirements and business process 
models can be used in evaluating risks and vulnerabilities. Because security 
requirements represent security needs, define the desired security and can be 
used as a measurement value for security, they allow more accurate identification 
of vulnerabilities; they can provide a more informed statement about the security of 
an organisation. Furthermore, the elicitation of security requirements is discussed 
and a structure for security requirements’ characterisation is defined, based on 
business process model information supporting the assessment process. This 
chapter concludes with a discussion of why and how security requirements’ 
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interdependencies on information assets between business processes can be 
considered, before the proposed approach is explained in detail in the next 
chapter.  
4.1. An extended information security model 
Information security models were compiled to present the fundamental concepts 
and their relationships in security risk management and assessment. The 
conceptual relations - e.g. between assets, threats, vulnerabilities, impact and 
security requirements - are demonstrated by means of information security models 
by other researchers such as Stølen et al. (2002), Matulevicius et al. (2008) and 
Innerhofer–Oberperfler and Breu (2006) as described in chapter 1. To reiterate, 
these models provide a basis for a common understanding about the relationships 
between the different elements used in security risk management. A relationship 
connects elements of the model and describes their links to others. An element 
represents a concept (e.g. risk) or part of the concept (e.g. vulnerabilities, threats 
and events defining a risk).  
 
The IS models of chapter 1 define risk based on threats and vulnerabilities. In this 
thesis risk is defined by security requirements. But before defining risk based on 
security requirements, the models presented in chapter 1 are compared to see 
whether relations between risk and security requirements are already defined. 
Before the comparison, core definitions of the elements are provided which will be 
used later in this section for the extended information security model, which is 
based on these three models using similar terminology. The core definitions of the 
elements are as follows:  
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A security objective is a high level description of the security to be achieved; 
security is the protection of information. The security objective is driven by 
business requirements that are affected by risks. Business requirements describe 
security needs from a business operations perspective, where the business 
operation is a set of activities that is defined and can be modelled as a business 
process. A security requirement is a refinement and further specification of the 
security objective, and represents constraints on the functions of the system, 
where these constraints operationalize one or more security objectives (Haley et 
al., 2008). Risk treatment is the process of selection and implementation of 
security functions to modify risk based on security requirements. A security 
function implements security requirements in the form of administrative, physical 
or technical controls and is applied to an asset to adhere to the security 
requirement. Assurance is about the evaluation of a security function, and is used 
to establish whether the security requirements are adhered to. Assurance gives 
confidence that security functions reduce risks to assets and assets are protected 
according to the requirements. An asset can consist of hardware, software, 
information systems or any physical assets used to fulfil the business 
requirements of an organisation. An information asset is a refinement of an asset 
consisting of data. A risk is the combination of a probable event and its impact, 
which would result in the violation of security objectives. An impact is an adverse 
change of an event that violates the security objectives on an asset. An event is a 
threat that exploits a form of vulnerability. A vulnerability is a weakness of an asset 
or control related to the security objective, and a threat is a potential attack or 
incident that could lead to a negative impact on an asset. 
Table 4-1 compares the elements used in the models of Stølen et al., Matulevicius 
et al. and Innerhofer-Oberperfler and Breu against the elements used in the 
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extended information security model. This comparison shows that the models are 
built on the same core concepts. But elements like assurance and business 
requirements are missing in the models, linking security risk assessment with the 
business process management field.  
Table 4-1: Comparison of model elements and concepts of risk 





Stølen et al. 
(2002) 
Threat Threat Threat Threat 
Vulnerability Agent Vulnerability Vulnerability 
Event Incident Event Not used 
Impact Threat Impact Likelihood and 
Consequence 
Risk Threat Risk Risk 
Risk treatment Security solution Risk treatment Not used 
Element/Asset Model element Asset Asset 









Security objective Business Security 
Objective 
Security criterion Target of 
evaluation 
Assurance Not used Not used Not used 
Business 
requirements 
Not used Not used Not used 
Business process 
modelling 
Not used Not used Not used 
 
The three models - of Stølen et al. (2002), Matulevicius et al. (2008) and 
Innerhofer–Oberperfler and Breu (2006) - are based on the definition of risk being 
threats and vulnerabilities; they do not consider security requirements for 
determining a risk. Therefore, these models are missing the relationships between 
risk, controls, security requirements and assets. Furthermore different terminology 
is used for some of the concepts used.  
 Table 4-2 identifies which links between risk/ vulnerabilities and security 
objectives/ requirements are present and which are not in these models. For 
example, Stølen et al. (2002) did not consider controls as an element; nor did they 
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consider security requirements that were not directly linked to risks or assets. 
Matulevicius et al. (2008) made no link between the security requirement and 
control to an asset. Innerhofer–Oberperfler and Breu (2006) did not consider risk 
as an element, apart from noting that there is no direct link between security 
controls, security requirements and assets. 




Matulevicius et al. 
(2008) 
Stølen et al. 
( 2002) 
Risk to security 
objective 
No Yes No 
Risk to security 
requirement 
No Yes No 
Risk to business 
requirements 
No No No 
Vulnerability to 
security objective 




Yes No No 
 
As none of these models address relations between risk, security requirements, 
security controls and assets, an extended information-security model (see Figure 
4-1) is introduced to build on the previous models and represent these relations. 
This extended information security model supports the consideration of risk from a 
security requirements perspective, as it provides a combined view on concepts 
related to risk, risk treatment and security requirements. 
This extended information-security risk model adopts model elements and 
relations between elements from the models of Stølen et al. (2002), Matulevicius 
et al. (2008) and Innerhofer–Oberperfler and Breu (2006).  It uses rectangles for 
elements and arrows with a text annotation to describe the relationships between 
the elements. It adds elements for assurance, business requirements and 
business process modelling which are not present in the existing models. The 
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labelled arrows between elements like vulnerability and risk are added to describe 
the context of the relations and to make explicit the relations between the concepts 
related to risk, risk treatment, assets and security requirements. Labels are used 
to describe the connections between the elements. The core definitions of the 
model elements were described at the beginning of this section.  
 
 
Figure 4-1 Extended information security risk model 
Benefits of the model for research 
In comparison to the existing models, this extended information-security risk model 
provides a combined view on concepts related to risk, risk treatment, asset and 
security requirements, similar to the model of Matulevicius et al. (2008). The 
difference is that risk treatment and asset-related concepts are related via risk and 
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security requirements, not only via risk. Model elements like risk, vulnerability, 
security objective, security requirements, security control and the asset are related, 
showing that risks and vulnerabilities have an effect on security objectives, 
security requirements and assets. Matulevicius et al. (2008) do relate risks to 
security objectives and requirements, but they use that relationship to indicate that 
security requirements mitigate risk and that the significance of risk is determined 
by the security criterion. Innerhofer–Oberperfler and Breu (2006) relate threats to 
security requirements. This indicates the violation, but it misses the links between 
security requirements and security controls, and their model also omits the 
concept of vulnerabilities. In the model of Stølen et al. (2002), vulnerabilities and 
assets are related via the security policy with security requirements, but risk 
treatment concepts are not made explicit. Because the extended information 
security model shows the effect of risks and vulnerabilities on security objectives, 
security requirements and assets, it can help to better understand the relationship 
between risk-, asset-, security requirements- and risk treatment-related concepts, 
and thus to achieve a better integration of these concepts within current risk 
assessment approaches. Furthermore, it is used as a foundation for defining risk 
in terms of security requirements - because of the relationship between risk and 
vulnerabilities, to security objectives and associated security requirements - rather 
than just in terms of threats and vulnerabilities. 
4.2. Security requirement definition of risk 
The extended information security risk model is the basis for the definition of risk in 
terms of security requirements. In the following a risk definition is developed based 
on the relations between risk, vulnerabilities, security objectives and requirements.  
  
 
 Page 138 of 394  
Risks and vulnerabilities violate the security objectives derived from business 
requirements, as the confidentiality, integrity and availability of information is not 
ensured. This can cause harm to the organisation. In the extended information 
security risk model, this is depicted as a relation with the labels “violates/breaches” 
between the risk or vulnerability and security objective. If the security requirement 
is not implemented, or not implemented correctly or adhered to, there is a negative 
impact upon the security objective, and ultimately also on the business 
requirements. This is because the security requirements refine the security 
objective defining the requirements for ensuring confidentiality, integrity and 
availability of information. Therefore, the non-adherence to security requirements 
is expected to harm the organisation and therefore constitutes a security risk. 
 
The relation between a risk or vulnerability and a security objective is that the 
former can violate the security objective, refined by security requirements and 
implemented via security functions, thereby harming the organisation. Therefore, 
risk can also be defined as “the non-adherence to security requirements thereby 
causing harm to the organisation”. Hence, both a risk and a vulnerability can be 
identified by a deviation from or non-adherence to the security requirement by 
implemented security functions. Security functions are implemented by 
administrative, physical, and technical controls that fulfil security requirements. 
This means that correct implementation and operation of security functions with 
regard to the adherence of security requirements is key in order to prevent the 
organisation from being at risk, as well as for identifying risks and vulnerabilities. 
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4.3. Business process model information  
A business process model is a detailed description of a business process including 
activities, agents, artefacts and roles involved in a modelling notation. Process 
activities describe what has to be performed by the process participants - or 
agents. An agent can be a human or system performing an activity. An artefact is 
a product that was created or modified by performing a process activity. A role is a 
set of activities that was assigned to process participants to define a functional 
responsibility. Business process models describe the value-generating processes 
of an organisation and can be seen as the place where risk materialises, 
information is generated and security functions are carried out, according to 
Rikhardsson et al. (2006). Therefore, business process models can be used to 
evaluate risks, vulnerabilities and security functions describing the operation and 
core values of the organisation.  
Zur Muehlen (2005), who addresses risk management in the context of business 
process management, clusters business process model elements into goals, 
structure and information technology, data and organisation, according to his 
business process taxonomy (see Figure 4-2). The ‘goal’ cluster contains the 
purpose or objective of the processes that should be achieved. The ‘structure’ 
contains the activities of a process as well as the pre- and post-conditions 
necessary for the activities. The ‘information technology’ cluster contains the 
systems (i.e., applications as in the process taxonomy, networks, servers) and 
embeds the ‘data’ cluster, containing business objects which are processed at 
process activities. All these clusters are associated by relationships between their 
single elements. But only the process activity element connects all clusters - 
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besides data, which is embedded in the information technology and organisation 
cluster. 
Because of these cluster relationships, the key to identifying risks and 
vulnerabilities with business process models is the process activity and the 
business object (data) of the business process. This is because the process 
activities describe the activities which have to be performed by process 
participants invoking systems, in order to achieve the business process goal. If a 
single process activity in a process is not performed on time and correctly then the 
process goal and ultimately the company’s objective are at risk. In addition, the 
business object of a business process is important as it represents an information 
asset. The information asset has to be available and correct in order to achieve 
the objective of the process efficiently. Therefore, the availability, integrity and 
confidentiality of the information asset - set by the process objective - are crucial to 
the organisation’s operations and are values to be protected by the organisation. 
Because of this, business process model activities and information assets are 
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Figure 4-2 Business process taxonomy from zur Muehlen (2005) 
 
It can be presumed that the quality and availability of process models in 
companies are sufficient to justify their use for information security risk 
assessments. Laws and regulations for financial service providers in the US and 
European Union require the identification of controls in the business context and 
solvency capital for risks, e.g. SOX (Sarbanes-Oxley Act, 2002); Basel II (Basel 
Committee on Banking Supervision, 2004); and Solvency II (European 
Commission, 2007). Process models contribute to identifying risks and controls, as 
they are often used as a basis to understand process activities and their 
associated risks, as well as to determine risks and/or control deficiencies within 
the analysed processes. Furthermore, the BPM surveys of 2008 and 2010 about 
current practices (Harmon and Wolf, 2008; Harmon and Wolf, 2010) confirm that 
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process models are available and up-to-date in about 55% of companies, as 
observed in these global market surveys which were answered by 264 
respondents. In the survey among security professionals performed in 2011 (see 
chapter 3.4.2) it was also observed that business process models for critical and 
important processes in companies are both available and up-to-date. 
4.4. Security requirements and business process models 
In the following subsections, the utilisation of the concepts in a security 
requirements-based risk assessment approach on business process models is 
illustrated. First, it is highlighted why security requirements should be used to 
determine risks. Then, the relation and utilisation of the concepts used - security 
requirements, information assets and business process models - within a security 
requirements based approach are explained. Finally, the target of evaluation - 
business process activities and information assets - in the business process model 
is explained, together with how this model information can be used in the 
assessment. 
4.4.1. Determining risk 
In section 4.2, a security requirement based definition of risk was proposed, where 
security requirements are the basis for determining risks caused by vulnerabilities 
to a deviation or non-adherence. A vulnerability can be described as a weakness 
that can be exploited by an attacker (Stoneburner et al., 2002b). But, a 
vulnerability has to do with the security requirements of the evaluated target. This 
is the case because the weakness of the asset that constitutes a vulnerability has 
to be an inadvertent weakness. This implies that the weakness could be by design, 
and therefore is not really a weakness (when the requirements constitute this, 
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even if they are imperfect from a security best practice viewpoint). The same is 
true for the impact of vulnerabilities; the impact on an organisation is related to the 
(security) requirements and any (monetary) thresholds. Whether the impact has 
adverse effects upon the organisation depends on the security requirements 
refining business requirements in terms of security, as well as any security 
functions that are in place. Security functions - administrative, physical, and 
technical controls - can be processes that detect or prevent any events when an 
exploitable vulnerability exists; they can also serve to reduce the impact of these 
events. As a result, without determining and considering the security requirements 
and evaluating the security functions in place, no judgement about vulnerability 
and impact can be made. But if a security requirement is not adhered to - by a 
security function - the company would be at risk, as the security needs are thereby 
not fulfilled. ‘At risk’ means that a vulnerability exists and violates the security 
requirement, potentially causing harm to the organisation. Because of the reasons 
given above and the security requirements definition of risk, security requirement 
evaluation can be used to determine risks and vulnerabilities in a security risk 
assessment. Security requirements are the reference for defining the required 
security and determining whether a given vulnerability is a risk for the organisation. 
 
Another aspect of security requirement evaluation and determining vulnerabilities 
accurately in risk assessment is the true value. If one would like to ensure the 
determination of all relevant vulnerabilities in a risk assessment, one would need 
to have a true value. The accuracy of a measurement system is defined as the 
degree of closeness to its true value (Viera and Garrett, 2005): this value can be 
defined as the adherence to security requirements, because such requirements 
specify the security needed as well as whether or not a security issue is a risk. The 
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degree of closeness to the true value cannot be indicated by current risk 
assessment approaches - methods used, such as security testing for vulnerability 
identification, only prove the presence of vulnerabilities, not their absence (Wang, 
2005) - with regard to the security needed. As a result, a statement about the 
security of information or an organisation cannot be made. If the true value is used 
for vulnerability identification, the presence and absence of security vulnerabilities 
can be determined. In this thesis this would constitute the evaluation of security 
requirements and security functions being able to provide a statement about the 
security of information assets - thus resolving vulnerability identification errors. 
4.4.2. Correlations 
The extended information security model of section 4.1 describes the relationship 
between risk- asset- and security-related concepts, by elements. On the basis of 
the extended information security model, risk is defined as non-adherence to 
security requirements. Business process models are identified as being useful to 
determine risk (see section 4.3), as they describe how the business value is 
generated in processes and the place where risk materialises. Hereafter, the 
correlation between business process models and security requirements is 
illustrated; this is then utilised in the proposed security requirements risk 
assessment approach in this thesis. A correlation is a mutual relationship between 
model elements. These correlations between elements can be due to their 
definition, e.g. a security function is implementing a security requirement, or due to 
their usage, e.g. within process models assets and actors are modelled that use 
information assets. Figure 4-3 shows, by an arrow and a text annotation, the 
correlation between business process models, security requirements, information 
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assets and security functions. The arrow specifies the correlation to a related 
concept. Next, the correlations between these elements are explained. 
 
A business process model contains information assets. Within a business process, 
information is processed to achieve the objective of the process. Information is 
used by the actors (e.g. humans) and the systems (e.g. an application or network) 
of the process, as such information represents the business transaction. 
Information assets have security requirements in order to ensure that the process 
objective can be achieved. The security requirements of the information asset are 
dependent on the business process objective, the context and the significance of 
the information relating to a company, product, service or person and represent a 
constraint. Security requirements are implemented via security functions for an 
information asset. Security functions afford protection in terms of the confidentiality, 
integrity and availability of an information asset. Security functions such as 
authentication mechanisms ensure that the security requirements of information 
assets are adhered to.  
 
Figure 4-3 Correlation of concepts 
Information assets are the key, as they connect business and security objectives 
by their requirements; security functions are applied to them, as well as being 
processed in the business context. The correlation between information assets, 
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business process models, security requirements and security functions could be 
used in a risk assessment to determine vulnerabilities. Security requirements can 
be evaluated by the security functions applied to the information asset. The 
information asset’s security can be evaluated in the business process context by 
the process activities of value-generating processes where the information is used. 
By using these elements in an assessment, one can assure that the required 
security can be implemented, and that the organisation is not at risk. 
4.4.3. Evaluation 
In the proposed security requirement risk assessment approach, the correlations 
between the elements security requirements, information assets, business process 
models and security functions are used to identify vulnerabilities. Next, it is 
explained (with the help of Figure 4-4) how security requirements, information 
assets, business process models and security functions are used in the security 
requirements risk assessment approach. The circle with numbers in the figure 
indicates the relationship or concept that is used, as well as the sequence of their 
usage. 
Initially, information assets are extracted from business process models (no. 1). 
Information assets can be identified by the information used in the process 
activities of critical business processes. Information assets have security 
requirements that can be defined for them, and as such represent constraints (no. 
2). For the definition of security requirements, artefacts such as business process 
objectives and security objectives, security policies or security best practices can 
be used. These security requirements of information assets are analysed and 
evaluated, in process activities of the business process model (no. 3), in respect of 
implemented security functions applied to information assets (no. 3), so as to 
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determine vulnerabilities. In each business process model activity, where 
information assets are used, the asset’s security requirements are evaluated to 
determine whether the implemented security functions fulfil them. 
 
Figure 4-4 Utilization of concepts  
The advantage of evaluating information assets’ security requirements with a 
business process model is that the basis for evaluation - security requirements 
representing the true value - is defined and explicitly evaluated in the operational 
business context. A statement about the security of information assets could be 
provided by the processes’ and information assets’ risk results, which show only 
true positive vulnerabilities. This statement can be provided as not only 
vulnerabilities are determined, but also the security needs are identified together 
with whether or not they are fulfilled. As a consequence, security design and 
security operation vulnerabilities (for example) can be determined more accurately 
rather than being based simply on security best practices for a single asset. 
Furthermore, security (inter)dependencies between information assets or 
processes (see 4.5.3) can also be considered, as the evaluation is performed 
systematically on security requirements of information assets, in the course of 
business. The difference to other approaches - which use parts of business 
process models, information assets or security requirements - is that vulnerability 
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identification for an information asset is based on the asset’s explicit security 
requirement evaluation, by considering business process activities and the 
implementation of security functions. 
4.4.4. Target of evaluation 
In the section above it was outlined how concepts like security requirements and 
business process models are applied in a security requirements risk assessment. 
In this section, the utilisation of business process model information - in particular, 
process activities and information assets - for determining security risks and 
vulnerabilities is described. Process activities can be used as the target of 
evaluation in an assessment, and the process objective and information asset to 
determine the criticality of occurring risks.  
To determine the criticality of a process, one can use the process objective and 
any input or output - the information asset representing the business transaction - 
of a process and its associated activities. The business process objective and the 
information asset can help to assess the impact for the organisation, and if the 
process is impaired. For example, using an impact evaluation of whether or not the 
business objective is achieved or only partially achieved, as well as the criticality 
for the organisation and its mission can be determined. Furthermore, the 
information asset processed can also be the input for other processes, to indicate 
how critical any corruption or leakage of the information (or interruption of the 
process) would be for the organisation. The impact can be determined 
quantitatively, if possible, or qualitatively. 
Secondly, the processes cluster referred to as structure, information technology, 
data and organisation in the process taxonomy of section 4.3 can be used as the 
target of evaluation in an assessment. The clusters and their related vulnerabilities 
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- such as security design-, technical-, security behaviour- and information 
processing issues - can be identified by evaluating process activities. This is 
because the process activities are associated to the clusters by describing the 
interactions between, and usage of, clusters (see section 4.3). Typically, process 
activities describe the manipulation of the information asset, the process 
participant who is performing the task and the system used, e.g. applications, 
networks, servers, etc. They can all be used as targets of evaluation representing 
the clusters. But in a process, multiple process activities are available which 
process the information asset and describe the information asset’s flow within the 
process. Therefore, one can distinguish between the processing of information 
and the process elements handling the information, within a business process. 
With processing, the processing of information assets relating to the different 
activities of the process is meant. At these processing points, information assets 
are created, processed, and communicated. With the evaluation of these 
processing points the security related to access, manipulation and communication 
of information assets can be determined, as well as whether the process design 
from an information flow perspective is secure. At each process point, the 
implemented security functions can be evaluated based on the information asset’s 
security objectives. The process elements are the systems and process 
participants relating to the process activities that handle the information asset. 
Process elements can be described as containers handling the information assets 
in the process activities. Containers can be any type of system (applications, 
networks, servers, etc.), a process participant (a human or machine) or the 
environment (an organisation or facilities) in which the information resides. The 
reason why the processing of information and the process elements are 
differentiated is that the process elements themselves can have a weakness, 
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which might be a risk for the information asset, although unrelated to the 
processing of the information asset and vice versa. Therefore, the security of 
information assets is determined by the security of processing of information and 
the security of process elements.  
Furthermore, the security of information assets is also dependent on security 
processes that, for instance, grant the process participant process activity access 
to information or a security process, such as the patch management process. 
These security processes are about the operation and maintenance of process 
elements, and should ensure their security. If one of these processes fails, the 
information asset is vulnerable; the process element might not be adequately 
protected, resulting in a vulnerability. Therefore, security processes have to be 
included in the evaluation of process elements with regard to their security. With 
the evaluation of the process elements and the IT security processes, technical- 
procedural- and behavioural issues can be determined, as well as the capability of 
the processes to protect assets from security issues. The IT security process 
evaluation determines any weakness to protect assets from security issues in the 
operation of process elements.   
To conclude, the security of information assets within a business process is 
determined by the processing of information in the process activities and the 
process elements handling the information, as well as the security processes 
managing the operation of process elements. Hence, to assess the IT security 
risks of information assets with business process models, one has to assess the 
security of information in the process elements handling the information - 
containers of information assets - the processing (information flow level) of 
information in the process activities, and the security processes ensuring secure 
operation. The processing, process elements and security processes - 
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representing the targets of evaluation - should be considered in a security 
requirement risk assessment. This will also form the basis of the security 
requirements characterisation structure proposed in section 4.5.2. 
4.5. Defining security requirements  
In the following subsections, firstly the security requirement elicitation process is 
discussed and secondly a security requirement characterisation structure based 
on business process information is proposed. Thirdly, it is illustrated that through 
the evaluation of the information assets’ security requirements, dependencies can 
be considered in a risk assessment. 
4.5.1. Elicitation  
Existing information security risk assessments that use security requirements 
propose neither a formal process as to how to elicit security requirements, nor a 
structure for defining them. They define them as text for: model elements of the 
organisation’s architecture (Breu and Innerhofer-Oberperfler, 2005); assets 
(Stoneburner et al., 2002b); or scenarios (Caralli et al., 2007). In software 
engineering (SE), different approaches have been proposed for security software 
engineering, containing activities for the definition and elicitation of security 
requirements. However, these approaches differ in the extent of the process steps 
as well as the starting point of the elicitation. For example, Square (Mead et al., 
2005) starts with security goals and ends with requirements’ inspection in nine 
process steps; Haley et al. (2008) start with functional requirements and end with 
system verification in four process steps; and Boström et al. (2006) start with 
critical assets and end with checking abuser stories and countermeasures in 
seven process steps. Tondel et al. (2008) surveyed the literature for security 
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requirement elicitation techniques and compared these security requirement 
engineering approaches based on the elicitation process steps. They conclude 
that there is no common definition of process steps, and that the different 
approaches don’t agree on what a security requirement is and whether concrete 
security measures should be specified. As there is no universally accepted 
definition of security requirements or of the process steps for security requirement 
elicitation, either in risk assessment approaches or at security software 
engineering approaches, the following process steps are defined for the elicitation 
of security requirements based on Tondel et al.’s proposal: 
 Identification of assets - critical processes and their information assets are 
identified; 
 Identification of security needs and legislation, policies, standards and best 
practices that apply to the process including actors, activities and 
information assets; 
 Definition of the security objective (SO) level and security requirements (SR) 
for information assets, based on identified security needs; 
 Checking for consistency and dependencies of information assets at SO 
and SR, by using one information asset requirement definition at all 
business processes. 
The security requirements elicitation process above differs slightly in the third step 
of definition of security objectives and requirements. Tondel et al. (2008) 
suggested that a risk analysis is to be performed; and in the information security 
system risk management process of Mayer (2009), a risk assessment is also to be 
performed. In these approaches, security objectives are defined first. Then a risk 
analysis/assessment is conducted to determine threats or vulnerabilities and then 
  
 
 Page 153 of 394  
the security requirements identified. Contrarily to the proposed security 
requirement elicitation steps discussed previously, one can argue that to 
determine security requirements, security knowledge about events (the 
combination of threats and vulnerabilities), the impact of the events and the effect 
of measures are all necessary; these would be determined in a risk 
analysis/assessment. However, in this thesis, it is argued that this elicitation step 
is not imperative. The following example of a threat and vulnerability should 
illustrate this. Wireless data transmissions without encryption can be intercepted 
and easily read by a malicious user. The fact that wireless data transmissions can 
be intercepted as well as read, if no encryption is provided, must be known by the 
security expert or be present in a security knowledge base. But, this knowledge is 
already explicitly available in public media, at security conferences and in security 
standards. This knowledge is not determined explicitly in a risk analysis/ 
assessment; it is only determined as to whether the system is vulnerable to this 
issue. Current risk assessment approaches identify known vulnerabilities by using 
best practices relating to security, as well as knowledge bases, but they don’t 
identify new and as yet unknown vulnerabilities. This explicit universally valid 
knowledge (that is generally available and accepted by the public) is also used in 
the security requirements definition in the proposed elicitation steps. The instance 
of wireless data transmission is an example of such knowledge that wireless data 
transmissions should be secured, for instance, by encryption measures 
representing the security requirement. The argument that security requirements 
cannot be defined as they use risk assessment knowledge - specifically relating to 
a system’s vulnerabilities that are determined in a risk assessment - is not valid, as 
the security requirement should describe what is to be protected and not merely 
provide a security statement of a system’s existing vulnerabilities. To describe 
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what should be protected, explicit security knowledge can be used with regard to 
the business security needs and the potential causes of harm to the business. 
Therefore, a risk assessment is not imperative. 
Basically, for the security requirements definition, the same basis of security 
knowledge is used, as for vulnerability identification in risk assessments. In 
contrast to current risk assessment proceedings, the necessary security is defined 
beforehand, and in the risk assessment how the implemented system should be is 
verified - against the design and operation - in order to identify vulnerabilities. In 
existing approaches, vulnerabilities described in knowledge bases are compared 
with the current situation, and don’t consider how the system should be. To 
evaluate how already existing systems should be - their security requirements - it 
is necessary to define the security requirements prior to the assessment; this is 
different to software engineering where systems are developed based on the 
security requirements. Therefore, in this thesis, the security requirement elicitation 
process differs from software engineering and it is proposed to specify security 
requirements without any risk assessment. 
4.5.2. Characterisation 
To specify security requirements, as well as for them to be utilisable in a security 
risk assessment with business process models, they have to be documented in 
some form. Security requirements should be characterised in a way which is 
understandable by the business user for verification purposes; it should be light-
weight and it must be usable by a security expert, whilst also being capable of 
elicitation without necessitating any additional knowledge or modelling. Ideally, 
security requirements are characterised by a structure aligned with the business 
context - the security needed in the operation - and no additional information or 
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modelling should be necessary. This is because the security requirement structure 
should help to assess them correctly and efficiently, and should provide a 
measurement criterion. In current risk assessment approaches that use security 
requirements, the requirements are described, e.g. as textual annotation for a 
scenario (Caralli et al., 2007), as a modelled element of the enterprise architecture 
(Innerhofer–Oberperfler and Breu, 2006), or as a checklist (Stoneburner et al., 
2002b) for an asset. In these approaches, security requirements are specified as 
text for an asset or element with regard to confidentiality, integrity and availability. 
But these textual specifications are neither structured to support the assessment 
process with business process models - they are instead attached to an element - 
nor are they reusable within other processes or process activities. Security 
requirements should be specified for an information asset in order to be (re)usable 
in other processes or activities. They should also consider the processing and 
handling of information (see section 4.4.4) in order to assess them efficiently and 
correctly, as discussed above. As in software engineering, modelling notations and 
frameworks were proposed to model security aspects as well as to derive security 
requirements (see section 3.2.2.). There may be approaches which are utilisable 
for security requirements’ characterisation that fulfil the previous requirements. 
Therefore, a few software engineering modelling notations of section 3.2.2 are 
examined to determine which approach might be best to characterise security 
requirements for information assets of business process models, as relating to the 
identification of vulnerabilities. 
 
Problem frames (Jackson, 1999) are an approach aimed at specifying user 
requirements for software. They decompose user requirements of real world 
problems. Cox and Phalp (2003) describe how to generate problem frames out of 
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business process models for the usage of process knowledge relating to the 
requirements phase. Cox and Phalp derived problem frames but ran into problems; 
such as problem frame domains not always being apparent. Also, information 
might be lost, or it may be necessary to specify other frames. Cox and Phalp 
worked with role activity diagrams (RAD) but do not reveal experience with other 
business process notations. In addition to the issues found by Cox and Phalp, no 
additional criteria for security requirements or evaluations can be specified. 
An attack tree (Schneier, 1999) provides an overview of attacks and shows how to 
achieve the attack goal - the root of the tree. It is presented as a tree structure 
consisting of the attack goal as the root and the sub-attack goals as branches. 
Leaves of the attack tree are attacks to achieve sub-attack goals. Attacks and sub-
attack goals can be performed in combination; this is represented by the 
nomenclature “And”. Attack trees can be used to specify security requirements but 
do not facilitate the specification of requirements. This means that out of the attack 
tree, one has to elicit and interpret the security requirements for the asset based 
on the attack and attack goal. Furthermore, the attack tree does not provide any 
structure showing how to define the security requirements. 
A misuse diagram (Sindre and Opdahl, 2005) presents the mapping between the 
use and misuse cases, via threat mitigations. A misuse case is the inverse of a 
use case and describes functions that should not be allowed and would result in a 
loss for the organisation or a stakeholder. The graphical representation helps to 
analyse and elicit security requirements. To use misuse cases for security 
requirements, there is a need to identify and model use cases, misuse cases and 
threat mitigations. The threat mitigations or safeguards represent the security 
requirements for information assets in a particular use/misuse case. Use and 
misuse cases describe security requirements specific to a particular case and one 
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would have to determine how the security requirements for the information assets 
and systems relating to different use/misuse cases have to be documented further. 
This means that all the security requirements have to be collected and 
documented within some kind of structure to be used for the security risk 
assessment; this creates additional efforts besides the modelling of the cases. 
An abuse case is a specification of an interaction between a system and an actor 
wherein the results of such an interaction are harmful to the system, the actor or 
the stakeholder (McDermott and Fox, 1999). Abuse cases are described with the 
same notation and symbols as use cases. When creating an abuse case, it has to 
be both identified and defined. Abuse cases can help to determine and elicit 
security requirements. But to draft abuse cases, one has to be aware of possible 
threats and vulnerabilities. Further on, an abuse case provides no specification 
structure or scheme for security requirements of assets.  
With semantic data models, the security requirements of data can be modelled to 
describe the constraints between data (Smith, 1990). With this approach, the 
dependencies of data entities relating to integrity and secrecy can be presented. 
However, it requires knowledge about the data structure that is either not available 
in or cannot be derived from, for instance, a business process model. The 
semantic data model would always be incomplete and does not include anything 
relating to the specification for security requirements. 
Wang and Wulf (1997) propose a framework for security measurement to 
approximate the security strength of a system. Because the security objectives are 
often only available in qualitative terms, they use a factor criteria model to specify 
the security objectives more definitely, in order to measure them against these 
criteria. For example, confidentiality is divided into three main factors: software 
access control, physical security and cryptographic protection. These factors are 
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further divided into a set of criteria, such as reliability and effectiveness for 
software access control. Then, a measure is defined for a criterion or further sub-
criteria. The underlying concept of the factor criteria model - decomposition of 
elements - is used both to specify security requirements as well as to evaluate the 
corresponding security functions. 
 
Security requirements for information assets 
If business process model information is used for a risk assessment, then ideally 
the security requirements characterisation should be aligned with this information 
to be understandable in the context. A textual annotation for a security 
requirement specification, as used in current information security risk assessment, 
without any structure or assigning security requirements to single assets being 
able to reuse them and supporting the assessment would not be efficient in 
describing them for the evaluation in a business process context. The factor 
criteria model proposed by Wang and Wulf (1997) would help to measure security 
more definitely; it would also provide a structure for the definition of security 
requirements, but is not aligned to business process model information and 
evaluation. On the other hand, this alignment between the security requirement 
and the business process context is necessary, as an information asset security 
requirement has dependencies on other applications, process participants or 
security processes. Because security requirements can be different to the 
applications context (Haley et al., 2008) they must therefore be checked with 
regard to consistency, completeness and redundancy over processes.  
 
In section 4.4.4 processing and process elements, referred to as containers and 
their security processes, were identified as targets of evaluation of a business 
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process model. Therefore, for the security requirements structure and to support 
the evaluation process, decomposition and the idea of a factor-criteria model 
(Wang and Wulf, 1997) have been applied as follows. Security requirements are 
defined for an information asset at each of the levels - processing, containers and 
security processes. The processing security requirements of information assets 
are defined by a security objective rating, which is used because information 
assets can be processed in different business processes, process activities and 
process elements, making it difficult to define a specific requirement. The security 
objective rating for processing of an information asset is evaluated via a 
predefined set of security functions defining the security requirements alike in a 
factor-criteria model. A predefined set of security functions is used as otherwise 
there might be misinterpretations of how to evaluate confidentiality, integrity and 
availability (Wang and Wulf, 1997) in the context. The evaluated security functions 
are “access control & accountability”, “authorisation”, “data input validation” and 
“encryption”. Process elements are defined as containers handling the information 
asset (e.g. systems or humans are defined as process participants) or where the 
information asset resides (i.e. the organisation or facilities). The container security 
requirements and IT security processes are described in natural language, 
because these requirements are specific to the container and cannot be 
generalised. The container security requirements are decomposed into ‘primary 
systems’, ‘organisation/people’ and ‘environment/physical’. These three categories 
follow the characteristics of a process activity - process participants either use 
systems or interact with their environment - and should help the assessor to 
evaluate the business process activities efficiently and with less interpretation of 
the adherence to the security requirements. Furthermore, IT security processes for 
the containers have to be defined as discussed in section 4.4.4. These security 
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processes ensure and operationalise security for ‘primary systems’, 
‘organisation/people’ or the ‘environment/physical’ on which they are dependent. 
Best practice security processes can be used based on standards like COBIT 
(ITGI, 2007) or ISO17799 (ISO, 2005c) to specify security processes for the 
containers’ security requirements. Technical vulnerabilities and IT operation issues 
should be identified with the assessment of these IT security processes, because 
these processes are mainly about the operation and maintenance of systems. 
Furthermore, the evaluation of IT security processes can support the results 
“independent of a point in time”, in the knowledge that risks do change over time 
(Jackson, 2007), and the security of information is dependent on the capacity to 
handle or prevent/limit risks in the near future. IT security processes can also be 
evaluated with regard to maturity and performance using, for example, an existing 
maturity model like CMMI (Paulk et al., 1993) to provide a statement about the 
capability of the processes to detect and prevent vulnerabilities. The result of such 
a security process assessment would strengthen the result statement for the asset 
or organisation, as it would indicate how well the current security state can be 
maintained in the near future. The security requirements characterisation structure 
shown in Table 4-3 defines the security needs of an information asset, considering 
the processing of information, the containers handling the information as well as 
security processes needed for the containers. 
Table 4-3: Security requirements for information assets 
Information asset: 
 








Data Integrity, Confidentiality and availability  
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4.5.3. (Inter)dependencies  
Security requirements for an information asset describe the functional 
requirements or constraints (Haley et al., 2008), affecting one or more systems in 
the processes where the information asset is used. Dependencies or 
interdependencies can be observed between processes and systems and their 
information assets security requirements, as they all use this particular information 
asset. An interdependency can be defined as “a bidirectional relationship between 
two infrastructures through which the state of each infrastructure influences or is 
correlated to the state of the other” (Rinaldi et al., 2001, p. 14), and a dependency 
as “a linkage or connection between two infrastructures, through which the state of 
one infrastructure influences or is correlated to the state of the other” (Rinaldi et al., 
2001, p. 14). The difference between an interdependency and a dependency is 
whether the link is bi- or uni-directional. Interdependencies or dependencies in 
security - in contrast to in safety - are related to the security principles contributing 
to confidentiality, integrity and availability of information. Segregation of duties, 
access control, authorisation, accountability and authenticity are examples of such 
security principles. As an example, a process or system relies on information (e.g. 
timeliness, integrity, availability) of another process or system, on the security (e.g. 










Integrity, confidentiality and availability 
 requirements for the systems that  
processes information.  
IT security processes that  




Integrity, confidentiality and availability 
requirements for the actors or the  
processes that handle the information. 
IT security processes that  




Integrity, Confidentiality and availability  
requirements for the environment where 
 the information is physically available. 
IT security processes that  
ensure security for facilities  
and the workplace.  
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availability of another process or system. These interdependencies or 
dependencies between processes or systems can be physical (availability of 
goods, personnel, etc), technical (e.g. operability of a web based service), 
functional (e.g. usage of materials or services that are within the specification) or 
conditional (e.g. triggers as used in supply chains or integrity of information). This 
means that the output of a process or system can be dependent on a state that is 
not within the process or system considered. For example, Research and 
Development (R&D) information can be secure in the R&D department or related 
R&D processes. However, it might not be secure if it is used in the marketing 
department or marketing processes, as applied security functions may not 
adequately protect this kind of information. In this case, the security of information 
with regard to its publication or leakage is dependent on corresponding security 
functions of the process. Vulnerabilities might exist - and might not be detected - if 
these kinds of interdependencies or dependencies between processes, systems 
and information assets are not considered in the information security risk 
assessment. 
 
Implications for security risk assessments 
According to ISO 27005 (ISO, 2011c), dependencies should be considered in the 
asset valuation step to determine the asset’s value. However, considering 
dependencies in the evaluation process is not described or elaborated in ISO 
27005. Furthermore, in current assessment approaches, security requirements are 
evaluated only for single assets or best practice security requirements used, but 
with this, interdependencies or dependencies cannot be fully taken into account. 
This is because security requirements are not evaluated in the context of the 
processes where the information asset is used. Therefore, the information asset’s 
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specific security requirements have to be evaluated in the systems, over 
communication channels (network and internet, for example), as well as in the 
processes (company internal or external) which use that information. This 
procedure allows for considering of the dependencies and interdependencies; the 
asset’s security requirements are evaluated in the different systems where it is 
processed. In contrast, current security risk assessments do not address the 
interdependencies or dependencies of an asset’s security requirements. Security 
requirements and security functions are not evaluated for multiple assets, but 
rather vulnerabilities of assets are determined. 
4.6. Chapter summary 
In this chapter, the extended information security model presented shows the 
relationships of vulnerabilities and risks between security objectives, requirements 
and assets. Because of these relations, security requirements can be used for the 
identification of risk and vulnerabilities for an asset, with regard to both the security 
needed and the implemented security functions. A definition of risk based on 
security requirements was provided as being necessary to determine risk using 
security requirements. By this definition, security requirements can be the basis for 
identifying risk and the resolution of vulnerability identification errors; they have a 
relation to vulnerabilities, risk, security controls and assets and provide a 
measurement criterion - the security needed - for risk. Security requirements not 
only form the basis for identifying vulnerabilities of information assets, they can 
also be used to indicate the security of information - whether security issues are 
present (by identifying vulnerabilities) or absent (by verifying security needs and 
corresponding security functions). Actually, this would allow for making a 
statement about the security of information. 
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Furthermore, the mutual relationships between security requirements, business 
process models, information assets and security functions were presented and 
illustrated, together with how to apply them to determine risks and vulnerabilities. It 
was also explained how business process model information can be used for risk 
assessments, and that for the evaluation of information assets, processing and 
process elements (containers) handling information must be distinguished, and IT 
security processes operationalising security must be considered. This is because 
an information asset is accessed or manipulated by systems, as well as process 
participants, in multiple process activities. By ‘processing’, the communication or 
manipulation of information assets is meant; on the other hand, the word 
‘containers’ is used to specify process participants, systems or the environment 
where the information assets are handled and where they reside.  
Next, a security requirement elicitation process and characterisation structure was 
presented. This can be used for the security definition and evaluation of business 
process model information. The security requirement elicitation process omits risk 
analysis/assessment, because security requirements describe what should be 
protected rather than the system’s current vulnerability. The security requirements 
characterisation structure is defined for information assets considers processing 
and the containers of handling information in business process models, as well as 
IT security processes. In that sense, it follows the concept of decomposition and 
uses the idea of a factor-criteria model. By defining the information asset’s security 
requirements and evaluating them in business process activities, 
(inter)dependencies between business processes, process participants and 
systems using the same information asset can be considered. 
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Chapter 5 - A Security Requirement Risk 
Assessment Approach 
This chapter presents the proposed security requirements risk assessment 
approach called ‘SRA’ for the identification of vulnerabilities with security 
requirements and business process models. The conceptional foundation for the 
approach - the relationship between security requirements and risk - is the 
enhanced information security model of section 4.1 and the security requirements 
based definition of risk of section 4.2. The SRA’s procedure is based on the 
concepts of business process models, security requirements and information 
assets, and their respective correlations as described in sections 4.4.2 and 4.4.3. 
The security requirements structure and evaluated elements of business process 
models is described in sections 4.4.4 and 4.5.2. The first section of this chapter 
will provide an overview of the approach, followed by a detailed description of the 
phases of the approach - in section 5.2 - and applying the approach to a running 
example in section 5.3.  
5.1. Introduction 
An information security risk assessment should consider both organisational and 
technological issues (von Solms and von Solms, 2005), providing a company-wide 
view of risk, both as a baseline for improvement and as a statement of security. By 
using business process models, one can consider organisational issues; by 
evaluating security requirements of information assets, one can identify 
technological issues as well as provide a statement of security. Information assets 
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can be described as information handled by systems or people residing in facilities 
of organisations. Such a security requirement risk assessment approach differs at 
the vulnerability identification phase to current proceedings, because information 
assets’ security requirements are explicitly evaluated in the business context 
against security functions to identify risks, instead of by using a list of 
vulnerabilities or security best practices. The aim is to determine and resolve 
vulnerability identification errors on the basis of information assets’ security 
requirements and business processes, rather than by identifying and evaluating 
vulnerabilities for single assets. This explicit evaluation of security requirements 
provides benefits, as business security needs and organisational issues are 
considered. The presence and absence of risk could thus be indicated by 
evaluating security needs; probability statistics and detailed impact estimates are 
not needed. 
5.2. The approach 
In the subsequent sections, each phase of the security requirements risk 
assessment approach (SRA) is explained in detail. The approach consists of six 
steps, organised into four phases, namely asset identification, asset profiling, 
vulnerability identification and risk documentation. Figure 5-1 shows the 
assessment phases and steps; a rectangle represents a step in the assessment 
process and the arrows indicate the order of the steps. 
 
In phase one, ‘asset identification’, information assets (Stevens, 2005) are 
identified using business process models of the company’s critical business 
processes. Events occurring in these processes would cause substantial impact to 
the company, as the business goal or objective would be endangered. Business 
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process models describe a structured flow of activities of actors and applications 
(systems that perform or support an activity), using information assets embedded 
in an environment (e.g. an organisation or facilities) (zur Muehlen, 2005). These 
information asset-representing business transactions can be identified by what 
information is used by actors or applications. The information assets are needed 
as an input for the next step - for the definition of security objectives and 
requirements. Phase one is completed when information assets are identified, 
however it does not necessarily require the identification of all assets at the first 
attempt - this activity can be restarted. 
 
In phase two, ‘asset profiling’, security objectives and requirements are defined for 
each information asset. This profiling step establishes clear boundaries of the 
security required, with regard to the processing of information, containers handling 
the information asset in a process and security processes applied, as well as when 
a vulnerability becomes a risk. Security objectives can be defined as high-level 
descriptions of the security to be achieved, whilst security requirements are 
refinements of the security objectives as the constraints required for the system to 
be satisfied (Mead and Stehney, 2005). Artefacts that can be used include the 
company’s security policy, organisational procedures and security best practices. 
The verification of security requirements with regard to validity and correctness is 
not an aim of this phase. Any dependencies and inconsistencies between the 
security needs of information assets can be identified by defining and aligning the 
security requirements for different business processes in which the information 
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In phase three, ‘vulnerability identification’, the information asset security 
requirements with regard to implemented security functions are evaluated on the 
basis of entry, process and communication points in the business process model. 
An entry, process and communication point is an activity by an actor or system in 
the process where an information asset is created, processed and transmitted 
respectively. With the evaluation of the asset’s security objectives at entry, 
process and communication points, the secure processing (entry, processing and 
transmission) of the information is determined. With the evaluation of the asset’s 
security requirements at the containers (systems, actors and the environment), the 
secure handling of the information is determined. Containers are systems, people 
or the environment utilising the information asset, or where information resides. In 
this thesis it is presumed that (see section 4.2) if security requirements are not 
implemented, not implemented correctly, or not adhered to, there is a negative 
impact upon the security objective and ultimately upon the business requirements 
and the organisation as a whole. Therefore, a risk and vulnerability can be 
identified by a deviation from, or non-adherence to, the security requirement by 
implemented security functions. Security objectives are evaluated by predefined 
security functions like access control or encryption, whereas security requirements 
instead by their implementation. The assessment is completed when all entry, 
process and communication points of the process are evaluated. Information asset 
identification can be restarted or applied iteratively (the arrow between steps 3.2 
and 1.2), if a new asset is identified in the vulnerability identification phase. 
 
In phase four, ‘risk documentation’, vulnerabilities and the information asset at risk 
is acknowledged for each business process. The assessment is completed by 
documenting the vulnerabilities and risks. For each business process and 
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information asset, a statement of the security can be provided by having or not 
having a vulnerability identified, where an information asset is either at risk or not 
at risk. 
 
Figure 5-1 Security requirements based risk assessment process (SRA) 
In the following, the different phases of the security requirements based risk 
assessment process (SRA) are explained. 
5.2.1. Phase 1 - Asset identification  
In step 1.1, the objective is to identify the critical business processes of a company 
and the information assets of these processes. The criticality of the business 
process can be determined by the objective and output of a process and its value 
for the organisation. For example, the required availability level for a process can 
be determined by the loss caused due to disruption of operations, or a business 
impact analysis - where critical functions of an organisation are identified whose 
disruption is regarded as unacceptable (e.g. a production process) - can be used. 
The required availability level should be evaluated in relation to all business 
processes at the company - assessed on the basis of the impact of a complete 
breakdown of the process - with a qualitative scale, e.g. high, medium. For 
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example, the Maximum Tolerable Downtime (MTD) could be used to determine 
the availability of the process. 
 
In step 1.2, information assets representing business transactions have to be 
identified for defining security requirements. Criteria and indicators for identifying 
information assets are decision points and process activities. These information 
assets are naturally grouped (e.g. payment data) or are already grouped by 
process activities (e.g. order data) and can be identified by the process activity 
descriptions or process names. At a process activity, customer data or payment 
data is entered. Another example is the processing of contract, order or customer 
data. 
5.2.2. Phase 2 - Asset profiling 
In this phase, the security objectives and security requirements are defined for 
identified information assets labelled as information asset security requirements. 
For specifying the information asset security requirements, the security 
characterisation structure of chapter 4.5.2 is used in order to distinguish between 
processing and the containers of information assets. At the processing level, the 
security needs for the processing of the information are specified. These security 
needs for an information asset are defined as security objectives on the basis of a 
security objective rating. Implicit requirements may have to be considered, such as 
the necessity of complete and accurate information or explicit requirements for 
information to be protected under privacy laws. For information asset containers, 
security requirements are defined for a process’ actors, systems and environment; 
the information is handled considering the security objective level. On both 
processing and container levels, objectives and requirements are defined for 
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integrity, confidentiality and availability, as well as IT security processes at 
container level. The elicitation of security objectives and requirements for identified 
information assets has to be conducted by the assessor based on security needs, 
legislation, policies, standards and best practices. 
 
Security objectives for processing 
At the processing level, the security objective for the information asset is defined 
on basis of a security objective rating for confidentiality, availability and integrity 
dependent on the information asset’s criticality. In order to classify between 
security levels for a security objective, a rating was derived (see Table 5-1). To 
specify the security objective rating, one should identify security needs, relevant 
legislation, standards and policies that apply. The rating used for the information 
asset’s security objectives is based on a qualitative scale with the following 
meanings: 
Table 5-1 Security objectives’ rating 
Integrity rating  
Level 1 (Poor) Information should be accurate but need not be 
complete. 
Level 2 (Average) Information must be accurate and complete. 
Level 3 (Trustable) Information must be accurate, complete and a person 
must be accountable. 
Confidentiality rating  
Level 1 (Public) Information access must not be restricted.  
Level 2 (Internal) Information access has to be restricted to people within 
the company. 
Level 3 (Confidential) Information access has to be restricted to single users. 
Availability rating 
Level 1 (business 
days) 
Information needs to be available within the next days. 
Level 2 (24 hours) Information has to be available within the next 24 hours. 
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Security requirements for containers 
At the container level, security requirements are specified for systems, actors, the 
organisation and the physical environment, as well as IT security processes 
designated guaranteeing the protection of the asset (see Table 5-2, third to last 
row). To define the security requirements, one can use artefacts like the 
company’s security policy (guidelines, technical parameters, etc.), organisational 
procedures (e.g. procedures for installation, changes), and security best practices, 
such as the ISO 2700x series. The container security requirements refine the 
processing security objectives and describe what should be protected, as well as 
the concrete security function implementation. In addition, IT security processes 
which ensure and operationalise security (see Table 5-2, last column) have to be 
defined, derived from IT operation guidelines like ITIL (CCTA, 2007) or security 
standards like the baseline protection manual (BSI, 2008). Any detailed 
specification for IT security processes is not necessary within our information 
asset security requirements specification, because - for efficiency reasons - 
already standardised and internationally accepted security process definitions and 
their descriptions can be reused for the evaluation. 
 
Table 5-2, below, shows the information asset security requirements definition for 
an information asset. Integrity, confidentiality and availability are rated on 
processing level and detailed specifically for containers. IT security processes are 
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Table 5-2: Information asset security requirements 
 
5.2.3. Phase 3 - Vulnerability identification 
At step 3.1, the degree of implemented security functions (activity one) at the 
processing level and their adherence to information assets security objectives 
(activity two) are evaluated. At step 3.2, the information assets’ containers (i.e., 
systems, actors, and environment) and security requirements are evaluated. 
 
Step 3.1 - Asses processing of information assets (activity one) 
To determine the adherence to security objectives, implemented security functions 
are evaluated. But before security functions are evaluated, one has first to 
determine where the information assets in the process are created, processed and 
transmitted. These process points are defined as entry (EP), process (PP) and 
communication (CC) points. Entry points (EP) describe activities where information 
available is made processable by its entry into a system. Process points (PP) 
Information asset: 
Customer data 








Data Integrity, Confidentiality and availability  
Security objectives rating according to  
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Integrity, confidentiality and availability 
requirements for the actors or the  
process that handle the information. 
IT security processes that  
ensure security in the  
organisation.  
Physical Integrity, Confidentiality and availability  
requirements for the environment where 
 the information is physical available. 
IT security processes that  
ensure security for facilities  
and workplace.  
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describe activities where information is permanently saved electronically or 
modified (processed). Communication channels (CC) describe activities where 
information between process activities is transmitted. The information transmission 
can be across organisational borders, geographic locations or between 
departments. The EP, PP and CC can be identified by keywords (e.g. enter, save, 
send) of process activities’ descriptions. Entry points, process points and 
communication channels specify entry, storage, processing and transmission of 
information. With these process points, the information asset’s processing security 
objectives are evaluated. For each EP, PP and CC, the degree of security 
functions’ implementation (like access control, authorisation, data validation, 
communication, encryption, performance and measures) are determined. These 
security functions are to be evaluated, as they are closely linked to security 
objectives by their definition (see section 2.3 for a definition of the security 
objectives). To take an example, integrity is about the protection of the accuracy 
and completeness; therefore access control, authorisations and data validation are 
verified to ensure integrity. Confidentiality is about the prevention of unauthorised 
disclosure and therefore access control, authorisation, communication and 
encryption are verified to ensure confidentiality. Availability means that assets are 
accessible and therefore implemented contingency measures and system 
performance are verified to ensure availability. Table 5-3 shows all possible ratings 
defined for access control (AC), authorisation (A), data input validation (D), 
communication (C) and encryption (E). For each level, its rating and abbreviation 
is defined, e.g. AC0 means Access Control Level 0; A2 means Authorisation Level 
2. After determining the security function implementation levels, the adherence to 
the information asset’s security objective at each EP, PP and CC, where the 
information asset is utilised, has to be determined.  
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Table 5-3: EP, PP and CC rating criteria 
EP/PP measures CC measures 













































completeness     
EP/PP security level CC security level 
Not applicable (n/a), Unknown (u), insufficient (nok), sufficient/best practice (ok) 
 
Step 3.1 - Asses processing of information assets (activity two) 
In this second activity of step 3.1, the security functions’ implementation rating for 
each EP, PP and CC is evaluated with regard to the security objective level of the 
information asset. Subject to the process point - an action on information - and the 
security objective, a set of security functions is evaluated considering the action on 
information and the security objective to be achieved. EPs are only evaluated with 
regard to integrity by the security functions access control and data validation. PPs 
are evaluated based on integrity and confidentiality by the security functions 
access control, authorisation and data validation. CCs are evaluated with regard to 
integrity and confidentiality by the security functions’ communication and 
encryption. Availability is rated for EPs, PPs and CCs which use systems by 
system performance and contingency measures. The evaluation of the security 
function implementation rating with regard to the security objective rating of the 
information asset is supported by a predefined set of rules to verify adherence. For 
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example, the evaluation of access control at EP1 (Entry Point 1) rated as AC0 
(Access control level 0) is compared against defined rules for the security 
objective integrity level 2. Figure 5-2 is an excerpt of the rule set in table form, 
defined for the security objectives integrity and confidentiality. The complete rule 
set can be found in appendix A.5. The rating for an EP/PP and CC can be ‘ok’ 
(sufficient - requirements are adhered to), ‘nok’ (insufficient - requirements are not 
adhered to), ‘n/a’ (not applicable) or ‘u’ (unknown - no rating possible). The rules 
can be read as follows for integrity level one and the security function access 
control (in each cell, one or more rules are presented): 
 AC0: If an EP is rated as AC0 then the data input validation rating has to be 
at least a D2 for that EP. A PP rating of AC0 is ok; 
 AC1 and AC2: If an EP is rated as AC1 or AC2 the data input validation 
rating has to be least D1. A PP rating of AC1/AC2 is ok; 
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Figure 5-2 Security objective rule set table 
The evaluation of the information asset security objective integrity and 
confidentiality is based on the same security functions and follows the same 
procedure. For the security objective availability, different categories like 
“performance” and “measures” are used. It is evaluated how often availability 
requirements were met in the past with the “performance” rating. Implemented 
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continuity measures are evaluated with the “measures” rating. The difference to 
the assessment of integrity and confidentiality is that in the availability assessment 
only system containers are evaluated. The rule sets are not static and can be 
adopted if company-specific policies require this. The rules were defined using 
security expert knowledge and considering security function dependencies with 
regard to the security objective level. For example, dependencies between access 
control and authorisation, as well as data validation, with regard to information 
entry or processing were considered at the rules. The rule set shown in Figure 5-2 
was implemented in (SWI-)Prolog (http://www.swi-prolog.org/) to support the 
assessment (see appendix A.6 for the complete program), which is briefly 
explained in the following. 
 
Introduction to automated security objective evaluation with Prolog 
The objective of the Prolog program (see section A.6) is to support automated 
assessment of security objectives. In Prolog, the program logic is expressed in 
facts and rules. The program is begun with a query, which the Prolog engine tries 
to satisfy by verifying the facts and rules available. The facts and rules represent 
the security objective rules of Figure 5-2. For each security objective (integrity, 
confidentiality and availability), a security rating (level 1 to 3) with regard to an EP, 
PP, CC facts was defined. These facts are verified by Prolog rules, as to whether 
the query becomes true. For rules of the rule set table representing a condition, a 
fact is used, for example, a PP is ok (true) when the security function authorisation 
is rated as A0 - authorisation(a0). For rules which represent a conditional 
statement, a fact with arguments is used, e.g. a PP is ok (true) when the security 
function authorisation is rated A0, and access AC1 - 
authorisation_access(a0,ac1). In order to represent dependencies 
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between a condition and a conditional statement, rules for integrity, confidentiality 
and availability were used. That is to say, both facts above are combined by a 
logical conjunction (‘and’ represented by a comma) in a rule: 
integrity(A,Ac):- authorisation(A), authorisation_access(A,Ac). 
 
With Prolog rules and logical conjunctions, facts and conditional statements can 
be combined. These can include or exclude conditions, or form a new condition. 
Prolog was chosen, because logical specifications of searches can be defined in 
order to determine when the security function implementation becomes true with 
regard to the security objective level. This Prolog characteristic can also be used 
for determining what security functions are needed - if not known - to comply with 
a security objective level. Furthermore, in Prolog, the rule base can be changed 
easily, or rules can be enhanced if required (i.e., if additional security functions 
have to be evaluated or if new facts are available). 
The program (see section A.6) consists of three main parts - the facts which 
represent single conditions for security objectives and process points, the 
assessment rules for security objectives and process points and the query 
interface to request the assessment information needed from the user. These 
three parts are explained briefly in the following: 
1. Query interface 
The program starts with assess. by asking for the security objective (X = 
confidentiality, integrity or availability) and rating (Lev = level 1 to 3). Next, the 
process point type (Pp = ep, pp or cc) is asked by the rule so(X,Lev), and 
dependent of the security objective entry the rule integrity(Pp, Lev), 
confidentiality(Pp, Lev) or availability(Lev) called. At 
integrity(Pp, Lev) and confidentiality(Pp, Lev) the EPs’ and PPs’ 
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security functions ratings are asked for access control (Ac = ac0 to ac3), 
authorisation (A = a1 to a4) and data validation (D = d1 to d4). For CCs only the 
ratings for encryption (E = e0 to e3) and communication (C = c0 to c3) are asked. 
At availability(Lev) the performance (P = p1 to p4) and measures (M = m1 
to m4) rating of systems of an EP, PP and CC is asked. The input can only be 
provided for one EP, PP or CC. The input of a security function can be omitted if 
not available (e.g. by ‘[]’) or asked to be resolved by Prolog using a variable (e.g. 
‘Result’). After that, depending on which security objective was specified, the 
corresponding assessment rules for availability, integrity or confidentiality with 
regard to the process point type are called, as explained below. The program only 
evaluates one security objective for one process point. 
2. Assessment rules 
The assessment rules are called after the user specified the security functions for 
an EP, PP or CC to evaluate the adherence of the security objective. 










The body of each rule checks whether a single variable or a combination of all the 
variables is true with regard to the facts defined. For example, for an EP, whether 
the security function rating Ac or D is true, or Ac and D is true. Lev contains the 
security objective level and is only used to distinguish between the facts defined 
for the different security objective levels. 
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Confidentiality is only evaluated at PPs and CCs; for EP, no confidentiality 









The body of each rule is checking whether a single variable or a combination of all 
the variables is true with regard to the facts defined. For a PP, whether the 
security function rating Ac or A is true or Ac and A is true. Lev contains the 
security objective level and is only used to distinguish between the facts defined 
for the different security objective levels. 
Availability is evaluated without a distinction between EPs, PPs and CCs and 
therefore directly by the facts defined. The rule 
availability_EPPPCC(Lev,P,M). verifies the ratings for performance and 
measure using the facts defined for an availability level. Lev contains the security 
objective level and is only used to distinguish between the facts defined for the 
different security objective levels. 
3. Facts 
The facts defined describe a true condition for an EP, PP and CC for integrity, 
confidentiality and availability with regard to the security function implementation. 
The facts are used by the assessment rules to verify whether the statement for an 
EP, PP or CC is true. The facts were constructed as follows: 
Name_of_the_fact(Security objective level, security function 
rating). 
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Step 3.2 - Assess container of information assets 
At step 3.2, the information assets’ containers (e.g. systems, actors, environment) 
are evaluated with regard to information assets’ security requirements. The textual 
security requirements of information assets’ containers are evaluated at each 
process activity where information processing takes place, in the form of EP, PP 
and CC, using information-gathering techniques such as on-site interviews and 
document reviews. The identified EP, PP and CC are assessed by the security 
expert, based on the evidence for whether the security requirement for the system, 
organisation or physical environment is adhered to (this evidence can be gathered 
from the system configuration, the system specification, the company’s security 
policy, process documentation or examples of implementation). IT security 
processes are evaluated by system testing, documentation reviews and process 
performance documentation reviews. The IT security process evaluation supports 
identifying technical issues and secure operation; it also determines the 
organisation’s capability to detect, prevent or mitigate security issues. IT process 
security is indicated by whether issues are identified in the process or not. 
5.2.4. Phase 4 – Risk documentation 
Phase 4 of the approach is about risk result documentation. The overall 
assessment result (for security objectives and requirements) of an information 
asset concerning all EP, PP and CC ratings for processing and containers in the 
process is determined by consolidating the results. This means all EP(1-x), PP(1-x) 
or CC(1-x) associated to an information asset in a process are checked for 
whether the processing or containers’ results indicate adherence or non-
adherence. If there is any failure (nok) then the processing or containers will be 
rated as ‘nok’ for the information asset. Then, the issue causing this non-
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adherence is identified and documented in the risk result documentation for the 
process and information asset. 
 
At the end of the assessment, all information assets at risk are presented (see 
Table 5-4). The results table shows the business processes, the issue associated 
(with an ‘X’), as well as the affected information asset. The risk result indicates - 
using ‘not at risk’ or ‘at risk’ - whether an information asset is vulnerable in a 
business or IT process, because the requirements for processing or containers of 
an information asset were not adhered to, or because IT processes do not perform 
properly. Probabilities don’t have to be specified, because the non-compliance 
causing harm to the organisation is determined. Basically, deviations in operation 
and implementation from the security needed (specified as security objectives and 
requirements) are identified, represented as a vulnerability, and defined as risk. 
Furthermore, the result can also indicate the absence of security risk, as the 
security requirements - business security needs - were evaluated in the business 
context regarding security functions.  
Table 5-4: Risk result documentation 
Processes/Issues - Information asset Information asset  Information asset 
Business  Process name at risk at risk 
Issue   
Issue X X 
Issue X  
 
5.3. Running example  
In the following, a real world example, modelled in Business Process Modelling 
Notation (BPMN), is used to demonstrate the applicability of the approach in a 
practical and realistic environment. 
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5.3.1. Process Modelling Notation (BPMN)  
The example process is modelled in Business Process Modelling Notation (BPMN) 
(OMG, 2009) (see Figure 5-3), a quite new proposal in comparison to existing 
process modelling notations like ARIS (IDS Scheer, 1994), whose notation 
considers a unique diagram for the representation of business processes. 
According to the state of the business process modelling industry, BPMN is among 
the most commonly used standards for process modelling. It was designed to 
facilitate use and understanding, as well as to bridge the gap between business 
process modelling and business process implementation (OMG, 2009). In this 
thesis, BPMN was used because it is open - the standard is directly available - and 
extensible - elements can be added. For example, Rodriguez et al. (2007) defined 
a BPMN extension to model security requirements within a business process 
diagram that can be attached to any business process model elements. However, 
in this thesis, only BPMN standard objects like data object, association and text 
annotation were used for presenting evaluation results; no extension for the 
evaluation or result documentation was defined. The reason for this is that the 
objective was to use BPMN standard model elements as extensions are not self-
explanatory, and might be lost during the interchange of models (OMG, 2009). In 
addition, it was not the aim of this thesis to model security risk assessment 
information or to perform any automatic processing or evaluation of the model. 
Furthermore, with the process example modelled in BPMN, also the applicability of 
our assessment approach - the evaluation and documentation of results - using 
standard BPMN models is demonstrated. 
  
 
 Page 185 of 394  
5.3.2. BPMN process example 
Process model - online travel insurance quotation: A major part of the turnover 
of an insurance company is created via an online system offering travel insurance. 
The travel insurance for vacations, business trips and other time abroad, is 
concluded when the customer has provided all data (name, address, email, phone 
number, date of birth, travel details) and agreed to the terms and conditions of the 
company. Payments can be made via credit card or debit payment and the 
insurance contract is then sent per email and post. The online system is a web 
application with a connected database storing all data about the contract. It also 
has an interface to a third-party service to verify credit card and bank account data, 
as well as to the accounting system for payment processing. As this is an example 
for illustration purposes, we know already (before applying the approach) that the 
online system has a code injection problem when personal data is entered (at 
process activity 3 - ‘Display product details ...’), and an encryption problem at the 
interface with the third-party service (at process activity 4 - ‘Verify personal and 
payment data’). In addition, the information technology (IT) continuity management 
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Figure 5-3 BPMN process model online insurance quotation 
 
5.3.3. Phase 1 - Asset identification 
Step 1.1 of the approach - identify critical business processes - is omitted, as in 
this example only one critical business process (the online insurance quotation 
process) is available. In step 1.2, the following information assets were identified in 
the online insurance quotation process: customer and payment data. Customer 
data is saved and processed, as along with payment data needed for the 
transactions. Criteria and indicators for identifying these information assets are 
decision points and activities in the process like ‘Enter personal and payment data’, 
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5.3.4. Phase 2 - Asset profiling 
In this phase, the information asset’s security requirements have to be specified. 
Firstly, the appropriate security objective rating for integrity, confidentiality and 
availability should be selected based on the security needs of the information 
asset. Secondly, the container security requirements should be specified; 
describing what is to be protected as well as the concrete implementation at the 
containers handling the information. To elicit and define the security requirements, 
one can use the company’s security policy, organisational procedures and security 
best practices. For the definition of IT security processes which ensure and 
operationalise security, IT operations guidelines like ITIL (CCTA, 2007), or security 
standards can be used. Table 5-5 and Table 5-6 show the security requirements 
defined for customer and payment data.  





















Address data has to be  
verified in the system.  
Data in the system  
should be protected  
against unauthorised  
access and  modification.  
192-bit AES encryption 
 if data is transferred. 
Access should be 
 given only to  
company people. 
Changes have to 
be logged.  
Within one  
business day. 
Access Management 
 (authorisations ) 
IT Security Management  
(Security of systems) 
Continuity management  





Personnel entering data 
should verify their  
entries as well as the 
data received.  
People of the  
departments  
should be aware 
of confidentiality.  
Core people 
 within one 
 business day. 
Access Management 
IT Security training 
Physical None. Documents should 
 be locked away  
and disposed of 
securely.  
Within one 
 business day. 
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Table 5-6: Payment data security requirements 
 
5.3.5. Phase 3 - Vulnerability identification 
Firstly, at step 3.1 of the approach, the degree of implemented security functions 
in information processing and their adherence to information assets’ security 
objectives are evaluated. Secondly at step 3.2, the information assets’ containers 
(systems, actors, and environment) are evaluated based on information assets’ 
security requirements. 
 
Step 3.1 - Assess processing of information assets 
The first step is to determine where the information assets in the process are 
created, processed or transmitted. The EP, PP and CC were identified by 
keywords (e.g. enter, save, send) of process activities’ descriptions. In the BPMN 
online insurance quotation process, the numbered EP, PP and CC points 
represent these identified processing points (see Figure 5-4). Furthermore, each 
Information asset: 
Payment data 

















Data in the system 
should be protected  
against unauthorised  
access and modification.  
192-bit AES encryption 
if data is transferred. 
Access should be 
given only to  
company people. 
Changes have to  
be logged.  
Within two  
business days. 
Access Management 
 (authorisations ) 
IT Security Management  
(Security of systems) 
Continuity management  





Personnel entering data 
should verify payment  
data details. 
Payment data details 
should be externally  
verified.  
People of the  
departments 
should be aware 





IT Security training 
Physical None Documents should 
be locked away  
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EP, PP and CC is associated with the information assets that are processed at 
these points (see Figure 5-5). Secondly, for each EP, PP and CC, the degree of 
security function implementation (including access control, authorisation, data 
validation and communication security) is determined. Then, the adherence to the 
information assets security objective at each EP, PP and CC is determined by the 
rule set. In Table 5-7, the columns ‘Entry, Process and Communication points 
rating’, ‘Processing (SO) Assessment’ and ‘Processing result’ show the security 
function ratings, the security objective assessment results and the overall 
assessment results for an EP, PP or CC at this step. For determining the 
‘Processing (SO) Assessment’ results in the table, the Prolog program of section 
A.6 can be used, with the input of the ‘Entry, Process and Communication points 
rating’. 
 
Figure 5-4 BPMN online insurance quotation with identified EP, PP and CC 
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Figure 5-5 BPMN online insurance quotation with EP, PP, CC and information assets 
 
Step 3.2 - Assess containers of information assets 
The containers’ security requirements are evaluated by the security expert at each 
process activity where data processing (EP, PP, CC points) takes place. The 
evidence for whether the security requirement for the system (PiSys), organisation 
(Org) or physical environment (Phy) is adhered to can be gathered from the 
system configuration or specification, the company’s security policy, process 
documentation or other examples of implementation. This means that, for each 
container of the information asset, the assessor has to evaluate the security 
requirement with the current system implementation and examine the environment 
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Table 5-7 ‘Container (SR) Assessment’ shows the results of the containers’ 
security requirements (SR) at each EP, PP, CC. 
Table 5-7 Evaluation results for EP, PP and CC 








EP AC A D I C A EP  PiSys Org Phy 
EP(1): Cust. data  AC0 A0 D4 ok   ok ok ok na na 
EP(2): Cust. data  AC0 A0 D4 ok   ok ok nok na na 
EP(2): Pay. data AC0 A0 D4 ok   ok ok ok na na 
PP AC A D I C A PP  PiSys Org Phy 
PP(1): Cust. data  AC3 A3 D3 ok ok ok ok nok ok ok 
PP(1): Pay. data  AC3 A3 D3 ok ok ok ok nok ok ok 
PP(2): Cust. data  AC3 A3 D1 ok ok ok ok ok na ok 
PP(2): Pay. data  AC3 A3 D1 ok ok ok ok ok na ok 
PP(3): Cust. data AC3 A3 D0 ok ok ok ok ok ok ok 
CC C E   I C A CC PiSys Org Phy 
CC(1): Cust. data  C0 E2   nok nok ok ok ok na na 
CC(2): Cust. data  C1 E2   ok ok ok ok ok na na 
CC(2): Pay. data  C1 E2   ok ok ok ok ok na na 
CC(3): Cust. data  C1 E1   nok nok ok nok nok na na 
CC(3): Pay. data C1 E1 
 
nok nok ok nok nok na na 
CC(4): Cust. data C1 E2 
 
ok ok ok ok ok na na 
CC(4): Pay. data  C1 E2   ok ok ok ok ok na na 
 
Result Explanation: EP2 was rated ok for processing however nok for the 
container (PiSys), because it was possible to change data of the system via code 
injection at customer data entry fields. PP1 was rated as ok for processing but nok 
for the container (PiSys), because of the missing encryption for both customer and 
payment data - which is required. CC1 was rated nok for processing, however the 
result manually set to ok, as a new customer cannot be authenticated. CC3 was 
rated nok for the processing as well as the container (PiSys) for both data forms, 
because of the weak encryption between the company and the bank transaction 
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Processing and Container evaluation results in the process model 
Figure 5-6 shows the BPMN (OMG, 2009) online travel insurance quotation 
process with the evaluation results for processing, as well as for containers’ 
security requirements. At each activity where data processing takes place, the EPs 
and PPs processing and containers are rated. CCs are evaluated between 
activities and decisions. The BPMN data object and BPMN associations are used 
to indicate where the BPMN data object is used in the process and where an 
evaluation was performed. Therefore, the BPMN data object - defined once in the 
process - was aligned using associations to process activities or decisions of the 
process where EP, PP or CC were identified. Identified EP, PP and CC points 
were presented with a BPMN textual annotation containing all consolidated 
evaluation results of each point. The BPMN data object was also used to present 
the consolidated results of all EP, PP and CC for the information asset. The 
property attribute of the BPMN data object could be used to contain the business 
security requirements - the data, primary system, actor/organisation, as well as 
physical requirements - but this was not used. The IT security process evaluation 
results are not documented in the BPMN process model; they are only 
documented at phase 4.  
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Figure 5-6 BPMN order process with evaluation information 
 
Evaluation of IT security processes of information assets 
The IT security processes of the security requirements specification are evaluated 
by system testing and process performance documentation reviews of the 
assessor. For the specified IT security processes, the assessor has to determine 
how mature the processes are, as well as whether they are periodically and 
accurately performed. The detailed requirements in the field of IT security 
processes can be reused from IT operation guidelines like ITIL (CCTA, 2007), or 
security objective standards like COBIT (ITGI, 2007). In our example, the IT 
security processes Access Management, IT Security Management, Change 
Management, Continuity Management and Disaster Recovery, IT Security Training 
and Facility Management were evaluated based on the ITIL process structure. 
Table 5-8 shows a list of ITIL processes and the results. 
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Table 5-8: IT security process assessment results  
IT process 
name 









no   





no   
Service Level Management no   
Risk Management no   
Capacity Management no   
Availability Management no   
IT Service Continuity 
Management 
yes all Documentation was not 
up-to-date and not all 
applications were tested. 
IT Security Management yes all No issues identified. 
Compliance Management no   
IT Architecture Management no   
Supplier Management no   
Service 
Transition 
Change Management yes all No issues identified. 
Project Management no   
Release and Deployment 
Management 
no   
Service Validation and  Test no   
Application Development and 
Test 
no   
Service Asset and 
Configuration Management 
no   
Knowledge Management no   
Service 
Operation 
Event Management no   
Incident Management no   
Request Fulfilment no   
Access Management yes all No issues identified. 
Problem Management no   
IT Operations Management yes all No issues identified. 




Service Evaluation no   
Process evaluation no   
Definition of process 
improvements 
no   
Tracking of improvements  no   
 
In our example, the IT Service Continuity Management, the IT Security 
Management, the Change Management, the Access Management, the IT 
Operations Management and the IT Facilities Management processes were 
evaluated. For each process, whether it was evaluated and whether all information 
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assets would be affected are both indicated. The processes were evaluated with 
regard to the following objectives:  
IT Service Continuity Management: Continuity measures for applications were 
evaluated, along with whether disaster recovery and business continuity 
processes were documented and regularly tested.  
IT Security Management: Whether someone is responsible for security 
management was checked, and whether processes and policies are in place to 
ensure the security of information. Especially, the presence of security guidelines 
for systems and a security policy for employees was established, and whether 
systems are evaluated for appropriateness of controls and associated risks was 
tested.  
Change Management: The change management process for applications in place 
was evaluated. Especially, the change management for the online web store was 
evaluated and how the process was performed during the last changes made to 
the system. 
Access Management: The access management process was evaluated; especially 
in terms of how access is granted/revoked for applications. 
IT Operations Management: The operation of systems was evaluated, based on 
whether process are in place for the maintenance of systems, whether systems 
operation is monitored and the automatic/manual job scheduling. 
IT Facilities Management: The facilities for the systems were evaluated for 
whether fire detection and prevention systems are installed and maintained, and 
whether information can be locked away at workplaces. 
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5.3.6. Phase 4 – Risk documentation 
At the end of the assessment, the information asset at risk within the business 
processes and the issue (with an ‘X’) is presented (see Table 5-9). The result 
indicates - by ‘not at risk’ or ‘at risk’ - whether an information asset is vulnerable in 
a business process. In the online travel insurance quotation process, customer 
and payment data is vulnerable because of the code injection and encryption 
issues. Furthermore, the issue of the IT continuity management process causes 
the information assets to be at risk. The overall results of the business process 
evaluation and the IT security process evaluation contain only vulnerabilities and 
risks associated for that process. If no vulnerabilities and risks were identified, 
then the online travel insurance quotation process would be ‘not at risk’ and 
information defined as secure. 
Table 5-9: Overall result documentation  
Processes/Issues - Information asset Customer data  Payment data 
Online travel insurance quotation process at risk at risk 
Contract system - injection/ unauthorised access X X 
Bank transaction service - weak encryption X X 
IT service continuity management X X 
 
5.4. Chapter summary 
In this chapter, the details of the security requirements risk assessment approach 
were presented and the procedure explained theoretically, as well as with a 
running example from the insurance sector. The evaluation of vulnerabilities and 
risks is based on the information assets’ processing and containers handling the 
information in business process models. Security objectives are specified for the 
processing of information, and security requirements for the containers handling 
information assets which are evaluated. Both are evaluated at entry-, process- and 
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communication points in the business process model, where information in the 
process is entered, processed or communicated respectively. Security objectives 
are evaluated for their implemented security functions based on a rule set. 
Security requirements are evaluated for the containers - systems, actors and the 
environment - whether they are adhered to within the business process context. 
Furthermore, IT security processes defined in the information assets’ security 
requirements specification are evaluated as to whether they prevent or detect 
vulnerabilities, and ensure the secure operation of systems to determine any IT 
operation or technical vulnerabilities. At the end of the evaluation, identified 
vulnerabilities (namely risks affecting information assets at processes) are 
documented; they could cause harm the organisation, and thus represent a risk. 
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Chapter 6 - Validation  
In this chapter, the validation of the security requirement risk assessment 
approach is performed using three validation criteria: the methods procedure, 
defining and using security requirements systematically; the proposed approach’s 
result accuracy regarding a best practice approach; and the methods capability to 
resolve vulnerability identification errors. 
6.1. Validation criteria 
The security requirements risk assessment procedure is validated by three 
validation criteria by different methods, in order not to rely just on one validation 
result and in order to be able to make independent statements about using 
security requirements for vulnerability identification if one fails. The criteria are 
briefly explained in the following, and in the corresponding sections of this chapter, 
the validation execution, results, interpretation, and threats to validity are 
discussed for each criterion.     
(1) Methods procedure 
With this criterion, it is illustrated that an asset’s security requirements are 
evaluated systematically at the proposed approach for identifying vulnerabilities. 
Validation is performed by assertion and document analysis of current approaches 
and procedures, as to how security requirements are defined and used for 
vulnerability identification. In addition, a proof of concept is conducted 
implementing the proposed approach as a pseudo-code program, to demonstrate 
that the approach’s procedure can be formally defined. 
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(2) Result accuracy 
With this criterion, the accuracy of the proposed security requirements risk 
assessment approach in determining (positive) vulnerabilities is verified. In 
particular, it is tested whether vulnerabilities are identified at least as accurately as 
with an alternative best practice risk assessment approach. Validation of this 
criterion is performed through testing, applying both approaches at three entities of 
a global insurance company at the same time.  
(3) Method capability 
With this criterion, it is demonstrated that using business process models and 
security requirements can resolve vulnerability identification errors (false positives), 
as well as that vulnerability identification errors do occur. Validation of this criterion 
is performed by a quasi-experiment using a survey of security professionals.  
6.2. Methods procedure  
In this section, it is illustrated that security requirements are evaluated 
systematically at the security requirements risk assessment approach for 
identifying vulnerabilities. Therefore, it is compared how security requirements are 
firstly defined, and secondly used, for vulnerability identification within current 
approaches like Octave Allegro (Caralli et al., 2007), NIST SP 800-30 
(Stoneburner et al., 2002b) and Innerhofer-Oberperfler and Breu (Breu and 
Innerhofer-Oberperfler, 2005). Furthermore, it is demonstrated that the proposed 
approach can be formally defined by a pseudo-code program. 
6.2.1. Analysis of security requirements utilization 
In the literature review of chapter 3, three information security risk assessment 
approaches were identified, which use security requirements and are closely 
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related to the proposed approach: OCTAVE Allegro (Caralli et al., 2007), NIST SP 
800-30 (Stoneburner et al., 2002b) and Innerhofer–Oberperfler and Breu (2006). 
In the following, the phases and activities of these approaches are compared, 
where security requirements (SR) are defined and used in the assessment for 
vulnerability identification, and in order to examine the systematic utilisation of 
security requirements for vulnerability identification. Figure 6-1 shows the phases 
and activities identified where security requirements are defined and used in each 
approach. The headings above the rectangles name the phases, and the 
rectangles describe the activity alongside the step number in the approach. The 
grey area in the figure highlights the activities where security requirements are 
defined, and the blank area where security requirements are used in each 
approach. 
 
Figure 6-1 Comparison of security requirement usage in the assessment approaches 
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Below, it is illustrated in detail how security requirements are defined and used in 
the risk assessment of all these approaches. In OCTAVE Allegro (Caralli et al., 
2007) at step 2 activity 7, security requirements for confidentiality, integrity and 
availability are defined for critical information assets identified. At step 2 activity 8, 
the most important security requirement has to be chosen for use later in order to 
determine the potential impact of a risk. Step 4 activity 1 in OCTAVE Allegro is 
about threat identification. Threats are identified for assets by brainstorming; the 
assessor has to “keep in mind the security requirements that you have set for your 
information asset and how they might be compromised due to a threat” (Caralli et 
al., 2007, p. 46). In step 4 activity 1, the assessor has to document how the threat 
would compromise the security requirement. Then, later in the assessment, the 
risk is determined by the consequence and the severity of the threat based on risk 
criteria established at the beginning of the assessment. The security requirement 
is used as an indicator for the outcome of a threat. 
In step 3 of NIST SP 800-30 (Stoneburner et al., 2002b), risk reports, security test 
results, audit comments and security requirements are used as inputs for 
vulnerability identification. The recommended methods for identifying 
vulnerabilities are vulnerability sources, security testing and a security 
requirements checklist, which “contains the basic security standards that can be 
used to systematically evaluate and identify the vulnerabilities of the assets” 
(Stoneburner et al., 2002b, p. 16). “Such a checklist, when created, should contain 
basic security standards that can be used to evaluate and identify information 
security vulnerabilities” (West and Andrews, 2004, p.14), as reported in a 
comparative analysis between NIST and OCTAVE. These basic security 
standards can come from different areas - like management, operational and 
technical security - or out of regulatory and security directives, and can include 
  
 
 Page 202 of 394  
assignment of responsibilities, data media access and disposal or identification 
and authentication, representing high level security principles or security control 
objectives that should be in place and are applied to IT systems. 
Innerhofer–Oberperfler and Breu (2006) assign the defined security requirements 
of step 4 to model elements of their enterprise architecture. Threats have to be 
identified through existing security checklists or standards like the baseline 
protection manual (BSI, 2008) or EBIOS (ANSSI, 2010a). At activity 5, an analysis 
of possible events that can violate the security requirements is performed to 
determine risk. Threats are assigned to model elements and related to the security 
requirements. The relation between the model element, threat and security 
requirement is then used to determine the impact of the threat. 
In the proposed approach in this thesis, security requirements are defined for 
information assets used in business processes (step 2.1). Information assets 
security requirements are evaluated at process activities where the information is 
processed, as to whether security functions adhere to the requirements (step 3). 
Information assets’ security requirement dependencies are considered by 
evaluating the information asset in multiple business processes, and the security 
control implementation for containers such as systems, actors and the 
environment. 
 
Differences in defining and using security requirements of the approaches  
In all three approaches, security requirements are defined for assets, however the 
level of detail of defining security requirements for assets and using them for 
identifying vulnerabilities is different. Current approaches lack a coherent definition 
AND usage of security requirements for vulnerability identification; this is 
summarised in the following: 
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(a) Definition of security requirements: In NIST SP 800-30 (Stoneburner et al., 
2002b), security control objectives are defined applicable for all IT systems 
representing basic security standards without any detailed specification of what 
should be achieved specific for the asset. Innerhofer–Oberperfler and Breu (2006) 
define security requirements generally for model elements (e.g. a process or 
system) dependent on the context. This is typed as a textual annotation. In 
OCTAVE Allegro (Caralli et al., 2007), security requirements are defined for an 
information asset for confidentiality, availability and integrity, describing what 
should be achieved. In the proposed approach in this work, security requirements 
are described based on confidentiality, availability and integrity for an information 
asset’s processing, and for the containers handling the asset at a business 
process. 
 
(b) Vulnerability identification using security requirements: For the threat or 
vulnerability identification, OCTAVE Allegro (Caralli et al., 2007) and Innerhofer–
Oberperfler and Breu (2006) use security requirements to determine the impact of 
an identified threat and vulnerability. Threats and vulnerabilities are determined by 
other methods like security checklists, security best practices and brainstorming 
for an asset or threat scenario. Dependencies are considered by Innerhofer–
Oberperfler and Breu (2006) via the model element relations of their enterprise 
architecture, which consists of process activities and IT systems. These are not 
considered by the other approaches. In NIST SP 800-30 (Stoneburner et al., 
2002b), the security requirements checklist applied to IT systems is used as one 
method alongside security testing and security vulnerabilities lists to identify 
vulnerabilities. However, the security requirements checklist lacks of details for the 
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security needs of a specific asset, as only basic security standards are evaluated. 
In the proposed approach, information asset security requirements are evaluated 
for the processing of information, and for containers handling the information in the 
business process, to identify vulnerabilities and risks. Dependencies are 
considered via the definition and evaluation of information assets’ security 
requirements at business processes.  
 
Table 6-1 compares how security requirements (SR) are defined and used for 
vulnerability identification in these approaches: 
















Specific SR definition Yes No Yes Yes 
SR only for assets  Yes Yes No Yes 
SR used for impact 
determination 
Yes No Yes Yes 
SR used for threat/ 
vulnerability identification 
No Yes No Yes 
SR evaluation for a specific 
asset 
No No No Yes 
SR dependencies 
considered 
No No Yes Yes 
 
The comparison of the usage of security requirements in Table 6-1 shows that 
security requirements for assets are only used in the proposed approach and NIST 
SP 800-30 for vulnerability identification. However, only in the proposed approach 
are SR used for vulnerability identification AND evaluated specifically for an asset. 
A reason for this is that, in NIST SP 800-30, security requirements are not asset-
specifically defined. Furthermore, in NIST SP 800-30, security requirements’ 
dependencies are not considered in comparison to the proposed SR approach. 
Therefore, the SR approach is proposed to use security requirements more 
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systematically for vulnerability identification, as security requirements are specified 
and evaluated for single assets at business process activities; they can thus 
consider dependencies. 
6.2.2. Proof of concept – The approach in pseudo-code 
In this section the security requirements risk assessment approach of section 5.2 
is implemented in pseudo-code to demonstrate that the approach is structured and 
can be implemented as a program. The running example of section 5.3.2 and the 
UML model of the appendix A.2 – the approach’s activities modelled by an UML 
activity diagram - are used to explain the program code. The input of the program 
is business process models and as a result, the business process, information 
asset and vulnerabilities are displayed. In the following, the program is presented 
using a Pascal programming language-like notation. Brief descriptions with 
references to the UML model and the running example are included in the 
program code denoted by [UML] and [Example] respectively, to illustrate the 
program procedure and processed information. 
 
program Risk identification 
/* [UML] Definition of the business process model object*/ 
OnlineTravelInsuranceQuotation type of business process; 
type business process := record 
name, ITprocesses:string, 
activity: record; 
type activity := record 
description, actor, system, environment, informationAsset, 
ProcessPointTyp, security_functions: string; 
/* [UML] Definition of the information asset object*/ 
Business Process information assets type of information asset; 
type information_asset := record 
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/* [UML] Definition of the vulnerability object */ 
Vulnerabilities type of result; 
type result := record 
business_process, information_asset, vulnerability: string; 
Phase 1 - Asset identification 
/* [UML] This procedure represents the partition ‘Phase 1 Asset identification’ 
identifying the information assets in the business process. As there is only one 
BPM, this is the critical BPM. [Example] Input is the Online Travel Insurance 
Quotation business process.*/ 
procedure phase 1 asset identification; 
While OnlineTravelInsuranceQuotation.activity do 
activity.description:= determine informationAsset in activity 
description; 
If an informationAsset is identified then  
activity.informationAsset:= new information_asset 
While information_asset.name do 
If information_asset.name = new information_asset then 
Information_asset already defined; 
Next information_asset.name 
If information_asset not already defined then 
Information_asset.name:= new information_asset 
Next OnlineTravelInsuranceQuotation.activity 
/* [Example] Output is the information asset object containing the customer and 
payment data */ 
Phase 2 - Asset profiling 
/* [UML] This procedure represents the partition ‘Phase 2 Asset profiling’, defining 
the information assets security objective and requirements. Objects like security 
best practices and security needs which are used for requirements’ definition are 
not implemented as program code. [Example] Input is the information assets 
customer and payment data. */ 
procedure phase 2 asset profiling; 
While information_asset.name do 
Information_asset.security_objective_level:= set security objective 
level; 
Information_asset.container_security_requirements:= set containers 
security requirements for PiSys, Phy and Actor; 
Information_asset.ITprocesses:= set IT process requirements; 
Next information asset.name  
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/* [Example] Output is the information asset object containing the customer and 
payment data now with defined security objectives, container requirements and IT 
process*/ 
Phase 3 - Vulnerability identification 
/* [UML] This procedure represents the partition ‘Phase 3 Vulnerability 
identification’ identifying EP, PP or CC for each process activity and then 
specifying the implemented security concepts. Afterwards, the processing and 
containers’ security requirements are evaluated, and at the end the IT processes 
are evaluated. [Example] Input is the Online Travel Insurance Quotation process 
and the information assets customer and payment data security requirements.*/ 
procedure phase 3 vulnerability identification; 
While OnlineTravelInsuranceQuotation.activity do 
/* [UML] EP, PP, CC and their security functions are identified */ 
activity.description:= Determine EP or PP or CC in activity description; 
If an EP, PP or CC is identified then 
activity.ProcessPointTyp:= Set typ to ‘EP’ or ‘PP’ or ‘CC’; 
activity.security_functions:= Determine implemented security concepts; 
/* [UML] EPs, PPs or CCs are evaluated regarding the information assets’ security 
objectives and requirements */ 
While Information_asset.name do 
If activity.informationAsset = information_asset.name then 
New information_asset:= no; 





Result.vulnerability:= activity.security_functions <> information 
asset.security_objective_level; 





Result.vulnerability:= activity.system <> 
information_asset.container_security_requirements(PiSys); 
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Result.vulnerability:= activity.actor <> 
information_asset.container_security_requirements(actor); 





Result.vulnerability:= activity.environment <> 
information_asset.container_security requirements(Phy); 
/* [Example] Output are the identified vulnerabilities - the contract system and the 
bank transaction service vulnerability - affecting customer and payment data. */ 
/* [UML] If a new information asset was identified, phase 1 would be restarted.*/ 
If New information_asset = No then 
Else procedure phase 1 asset identification; 
/* [UML] The BPM IT processes are evaluated with regard to the information 
assets’ IT processes */ 
OnlineTravelInsuranceQuotation.ITprocesses:= determine implemented IT 
processes; 
While information_asset.name do 






ITprocesses <> information_asset.ITprocesses; 
/* [Example] Output is the IT processes’ vulnerabilities - the IT service continuity 
management issue with regard to customer and payment data IT process 
requirements.*/ 
Phase 4 – Risk documentation 
/* [UML] This procedure represents the partition ‘Phase 4 document risk’ 
presenting the identified vulnerabilities in the business process*/ 
procedure phase 4 risk documentation; 
While result.business_process do 
Writeln('Business process name: ', result.business_process); 
Write(‘Vulnerability: ', result.vulnerability; 
Write(‘Affected information asset: ', result.information_asset; 
/* [Example] Output are the vulnerabilities for the Online Travel Insurance 
Quotation process, the contract system and the bank transaction service issue, as 
well as the IT service continuity management vulnerability affecting customer and 
payment data. */ 
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6.2.3. Result interpretation and threats to validity 
The pseudo program code demonstrates that the proposed approach can be 
implemented in a structured program.  However, it should be noted that the 
security objective and requirements evaluation is a comparison of what is defined 
at the security requirement description with the implemented security functions. 
This comparison is simplified in the program and depicted with the ‘<>’ operator in 
the phase 3 vulnerability identification. This is not just a string comparison, but the 
evaluation of security functions with their characteristics at a process activity. How 
such an evaluation could be implemented in detail with a program language is 
shown in section A.6 with the Prolog program, which determines the adherence of 
the security objective level for confidentiality, availability and integrity with regard 
to the implemented security functions. A rule set is used for the evaluation, which 
represents a knowledge base when the security requirement is adhered to. The 
user must specify the security objective rating and the ratings of implemented 
security functions for an EP, PP or CC, after which the program determines 
whether the security objective is adhered to. Even if the security requirement risk 
assessment approach (SRA) can be implemented as a formal program, natural 
language is used to describe the security requirements and as an input for the 
program. Furthermore, operative security functions have to be identified by the 
security expert and evaluated against the security requirements. Both procedures 
identifying security functions as well as the evaluation of security requirements are 
informal and prone to errors. This is because natural language is used for the 
description of security requirements (which might be ambiguous) and the degree 
of operative security functions is determined by documentation reviews (of policies, 
reports, processes) and interviews by the security expert, for example. 
  
 
 Page 210 of 394  
The comparison at Table 6-1in section 6.2.1 demonstrates that the proposed 
approach is defining and using security requirements more systematically. Even if 
the view taken in the comparison would be biased by the belief of the superiority of 
the proposed approach and therefore disregarded, the comparison between the 
existing approaches shows that security requirements are currently not coherently 
defined AND used for vulnerability identification.         
 
In the following a summary about the hypothesis and validation result of the 
criterion methods procedure is provided. 
Hypothesis: Security requirements are evaluated systematically for a specific 
asset by the SRA. 
Validation: The comparison (see Table 6-1) between the usage of security 
requirements in current approaches identified in the literature review using security 
requirements shows that a coherent definition AND usage of security requirements 
for vulnerability identification is not the case in current practice. In the SRA, the 
information assets’ security requirements - business security needs - are specified 
for processing of and containers handling information assets. They are then 
explicitly evaluated in the business process context. As a result, the security 
requirements evaluation is more systematic as security requirements are specified 
and evaluated for single assets in the SRA. Furthermore, the pseudo-code 
program demonstrates that the approach can be implemented as a program and 
can be automatised.  
6.3. Result accuracy 
With result accuracy, the objective was to validate whether the security 
requirement risk assessment approach is at least as accurate as a current risk 
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assessment approach (conformity of results). Therefore, an alternative best 
practice risk assessment approach and the security requirements risk assessment 
approach were applied by two different assessment teams from the company 
headquarters, at the same time, at three different insurance entities. Subsidiaries 
were chosen as their business; IT operations are comprehensible for a security 
risk assessment and provide a boundary for the assessments. This reduces both 
the overall complexity and the expenditure of time for the assessment. The results 
of applying both approaches were used to verify accuracy. It was defined that the 
validation of accuracy is successful if the security requirements risk assessment 
approach produces a higher relative accuracy than all identified vulnerabilities of 
both approaches, and identifies at least the same number of high-rated 
vulnerabilities. In the following, the context and procedure is described. 
6.3.1. Assessments context and procedure 
(1) Context 
IT security risk assessments are performed by two security experts at entities of a 
global insurance company, lasting a maximum of one week. The approach used is 
based on NIST SP 800-30’s (Stoneburner et al., 2002b) assessment steps, using 
COBIT (ITGI, 2007) and ISO/IEC 27001 (ISO, 2005d) control objectives. IT staff 
are interviewed about security, and security scanning is conducted on systems. 
Security subject areas are selected based on importance, compliance 
requirements and common vulnerabilities. Systems used, the underlying 
infrastructure, and the systems’ management are all examined; risks are 
determined and qualified by their significance (low, medium or high). The 
approach is performed using the NIST SP 800-30 risk assessment process. 
Threat-/vulnerability-identification and control analysis are performed by using 
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vulnerability scanning tools, vulnerability lists and selected COBIT (ITGI, 2007) 
and ISO/IEC 27001 (ISO, 2005d) control objectives (see appendix A.3), in order to 
evaluate the implementation of controls. This approach is called the audit/risk 
assessment approach (ARA). 
(2) Procedure  
The ARA and the security requirements approach (SRA), proposed in this thesis, 
were both applied to processes (claims, accounting and underwriting) and systems 
of three distinct insurance entities. Each of the entities’ IT departments operates 
directory, file, email and application servers, as well as their internet access, and is 
connected to the corporate network; headquarters provide guidelines for IT 
security and system standardisation. Each local IT department consists of about 
20 to 30 people responsible for service desk, desktops and server operations. 
Application development does not take place. Business processes were available 
for the evaluated processes and process activities were similar because of the 
business model (insurance non-life), but the level of detail and modelling of the 
processes differed between the entities. Those interviewed did not know whether 
the information requested was for the ARA or SRA. At the first entity, the ARA and 
SRA were applied successively, twice, by one assessor. Two different 
experienced assessors applied the ARA successively, and the SRA was applied 
by an experienced one and a naïve one, to determine interrupter reliability (Cohen, 
1960). At the second and third entities, the ARA and SRA were performed by the 
same people - now acting as team. The teams did not change and they conducted 
the assessments subsequently at the three entities. The ARA and SRA teams, 
which were from the companies’ headquarters, had to specify the significance for 
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the issues identified; furthermore, there was no interaction between the teams 
after each assessment. 
(3) Data - Available business process models 
In the environment where the research was performed, a global insurance 
company, process models are defined for key and support processes. However, 
the level of detail and currency of process models varies between departments 
and functions; there is not always a regulatory imperative and a reason for 
efficiency improvements. The factors relating to the prevalence of business 
process modelling in a company are the business model (mass production vs. 
manufacture), profitability (low vs. high margins) and the size/location of the 
company (non-listed vs. listed and regulated vs. non-regulated). This can be 
accounted by the fact that process improvements and modelling can help to 
increase the revenues of companies, as well as to adhere to regulations. 
In the following insights are provided as to what business process models were 
available for the evaluation, which were modelled in Adonis© (BOC, 1995). In the 
following, a brief overview of the Adonis©  notation elements is provided: 
 A triangle and cycle represent the start and end of a process; 
 Rectangles represent the activities of the process. Each rectangle is 
labelled with the name of the activity, can contain the activity number and 
those responsible for the activity as well as can state the used system. 
Activities are tasks to be executed at that moment and their granularity can 
vary regarding the requirements of the model; 
 Diamonds represent decision points. A decision point has one predecessor 
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 Arrows between modelling objects (e.g. between rectangles) define the flow 
of activities and decisions in the process; 
 A hexagon represents a trigger that is an event that causes the start of the 
process; 
 A blue triangle with an arrow represents a sub-process. Sub-processes can 
be used if the same activities are carried out several times in a process or 
to structure a process. 
In Adonis© it is also possible to model risks, controls and the organisation of a 
company, but these additional elements were not used in the environment where 
the research was performed. 
 
The process models of the evaluated entities were accessible and could be used 
for validation testing purposes. However, due to confidentiality reasons, the 
original process models cannot be presented in this thesis. This is not unusual and 
other researchers (zur Muehlen, 2007) have also reported that companies are 
unwilling to provide their business process information for research purposes. 
Therefore, the original process models have been remodelled to provide a true 
and fair view of available process models. Any specific details, names or functions 
have been omitted for confidentiality reasons. In addition, some of the process 
activities have been consolidated as, in the original process model, this was too 
specifically modelled with regard to the entity and business type. In the following, 
the remodelled business process models and the processes purposes are 
presented and explained. Only the processes that are significantly different at the 
entities are presented. By significant it is meant that the process flow, activities of 
the processes, is different. But, in general, the process activities for the three 
areas examined (underwriting, accounting and claims) at the three entities were 
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not very distinct, because the examined companies’ business and business 
segment (insurance non-life) is the same, and because global process blueprints 
were used for organising the business processes at these companies. In addition, 
the central management and steering of these entities is a further reason why 
there are only small process differences. The processes available and evaluated 
are depicted in Table 6-2. A brief description of these is provided afterwards. 
Table 6-2: Overview of available and assessed processes at the companies 
Processes available and evaluated at 
companies 
Company 1 Company 2 Company 3 
Claims processes    
Claims evaluation X X X 
Claims notification X X X 
Claims payments X X X 
Accounting processes    
Claims payments X X X 
Commission payments X X X 
Booking of new premiums X - - 
Booking of changes in premiums X - - 
Booking of new and changes in premiums - X X 
Underwriting processes    
Contract request and offer X - X 
Contract negotiation X X X 
Broker business X - - 
Customer and broker business - X X 
 
Claims processes 
 Claims evaluation (see Figure 6-2): Received claims are evaluated as to 
whether they are valid; payments are set up and settlements negotiated.  
 Claims notification (see Figure 6-3): Claims are received and the claim is pre-
checked as well as internally notified. 
 Claims payments (see Figure 6-4): Claims payments are checked and 
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Figure 6-2 Claims evaluation process  
 
 
Figure 6-3 Claims notification process  
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Accounting processes 
 Claims payments (see Figure 6-5): The accountant checks the payment 
details and verifies the bank statements.  
 Commission payments (see Figure 6-6): The accountant creates the 
commission payment and verifies the bank statements. The accountant 
manager authorises the payments in the systems. 
 Booking of new premiums (see Figure 6-7): The accountant sets up a 
premium booking in the system and matches the daily received bank 
statement data with the premium booking. 
 Booking of changes in premiums (see Figure 6-8): The accountant changes 
the premium booking in the system.  
 Booking of new and changes in premiums (see Figure 6-11): The account 
decides whether a new premium has to be set up or a change be performed. 
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Figure 6-6 Accounting commission payment process 
 
 
Figure 6-7 Accounting booking of new premiums process 
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Figure 6-9 Accounting booking of new and changes in premiums 
 
Underwriting processes 
 Contract request and offer (see Figure 6-10): The contract request will be 
forwarded to the appropriate underwriter. The underwriter creates the offer 
and sends it to the customer. 
 Contract negotiation (see Figure 6-11): Underwriter and customer discuss 
contract details and may change the contract. Contracts exceeding a certain 
limit have to be authorised by the manager. The underwriter sends the 
contract to the customer. If the contract is accepted, necessary details and 
estimation figures are entered and verified in the system. Contract is set active 
in the system and documentation (e.g. actuary memo) archived. 
 Broker business (see Figure 6-12): Underwriter who receives the broker 
business verifies the broker’s registration and the submitted contract details. 
These details are verified against the Underwriting policy and gain 
authorisation from a manager when the contract exceeds defined limits or 
contains special clauses. Underwriter confirms to the broker whether the 
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contract is accepted, and sets up a new contract in the system. Further 
contract details are entered into the system and the contract is set as active in 
the system as well as documentation (e.g. actuary memo) archived. 
 Customer and broker business (see Figure 6-13): The customer and broker 
business process is about creating insurance cover based on the contract 
request of a customer or broker. 
 
 
Figure 6-10 Insurance/contract request process 
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Figure 6-12 Broker business process 
 
 
Figure 6-13 Customer and broker business process 
6.3.2. ARA assessments execution and results 
The ARA has four steps: system characterisation, threat identification, vulnerability 
identification and control analysis, and likelihood and impact analysis, which follow 
the risk assessment process described in NIST SP 800-30 (Stoneburner et al., 
2002b). In the following, these assessment steps are described in general and the 
results of the three evaluated entities are presented at the end of this section 
which were used for validating result accuracy. The detailed assessment results 
for each entity can be found in the appendix at sections A.4.v, A.4.vi and A.4.vii. 
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The ARA starts with system characterisation. Hardware, software, data and 
people have to be identified, as well as their criticality or value to the organisation. 
In the three entities, the contract, claims and accounting application, bank service, 
and the corresponding information were identified as assets. People involved 
include claims personnel, accounting personnel and underwriters. For asset 
identification, the application and network overview were used as well as 
interviews conducted with IT people. The objective of this step is to determine the 
assets - the most relevant applications of the organisation for their business - of 
the company which are included in the risk assessment and are seen as critical for 
the business. The relevance of the applications is determined by the criticality of 
the application for the business operation, and whether it contains sensitive (e.g. 
payment or confidential data) information. 
 
The second step is threat identification. All potential threat sources have to be 
identified. Natural disaster threats, such as tornados, floods and earthquakes, and 
human behaviour threats from hackers, computer criminals, terrorists/espionage 
and insiders/disgruntled employees are identified for all three entities. As technical 
threats, blackouts, fire, earthquakes and chemical pollution are also cited, along 
with the malfunction of processes. The identified threats are not specifically 
associated to the assets; they apply for all assets and are to be considered in the 
evaluation of the assets if applicable. The identified threats drive the selection of 
evaluated areas and applications at the entities, especially, which parts of the 
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As the third step, vulnerability identification and control analysis has to be 
conducted. All weaknesses that can result in security breaches in the system’s 
security procedures, design or operation have to be determined. As a normal 
procedure, a penetration test and patch scanning are performed. These system 
testing methods are conducted on infrastructure systems (i.e., network systems, 
servers and databases) as well as business applications (i.e., the claims, contract 
and accounting systems). Because of the natural disaster threats, the business 
continuity documentation and disaster recovery at each entity are examined. The 
insiders/disgruntled employee threats lead to the review of the access permissions 
and user accounts of the systems. Natural disaster threats were not considered, 
as the companies are not exposed. Technical threats like earthquakes, blackouts 
and chemical pollution were evaluated as unlikely, and fire is treated by sprinkler 
systems at the entities. Terrorists and espionage were also not considered at the 
entities because the business is not critical. Later, the information security at the 
entities is evaluated as to whether business people have enough knowledge about 
security, and as to whether IT staff handle information securely.  
For the identification and analysis of vulnerabilities, a security checklist is used 
which is based on security best practices such as COBIT (ITGI, 2007), ISO/IEC 
27001 (ISO, 2005d) or the ISO 17799:2005 (ISO, 2005c), containing security 
control objectives (see Table A-5 in the appendix A.3). The security control 
objectives are used to compare the current implementation with these objectives. 
Table A-5 shows the typical control objectives used in the ARA for identifying 
vulnerabilities and risks. For each of the subheadings, a detailed questionnaire is 
available to determine any vulnerabilities that might exist; this is then evaluated by 
the assessor if applicable. The evaluated security control objectives for identifying 
vulnerabilities are selected by the assessors based on the threat identification step 
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beforehand and the criticality of the assets. The questions aim to identify any 
vulnerabilities to applications, data, and operational IT processes. For example, 
asset management, physical and environmental security, information security 
incident management were evaluated in the assessment at the entities. 
 
As a last step in the assessment, the vulnerabilities’ likelihood and impact are 
analysed. The impact and the likelihood of a successful security breach have to 
be determined based on the criticality of the asset. Therefore, the assessors have 
determined the significance – a combined likelihood and impact rating – of the 
vulnerability and rated it as low, medium or high. These significance ratings are 
based on the assessor’s expert judgement. Statistical data or other external data 
are not used as these data are not relevant or not available for the specific 
environment. 
The assessment results at each company are depicted in Table 6-3, Table 6-4 and 
Table 6-5. Only at company one, the two assessors performing the assessments 
had to identify the vulnerabilities separately to compare result reliability. The 
detailed results of the assessments can be found in the appendix at sections A.4.v, 
A.4.vi and A.4.vii. 
Table 6-3: Company 1 assessment results 
Company 1 Results Assessor 1 Assessor 2 Significance 
1. The claims specialist has unrestricted access in 
the claims system. 
Yes Yes Medium 
2. Data transfer between the bank and the company 
is insecure as only a weak encryption is used. 
Yes Yes Medium 
3. The operating systems, e.g. of the accounting 
system misses several patches. 
Yes Yes High 
4. The firewall is not properly configured; websites 
are not blocked.  
Yes Yes Medium 
5. Unused and active administrative accounts in MS Yes No Low 
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Active Directory. 
6. Staff are not aware about IS threats. Yes Yes Low 
7. There is no appropriate disaster recovery and 
business continuity documentation. 
Yes Yes Medium 
8. Documents/information were not securely stored 
in the Claims Department. 
Yes Yes Low 
 
Table 6-4: Company 2 assessment results 
Company 2 Results Significance 
1. Weak VPN connection used by IT staff. Medium 
2. No updated disaster recovery plan. Medium 
3. No testing of the BCM/DR activities.  Medium 
4. System access approval process not adequate.  Medium 
5. Daily data centre operations procedure not adhered to. Medium 
6. Unused and active administrative accounts in MS Active Directory. Low 
7. Data owner not aware of responsibilities. Low 
8. Unused and active accounts in the HR application. Medium 
9. Paper documents were not securely stored. Low 
10. No audit trail logging activated on database level. High 
 
Table 6-5: Company 3 assessment results 
Company 3 Results Significance 
1. Shared account used for the online banking system. High 
2. The operating systems for various servers are missing several patches. High 
3. No business continuity and disaster recovery plan in place. Medium 
4. Unused and active administrative accounts in MS Active Directory. Medium 
5. No user access lists for local applications. Low 
6. Unused and active accounts in the HR application. Medium 
7. Paper documents were not securely stored. Low 
8. No configuration management existent. Medium 
9. Weak passwords for the backup recovery tool. Medium 




 Page 226 of 394  
6.3.3. SRA assessments execution and results 
The SRA assessment steps are described in detail in chapter 5.2. It begins with 
phase 1 asset identification. As the most critical processes at all three entities, 
the claims, accounting and underwriting processes were identified. As information 
assets, the corresponding data for these processes were determined. At the 
phase 2 asset profiling, the information assets’ security requirements have to be 
specified. The security requirements for the information assets were then reused 
at the entities as they did not differ much. As information assets, claims, 
accounting and underwriting data were identified at each entity. Table 6-6, Table 
6-7 and Table 6-8 show the security requirements for claims-, accounting- and 
underwriting information assets with the security objective rating and the security 
requirements which were used for the evaluation at each entity. 
Table 6-6: Claims data security requirements 





























Claims data have to be  
verified in the system.  
Data in the system  
should be protected  
against unauthorised  
access and modification.  
Claims  limits needed 
as well as authorisations. 
Medium encryption  
necessary. 
Access should be 
 given only to  
dedicated people  
of the company  
Changes have to 
 be logged.  




 (authorisations ) 
IT Security Management  
(Patch Management,  
Facility ) 
Continuity Management  
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 Personnel entering data 
should verify their entries 
as well as the data 
received.  
Segregation of duties for 
claims payments. 
People of the  
departments 
should 
 be aware of 
 confidentiality. 
Core people 




IT Security Training 









 be locked away  
and disposed of 




IT Security Training 
Facility Management 
Business Continuity  
Management 





























Accouting data has  
to be verified in the 
 system.  
Data in the system  
should be protected  
against unauthorised  
access and modification. 
Separation of  duties  
of payments entry and  
payments release.  
Medium encryption  
necessary. 
Access should be 
 given only to  
company  people. 
Changes have to be 
 logged.  
Within one  
business day 
Access Management 
 (authorisations ) 
IT Security Management  
(Patch Management,  
Facility ) 
Continuity Management  



















 Personnel entering  
data  should verify 
 their entries as well 
as the data received.  
People of the  
departments should 
 be aware of 
 confidentiality. 
Core people 




IT Security Training 







none Documents should 
 be locked away  
and disposed of 




IT Security Training 
Facility Management 
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Table 6-8: Underwriting data security requirements 
 
At phase 3 vulnerability identification, for each process/sub-process, the EP, 
PP and CC points in the process are identified and the processing and containers 
evaluated based on the information assets’ security requirements. For each EP 
and PP, the implemented security concepts - access (AC), authorisation (A), data 
validation (D) and for CCs encryption (E) - are identified and the adherence to the 
information assets’ security objectives checked. Then, the containers – actors 
(Org), systems (PiSys) and environment (Phy) - are assessed regarding the 
security requirements. Finally, the IT security processes specified are evaluated as 
to whether they are effective and compliant to best practice security processes. 





























Underwriting data has  
to be verified in the 
 system.  
Data in the system  
should be protected  
against unauthorised  
access and modification.  
Medium encryption  
necessary. 
Access should be 
 given only to  
company  people. 
Changes have to be 
 logged.  
Approval of policy 
deviations. 
Within one  
business day 
Access Management 
 (authorisations ) 
IT Security Management  
(Patch Management, 
 Facility ) 
Continuity Management  




















Personnel entering  
data should verify 
 their entries as well 
as the data received.  
Underwriting and  
actuarial alignment. 
People of the  
departments should 
 be aware of 
 confidentiality. 
Core people 




IT Security Training 







none Documents should 
 be locked away  
and disposed of 




IT Security Training 
Facility Management 
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To reiterate, at the first entity, the ARA and SRA were applied successively, twice, 
by one assessor as explained in section 6.3. At the second and third entities, the 
ARA and SRA were performed by the same people - now acting as a team. 
 
Security process evaluation 
Selected IT security processes, derived from best practice security standards, are 
evaluated with regard to their implementation and performance. In the sections 
A.4.i, A.4.iii and A.4.iv in the appendix, the assessment results of the IT processes 
(ITIL (CCTA, 2007) was chosen as security best practice processes) are included. 
The column ‘evaluated’ indicates whether the process was evaluated and the 
column ‘affected data’ which information asset could be affected.  
 
At phase 4 risk documentation of the SRA, the risks and vulnerabilities are 
documented. The following tables (Table 6-9, Table 6-10, Table 6-11 and Table 
6-12) contain the results of the SRA for the evaluation of claims, accounting, and 
underwriting processes at the three entities. The result table shows the processes, 
issues and affected information asset at risk. In addition, the column ‘significance’ 
was inserted, denoting where the assessors had to determine the significance of 
the issue identified at the result presentation phase. This rating was introduced for 
comparison between the proposed approach and the AR approach. 
Table 6-9: Result presentation company 1 assessor 1 







Claims processes – data     
The claims specialist has unrestricted 
access in the claims system. X   
High 
There are no claims limits set up in the 




 Page 230 of 394  
There is no authorisation activity in the 
process.    
High 
Paper documents were not securely stored 
in the Claims department. X   
Medium 
Internal oral communication in the claims 
process was identified as not secure. X   
Low 
Accounting processes – data 
   
 
Accountants can authorise bookings in the 




Data transfer between the bank and the 
company is insecure as only a weak 




Underwriting processes – data 
   
 
There is no treaty data verification in the 
treaty system.   
X Low 
Staff are not aware of IS threats.  
  
X Low 
IT Security processes – all data 
   
 
There is no appropriate disaster recovery 
and business continuity documentation. X X X Medium 
The operating system of the accounting 




Table 6-10: Result presentation company 1 assessor 2 







Claims processes – data     
Unrestricted access in the claims system. X 
  
High 
Claims limits are not reflected in the 
system or process.  X   
High 




Accounting processes - data 
   
 





Underwriting processes - data 
   
 
Treaty data is not verified in the system. 
  
X Low 
Information is insecurely treated by staff. 
  
X Low 
IT Security processes – all data 
   
 
Disaster recovery and business continuity 
documentation insufficient. X X X Low 
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Table 6-11: Result presentation company 2 







Claims processes - data     
The claims specialist is able to release 
claims without authorisations in the 
system. 
X   High 
Process of claims data entry is 
inappropriate due to missing claims 
information. 
X   High 
Used spreadsheets for claims calculation 
- no access and change controls. X 
  Medium 
Claims data received were not properly 
checked. X 
  Medium 
Underwriting processes - data     
Missing alignment between Underwriter 
and Actuarial services for contract 
pricing. 
  X Medium 
Broker approval process was to work as 
designed. 
X  X Medium 
Missing authorisation for underwriting 
policy deviations. 
  X High 
IT security processes – all data     
There is no updated disaster recovery 
plan. 
X X X Low 
The BCM/DR activities were not tested 
appropriately.  
X X X Medium 
The system access approval process for 
claims system was not adequate as 
unlimited access was granted 
immediately. 
X   Medium 
The daily procedures in the system 
operation centre were not processed as 
required. 
   Medium 
In interviews it was found that data 
owner are not aware of their 
responsibilities with regard to 
applications and the system access. 
   Low 
Some paper documents which contained 
confidential information were not stored 
in locked cabinets. 
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Table 6-12: Result presentation company 3 







Claims processes - data     
There is no authorisation activity in the 
claims process. 
X   
Medium 
Underwriting processes - data     
Review and release of quotations in the 
system were not in line. No system-
supported authorisation process.  
  X High 
Inaccurate data from systems are used 
in the expected loss ratio studies. 
  X High 
Inappropriate use of spreadsheets for 
the calculation of premiums. 
  X High 
Local actuary model not aligned with 
central model. 
  X Medium 
IT security processes – all data     
Shared accounts were found, e.g. for 
the bank service.  
 X  Medium 
The security patch report revealed that 
some patches were missing. 
X X X Medium 
The business continuity and disaster 
recovery documentation was missing 
applications. 
X X X Medium 
IT was not able to provide user access 
lists for applications. 
   Low 
Paper documents were stored in 
unsecured lockers. 
X X X Low 
It was found that a configuration 
management system did not exist. 
   Medium 
In a few cases where viruses were 
identified as well as equipment was lost 
the security incident process was not 
followed. 
   Medium 
Confidential information was 
exchanged via the internet. 
X X X Medium 
 
6.3.4. ARA/ SRA result interpretation and threats to validity 
To compare accuracy, one must know the true value. But as one does not know all 
existing vulnerabilities (or at least all positive vulnerabilities) in these real world 
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examples, it is hypothesised that all identified vulnerabilities in both approaches 
the ARA and SRA  represent our relative accurate value (all positives). Whether all 
existing vulnerabilities have been resolved cannot be verified, as a natural 
language for security requirements is used and the assessment is a manual 
process which is error-prone. Table 6-13 categorises the total number of identified 
vulnerabilities by the ARA and SRA at the three companies, as well as 5-year 
results of applying the ARA. The number of total identified vulnerabilities 
encompasses all (positive) vulnerabilities that were identified with both approaches 
the ARA and SRA with identical ones eliminated. At the 5y column, the number of 
total identified vulnerabilities represents all identified vulnerabilities applying the 
ARA over the last 5 years (from 2007 to 2012). The number of identified 
vulnerabilities is the number of vulnerabilities that were identified with the ARA or 
SRA. Relative accuracy/recall is defined as the number of identified vulnerabilities 
divided by the number of total identified vulnerabilities. The overlap between ARA 
and SRA is defined as the number of identical vulnerabilities identified by both the 
ARA and SRA at a company with regard to the number of total identified 
vulnerabilities. The number of identified high/medium/low vulnerabilities in 
percentage terms is the number of vulnerabilities rated as high/medium/low 
divided by the number of identified vulnerabilities. The number of unidentified 
high/medium/low vulnerabilities is the vulnerabilities that were not identified with 
the ARA or SRA with regard to the total number of identified vulnerabilities and 
their significance rating. The 5-year history values at the rows percentages of 
identified high/medium/low vulnerabilities shows the percentages of 
high/medium/low-rated identified vulnerabilities in 27 assessments of 612 
identified vulnerabilities in total. The 5-year history values do not include the 
current assessment results at the three entities. 
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Table 6-13: Result comparison 
5 y History Company 1 Company 2 Company 3 
No. total identified vulnerabilities  612 13 17 16 
 ARA ARA SRA ARA SRA ARA SRA 
No. identified vulnerabilities  612 8 11 10 13 10 13 
Relative accuracy/recall on total 
identified vulnerabilities in % n/a 
62% 85% 59% 76% 63% 81% 
Overlap between ARA and SRA – no. 
and in % n/a 
6/ 46% 6 / 35% 7 / 44% 
No. identified high vulnerabilities (%) 5% 1 (12%) 4 (36%) 1 (10%) 3 (23%) 2 (20%) 3 (23%) 
No. identified medium vulnerabilities 
(%) 65% 
4 (50%) 4 (36%) 6 (60%) 7 (54%) 6 (60%) 8 (62%) 
No. identified low vulnerabilities (%) 30% 3 (38%) 3 (28%) 3 (30%) 3 (23%) 2 (20%) 2 (15%) 
No. unidentified high vulnerabilities n/a 3 0 3 1 2 1 
No. unidentified medium vulnerabilities n/a 0 1 4 2 3 3 
No. unidentified low vulnerabilities n/a 2 1 0 1 0 0 
 
Relative accuracy/recall and significance of vulnerabilities is used to determine 
accuracy of the approach’s results. The relative accuracy/recall varies between 
17% and 23%, but shows higher accuracy for the SRA in all 3 cases, and is 
always above 76%. The SRA reliably identifies more (positive) vulnerabilities than 
the ARA. The overlap of 35-46% of identified vulnerabilities between the ARA and 
SRA approaches is attributed to the fact that the SRA identifies more process 
security issues, whereas the ARA is more technically-focused. Using system 
scanning tools would improve identifying technical issues in the SRA, but tool-
based vulnerability identification is time-consuming and momentum is lost (Caralli 
et al., 2007).  
 
Next, the vulnerabilities’ significance was analysed using a distribution analysis. 
On average, 78% and 71% of all identified vulnerabilities are rated high or medium 
by the SRA and ARA respectively. The risk significance distribution lies within the 
expected range of other approaches (Buyens et al., 2007) and the ARA within our 
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5-year historic data of assessment results, with a higher tendency for low ratings 
than reported by others (Buyens et al., 2007). This study on risk assessment 
results (Buyens et al., 2007) and their distribution indicates that risk assessment 
methods behave differently, especially in the classification of threats. However, the 
study examined not whether one of the approaches has identified significantly 
more threats than another approach, as the number of threats was constant. The 
total number of unidentified vulnerabilities (false negatives) shows that the ARA 
missed 8 (17%) and the SRA two (4%) high-rated vulnerabilities, out of a total of 
46 (positives). With the SRA approach, a high accuracy on business process-
related issues, as well as on high-rated vulnerabilities can be achieved. Any other 
developed approaches would not perform significantly better, as they are based on 
information security standards using security best practices and vulnerability lists 
for vulnerability identification, like in the ARA approach. This is also true because 
these approaches do not evaluate asset-specific security requirements. With the 
SRA, there are 15-28% low-rated vulnerabilities which were not expected, 
because of our security requirements definition only identifying significant ones. 
 
An inter-rater reliability analysis using Cohen’s Kappa (Cohen, 1960) was 
performed for the ARA and SRA results at company one, determining consistency 
between raters, and was found to be 0.45 for the SRA and 0.51 for the ARA. 
These ratings represent a moderate agreement (Landis and Koch, 1977) for both 
raters in both approaches, indicating that the consensus was more than due to 
chance. In general, it is difficult to attain an almost perfect agreement between 
raters for risk assessments; the risk assessment procedure to be followed is an 
informal one, relying on the assessors’ experience and natural language 
descriptions of vulnerabilities and security requirements. 
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For the comparative analysis between the ARA and SRA approach results, one 
risk identifier was created and assigned. This could have affected both 
approaches, assuming that it holds no advantage for either one. The proposed 
approach in this thesis was only tested in one specific business sector insurance 
non-life at three companies. Therefore, the generalisation of results may be limited 
to some degree. But the sample size used is not unusual for this type of research, 
as often only one real world example is used by other researchers for validation. 
Furthermore, it was found that case studies with a large number of business 
process models are not available, and companies are often unwilling to publish 
their business models for research (zur Muehlen, 2007). 
 
A security checklist based on COBIT (ITGI, 2007) and ISO/IEC 27001 (ISO, 2005d) 
was used in the ARA and a rule set for evaluating the security object level in the 
SRA. Both tools which were used for the identification of vulnerabilities have not 
been evaluated as to how efficiently they can identify any vulnerabilities, or 
whether there is an advantage for one of the approaches. The same could be true 
for the ARA and SRA procedures for identifying vulnerabilities. This efficiency 
identifying most (relevant) vulnerabilities could also cause a better accuracy of 
results. However, as the approaches were applied three times, the assessors were 
more familiar and experienced with the ARA approach, and the assessment 
results were quite similar, so this should not be an advantage for the SRA 
approach.         
 
When applying the SRA, the assessors already had extensive experience in doing 
risk assessments in the applied business domain. Therefore, their experience and 
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knowledge may have unknowingly influenced the results. It is not known whether 
the results would have been different if the assessors had not been familiar with 
the SRA or ARA, or had less knowledge in risk assessments. On the other hand, 
professional IT security experts have experience in different domains and 
approaches and also use that in their risk assessment, without being aware of it. 
Risk assessors underlie subjectivity with regard to the risk rating. Furthermore, the 
SRA assessors reported that the approach was no more complex to apply than the 
ARA approach. Complexity was rated by the number of activities/ steps of the 
approaches and whether they are readily understandable.  However, the SRA 
assessors criticized that identifying entry, process and communication points, 
applying the rule set and consolidating results is work-intensive. But with 
automation of the SRA approach, manual and work-intensive steps could be 
reduced. 
 
In the following a summary about the hypothesis and validation result of the 
criterion result accuracy is provided. 
Hypothesis: The SRA is accurate in determining vulnerabilities: in particular, the 
SRA produces a higher relative accuracy referred to all identified vulnerabilities 
(positives) of the ARA and SRA, and at least identifies the same number of high-
rated vulnerabilities.  
Validation: This hypothesis was tested at three distinct insurance entities applying 
both the ARA and SRA, in parallel, and by different assessment teams. With the 
SRA, security issues were identified 17% more accurately (true positive 
vulnerabilities). Especially business-related security issues were identified more 
accurately, and these are more significant risks for the company 
(Khanmohammadi and Houmb, 2010). The SRA identified the same number of 
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high-rated vulnerabilities as the ARA at all entities. The total number of 
unidentified vulnerabilities (false negatives) shows that the ARA missed 8 (17%) 
and the SRA two (4%) high-rated vulnerabilities, out of a total of 46 (positives). 
With the SRA, a high accuracy was seen on business process-related issues, as 
well as high-rated vulnerabilities, in comparison to the ARA, which uses security 
best practices for vulnerability identification. 
6.4. Method capability 
To demonstrate that vulnerability identification errors occur (false positives) and 
can be resolved by using security requirements, a quasi-experiment was 
conducted included in a survey about security risk assessment procedures at an 
information security conference of professionals in the ‘D-A-CH’ region (Germany, 
Austria, Switzerland). The complete survey and its results can be found in the 
appendix at section A.1. The conference was about information security trends, 
threats and assessments. In the quasi-experiment (see appendix section A.1.iv) 
participants had to assess risks using different sets of information. Both the survey 
and quasi-experiment were administrated by the thesis author.  
6.4.1.  Quasi-experiment design and procedure 
In the quasi-experiment, each third of all conference participants (in total 55 
security professionals) had to identify risks of a real world example based on 
threats; based on threats and a business process model; and based on threats, 
security requirements and a business process model respectively. The participants 
had to determine risks and their impact based on the information available. In 
cases A and B there were two predefined risks, and in case C there were three 
additional predefined risks (see Table 6-14, risks 1 to 5). All were described in the 
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risk (risks 1 and 2) and security requirement (risks 3,4 and 5) description. In this 
quasi-experiment, the precision and accuracy of determining predefined and 
additional vulnerabilities by the participants’ is studied. A high number of additional 
risks identified by the participants, but not described in the risk/threat description, 
would indicate that vulnerability identification errors occur. A higher accuracy of 
identified predefined vulnerabilities as well as a decrease of additional identified 
risks at case C, would indicate that vulnerability identification errors can be 
resolved with security requirements. The following information was provided to the 
survey participants in case A, B and C: 
Risk situation description (provided in cases A, B and C): 
A company sells all its goods through an online shop. Approximately 1000 orders 
per day are processed and only orders that are higher than €25 are processed and 
stored in an online CRM system. If the customer wants to pay by credit card or by 
bank transfer, the payment data is forwarded to a bank which processes the 
payment transaction. The online shop is important for the company, as all sales 
are generated through it. In a security analysis, it was found that via the input 
fields in the online shop (CRM system), database content can be changed. In 
addition, customer data and payment data transmitted are not encrypted. All 
employees of the ordering process have access to read and order data in the 
CRM system. The CRM system was not available in the last ten days, on two 
occasions for one hour each, due to a system failure caused by maintenance work. 
Business Process model “Sales” (provided in cases B and C): 
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Figure 6-14 Business process example order process 
 
Security requirements description (provided only in case C):  
The business process "sales" is classified as critical for the operation of the 
company. For all customer, order and payment data, the confidentiality and 
integrity must be ensured and IT systems should not exceed 15 minutes per day of 
unavailability. In the business process "invoice", it was specified that only 
employees of accounting may view all order data. Saved transactions (orders) in 
the sales process are to be authorised after saving the order, by a member of the 
sales process and to be transmitted to the “invoice” process.  
 
 Quasi-experiment procedure  
The quasi-experiment was conducted with all 55 security professionals of the 
conference in a closed room; for the completion of the risk assessment 30 minutes 
were available. A closed room was used so as not to disturb participants by any 
non-participants, or those leaving the experiment early. Interaction with others was 
not allowed and the survey instructor’s involvement was limited to answers on how 
to fill out the template. Each third of the participants was provided randomly with 
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one of three alternative sets of information representing the dependent variables of 
the experiment. In case A (12 of 20 distributed forms were evaluable) a risk/threat 
description was provided, in case B (13 of 15 distributed forms were evaluable) the 
risk/threat description with a business process model was provided and in case C 
(11 of 20 distributed forms were evaluable) the risk/threat description with security 
requirements and a business process model were provided. All participants were 
security professionals responsible for information security in their companies, or 
security consultants, and therefore knowledgeable about security risks. In addition, 
in the survey conducted before the quasi-experiment, participants had to answer 
various questions about risk assessments and therefore should be aware of 
concepts used in the experiment.   
6.4.2.  Quasi-experiment results 
For each case, it was analysed how accurately the participants identified the 
predefined risks (true positives), and how many other risks (false positives) were 
identified. The results are shown in Table 6-14. Furthermore, the risk rating 
assigned by the participants to the predefined risks as well as to other risks in all 
three cases was analysed - see Table 6-15. In case C, participants only had to 
specify whether the risk is acceptable or not based on the security requirements 
provided. In the result presentation the term risk is used synonymously with 
vulnerability, as threats were not identified separately. The results are as follows: 
Table 6-14 Quasi-experiment risks identified by participants 
 Identified Risks in percentages 
Predefined Risks Case A Case B Case C 
1.Data integrity (in case A, B and C) 100% 100% 73% 
2. Data confidentiality (in case A, B and C) 67% 85% 91% 
3. Process design data confidentiality (only case C) 8% 0% 45% 
4. System availability (only case C) 100% 85% 100% 
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5. Process design authorisation (only case C) 0% 0% 20% 
6. Other identified risks (in case A, B and C) 75% 77% 55% 
Table 6-15 Quasi-experiment risk impact evaluation by participants 
 
Risk Rating   
Predefined Risks High Middle  Low 
1. Data integrity - Case A  83% 17% 0% 
1. Data integrity - Case B  85% 15% 0% 
2. Data confidentiality - Case A  75% 13% 12% 
2. Data confidentiality - Case B  55% 45% 0% 
4. System availability – Case A  58% 34% 8% 
4. System availability – Case B  73% 18% 9% 
6. Other identified risks - Case A  44% 56% 0% 







1. Data integrity - Case C  88% 
 
12% 
2. Data confidentiality - Case C  90% 
 
10% 
3. Process design data confidentiality – Case C 100% 
 
0% 
4. System availability – Case C 100% 
 
0% 
5. Process design authorisation – Case C 100% 
 
0% 




6.4.3. Result interpretation and threats to validity  
In case A, 100% and 67% of the participants identified predefined risks one and 
two respectively (see Table 6-14). All participants (100%) identified an availability 
risk that was not present; three out of four identified multiple other risks that were 
not present. In case B, predefined risks one and two were identified by 100% and 
85% of participants, respectively. The non-existent availability risk was now only 
identified by 85%, but three out of four participants also identified multiple other 
risks that were not present. In case C, 75% and 91% of participants identified the 
predefined risks one and two respectively, and 45%, 100% and 20% recognised 
risks three to five. ‘Other identified risks’ were noted by 55% of the participants. 
One could argue that the risk description was misleading - especially the 
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availability problem description - or that variants of risks were identified by the 
participants not related to the data integrity risk, for example, leading to 
vulnerability identification errors. But even if we omit the availability risk, other risks 
were identified. The issue that participants identified variants of risks not properly 
related to predefined risk was considered. All identified risks were recorded per 
participant and associated with one of the six predefined risks. Only these risks 
which could not be associated with one of the predefined risks were associated 
with the other identified risks, but only one other identified risk per participant was 
counted. 
 
The experiment risk results show that in all three cases, ‘other identified risks’ (one 
or more) were identified by between 55% and 77% of the participants (see Table 
6-14). In case B, the process model information supported study participants by 
identifying vulnerabilities more precisely; e.g. the increase of 18% in risk 2 and a 
decrease of 15% in risk 4. In case C, where security requirements were provided 
additionally, the identification of non-existent risks decreased (from 75% to 55%), 
but the added complexity negatively influenced the risk identification rate. Risk 5 
was identified by 20% of participants and in risk 1, the rate decreased to 27% due 
to the need to identify multiple risks. However, in all cases, more risks were 
identified as existent in the information provided, because assessors used tacit 
information and knowledge about security requirements and risk/vulnerabilities. 
This was evident by the participants identifying and describing risks differently.  
 
The analysis of the risk impact evaluation of the participants per predefined risk 
(and ‘other identified risks’) in cases A and B (see Table 6-15) illustrates that 
assessors tend to rate vulnerabilities as high or medium. Especially risks rated as 
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medium need a further analysis and prioritisation by the security expert and 
management, as to whether security functions have to be implemented. In case C, 
participants had to rate only whether the risk was acceptable or not, according to 
the security requirements definition. This follows the concept of ‘security needs’ - a 
risk is only a risk if there is a requirement. This rating, together with the security 
requirements, helped participants to decide whether the issue is a risk/ 
vulnerability for the company; this is reflected in high ratios for not acceptable risks. 
A further analysis of the ‘Other identified risks’ and their risk impact rating shows 
that, in cases A and B, the impact of other risks was mostly rated as medium or 
high; they were perceived as risks/vulnerabilities. In case B, some of the other 
risks were not rated by participants and therefore were not included in the 
statistics. In case C, 33% of the other identified risks (55%) were rated as 
acceptable. This reduces the effective rate of other identified risks to 36%. This 
result supports also the statement that vulnerability identification errors can be 
resolved with security requirements. 
 
The response rate was 60% in cases A and C but 87% in case B. Some of the 
forms were not filled, or were completed in a way so that results were not usable. 
The process model supported the participants to be able to evaluate risks, 
represented by a higher return rate. Case A was unusual as the risk description 
was represented clearly and was easy to understand. The low response rate in 
case C can be attributed to the complexity – three sets of information that have to 
be considered together – of the risk assessment example; the variable of the 
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In case C, the variable of the quasi-experiment, the predefined risks, caused 
complexity. The internal validity of the experiment is threatened by this complexity. 
But, additional risks had to be created in case C in comparison to A and B, in order 
to verify whether participants can really identify vulnerabilities by the security 
requirement definition and not only by the risk description. This caused the 
accuracy of risks 1 and 2 to decrease slightly, as well as other risks being 
identified in case C. One could assume having added additional risks is the reason 
for the decrease of identified additional risks. But the total number of all identified 
risks decreased by almost 10% in case C, indicating a higher accuracy. With the 
additional risks in case C, it is also demonstrated that participants were able to 
identify vulnerabilities only based on security requirements and business process 
model information. 
 
The error rate defined as non-existent risks (false positives) identified per 
participant in the experiment was: in case A 2.1; in B 1.6; and in case C 0.55. A 
participant in case A identified 1.5 times as many non-existent additional risks than 
one in case C. The business process model and security requirements provided 
helped the participants to identify risks more accurately - identifying positive risks 
in the experiment. 
 
The experiment participants – security professionals – had various competence 
levels in risk analysis and security assessments, and therefore were well aware of 
security risk concepts. Their competence level in security risk analysis was not 
further determined, but the experiment results and survey results showed their 
general understanding of security risk concepts. The synonymous usage of the 
term risk and vulnerability could have influenced their interpretation and thus the 
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results. However, a discussion with the participants about differences of risk and 
vulnerability and using security requirements for vulnerability identification 
following the quasi-experiment did not reveal any issues about synonymous usage 
of terms as also the impact for a risk was required in the experiment. 
 
In the following a summary about the hypothesis and validation result of the 
criterion method capability is provided. 
Hypothesis: Vulnerability identification errors occur in practice and by explicitly 
considering security requirements in an assessment, vulnerability identification 
errors can be resolved. 
Validation: The quasi-experiment shows that vulnerability identification errors 
occur in practice. Up to 77% of the study participants identified additional risks 
(false positives) in cases A, B and C which were not present in the example 
provided. Furthermore, security requirements and business process model 
information helped study participants by identifying vulnerabilities more precisely, 
leading to a decrease of approximately 20% in vulnerability identification errors 
(false positives). If the impact ratings of these additional vulnerabilities are also 
considered by eliminating acceptable vulnerabilities, then vulnerability 
identification errors were reduced by 39%. 
6.5. Lessons learned 
With the validation, experience was gained about a security requirements-based 
risk assessment approach for vulnerability identification which is presented below.  
Security requirements elicitation  
In general, security requirement elicitation was not very difficult for the information 
assets, as the context the business process and activities of the assets was 
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described. The business context helps to determine security requirements as 
information about the business goal, the input and output of the process, the 
process activities’ interaction as well as the actors is available. However, the 
detailed specification of requirements was not straightforward, as knowledge about 
the security requirement to-be and security functions are necessary. Existing 
security best practices can help to derive security functions. In addition, the more 
specifically the security requirements were defined, the easier their evaluation was. 
Furthermore, security requirements have been reused as the specification was 
quite similar and has not to be changed. 
 
Identification of vulnerabilities 
It was recognised that issues related to system implementation, process 
design/implementation and the organisation were identified more easily with the 
SRA, whereas technical issues were identified more successfully with the ARA. 
This shows up strongly in the results. However, sometimes the comparison of the 
requirement with the current implementation and their evaluation was difficult - 
especially to determine the extent to which security functions are implemented and 
whether they were implemented accurately. There is some scope for inaccuracies 
whether the implementation corresponds with the requirement, particularly when 
the requirements are described as high-level. Technical issues, like system 
vulnerabilities, can be determined by the SRA by checking corresponding security 
processes. However, the identification of technical risks was sometimes tough; 
other techniques like security testing had to be applied. An example for this is 
checking system vulnerability patches, where the assessors had to use a security 
scanning tool instead of evaluating the documentation in order to verify the 
performance of the process - no system patch report was available. 
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The assessment process 
The security requirements based assessment process is still an informal one, 
because security requirements and functions have to be defined, identified and 
evaluated by a security expert. For example, the extent of the security function 
implementation and determining the security function configuration at the process 
activities need expert judgement. The ratings assigned to, say, process points and 
the fulfilment of security objectives or requirements needs interpretation and could 
be influenced by the perception of the security expert. 
Furthermore, often the system, actor or organisation has to be evaluated several 
times at the different EP, PP and CCs in the business process. This causes 
reoccurring evaluation work for the assessor, who could tend to copy and paste 
the results. In addition, the reasons why a process point does not adhere to the 
security requirements must be documented separately as the evaluation result 
does not reflect the underlying issue. This means the result documentation has to 
be immediately updated with the identified issues. 
Beyond that, the rules base which is used for the evaluation was derived from the 
security objective ratings, as well as from company specific security definitions and 
guidelines. These rules were validated by the companies’ security policies and 
publically available security best practices. The rule base can and might be 
adjusted if used at other companies, as some rules might not apply to other 
companies. Some borderline cases were recognised where the rules tend to 
classify the implementation as insecure or secure - this might be wrong in a given 
situation. Therefore, the rules’ result had to be questioned in some cases and 
even manually corrected. Before an assessment is started, the rule base should 
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Risk result presentation 
The presentation of the business process and whether an information asset is 
threatened helped managers to understand what assets are endangered after the 
assessment. This presentation of risks was found to be more helpful as the risk 
impact representation in current approaches, as was confirmed in the survey. In 
addition, fewer discussions were recognised on risk mitigation and 
countermeasure implementation; this is because the security requirement violation 
is backed up by business security needs or security policies which were not called 
into question. In the ARA, low/medium or medium/low risks were discussed with 
managers and sometimes not rectified. These discussions are due to the 
representation of the risk and the possibility to interpret results. One has to be 
aware that any acceptance of identified risks by managers would change the 
company’s security level. The modification of the security level by accepting risks 
will become more apparent in the SRA, because this would directly lead to 
changes in the company’s security requirements. Furthermore, it was experienced 
that there are different factors implicitly considered by people representing 
constraints to countermeasure implementation. 
Frequency: Countermeasure implementation is dependent not only on costs, 
impact and probability, but also on frequency. But the frequency in a period of time 
is generally not specified in risk assessment results. 
Cost objectives: The implementation of measures depends on a company’s 
internal cost objectives; personal or departmental objectives may not be 
accomplished. Furthermore, measures that are not planned in the current year’s 
budget may not be implemented immediately. 
Prioritisation: Business-critical projects’ or daily operations’ security issues have a 
higher priority than proposed countermeasures, as an event has materialised. 
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Risk attitude and perception: The perception of risk by people influences 
countermeasure implementation. Personal experiences as well as the risk attitude 
of a person - risk-taker vs. risk-aware person – have an impact on risk decisions 
which are not apparent. 
6.6. Chapter summary 
With the validation criteria method procedure, result accuracy and method 
capability the objective was to demonstrate that a security requirements-based 
approach (SRA) systematically determines vulnerabilities and can resolve 
vulnerability identification errors (false positives). With method procedure it was 
shown that a coherent definition AND usage of security requirements for 
vulnerability identification are not present in current practice and therefore, the 
SRA is more systematic. With result accuracy it was demonstrated that with the 
SRA, security issues were identified 17% more accurately regarding all identified 
vulnerabilities of both approaches – the ARA and SRA. With method capability it 
was demonstrated that vulnerability identification errors occur in practice and 
security requirements and business process model information helped to decrease 
identification errors by at least 20%.     
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Chapter 7 – Conclusions and Future Work  
In this chapter, a summary of the research contributions is presented in section 
7.1. Section 7.2 describes the limitations of this study, and section 7.3 discusses 
recommendations for future work. 
7.1. Research contributions 
The research objective was to utilize security requirements at the vulnerability 
identification phase of security risk assessments for resolving vulnerability 
identification errors (false positives). Therefore, in this thesis, three research 
contributions were presented to achieve the objective. Firstly, vulnerability 
identification errors do occur and security requirements are not explicitly evaluated 
to identify vulnerabilities accurately. The discussion on problems of risk 
assessment approaches (section 3.4) shows that vulnerability errors occur 
because of uncertainty about events, threats and probabilities used in the 
assessment procedure. This was also reported by participants of a survey 
performed at an information security conference (see section 3.4.2), characterising 
assessments as subjective and error-prone, and further confirmed in the quasi-
experiment (see section 6.4). Furthermore, the literature review (chapter 3) 
identified that in current risk assessment approaches for organisations, asset-
specific security requirements are not explicitly evaluated to identify vulnerabilities 
accurately, but rather used for determining the impact of vulnerabilities. Therefore, 
a statement about security - the true, accurate value of a measurement system 
(Viera and Garrett, 2005) - cannot be made, because the security itself is not 
explicitly evaluated in assessments. 
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Secondly, an extended information security model was presented in chapter 4.1; 
this showed the relationships between risk-, asset- and security-related concepts 
for a security requirements-based definition of risk. Security requirements are 
linked to risks, vulnerabilities, business security needs, security controls, assets 
and risk treatment. Based on these relations, a security requirement-based 
definition of risk was provided which allows for the accurate identification of 
vulnerabilities and risks by using security requirements – business security needs. 
Furthermore, the extended information security model relates risk treatment and 
asset-related concepts via risk and security requirements, not only via risks as in 
other models. The extended model can help to better understand the relationship 
between risk-, asset-, security requirements- and risk treatment-related concepts 
and thus can help to achieve a better integration of these concepts in risk 
assessment approaches. 
 
Thirdly, vulnerability identification errors can be resolved by a security 
requirement-based approach. Security requirements and business process model 
information help to decrease vulnerability identification errors, as shown by the 
quasi-experiment of chapter 6.4. Vulnerability identification errors (false positives) 
decreased by approximately 20% when using business process models and 
assessing security requirements. If the impact ratings of these additional 
vulnerabilities are also considered by eliminating acceptable vulnerabilities, then 
vulnerability identification errors decreased by 39%. The error rate - defined as the 
rate of non-existent risks/vulnerabilities (false positives) identified per participant – 
decreased, while the accuracy on (positive) vulnerabilities increased by using the 
business process model as well as security requirement information. Furthermore, 
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the validation work of chapter 6.3, applying the ARA and SRA by two different 
assessment teams at three insurance entities, shows that security issues were 
identified at least 17% more accurately (true positive vulnerabilities) with a security 
requirement-based approach, in comparison to a security best practice approach. 
Accuracy was defined as the number of identified vulnerabilities of the approach 
divided by the number of total identified vulnerabilities (all positives) by both 
approaches. In particular, business-related security issues were identified more 
accurately, and the SRA missed only two of all high rated vulnerabilities, in 
comparison with eight missed by the ARA - and these are more significant risks for 
the company (Khanmohammadi and Houmb, 2010). 
 
Furthermore, with the pseudo-code program (see section 6.2.2), the UML model 
(see appendix A.2), and Prolog program (see appendix A.6), it was demonstrated 
that a security requirements-based approach using business process models can 
can be implemented as structured procedure. This proof of concept - implementing 
the proposed security requirement-based approach as a program - illustrates that 
the assessment procedure and evaluation can be automatised and is applicable. 
 
Because of the results in this thesis, it is suggested that the explicit evaluation of 
assets’ security requirements is incorporated into risk assessments, especially in 
the risk identification phase, to identify true positive vulnerabilities and to resolve 
vulnerability identification errors (false positives and false negatives). This is 
different to current approaches where security requirements are used only for 
determining the impact of vulnerabilities. 
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7.2. Limitations  
The work in this thesis has some limitations, particularly regarding the usage of 
security requirements and business process models for resolving vulnerability 
identification errors. The limitations noticed are as follows: 
 
The definition and specification of security requirements both need public 
knowledge about threats and vulnerabilities; if a specific threat or vulnerability is 
not commonly known, it is unlikely to be identified. This is because the security 
expert or any security testing tool would not identify the vulnerability, and it might 
not thus be properly reflected in the security requirement specification. However, 
the same is true in any vulnerability identification procedure, if vulnerabilities are 
not known at all. In all methods, only known vulnerabilities can be identified, as the 
matching principle is applied to identify vulnerabilities. 
 
Security requirements can be defined generally, but the identification of 
vulnerabilities is more efficient if security requirements are specified more 
precisely with regard to threats and vulnerabilities. Vulnerability identification is 
dependent on the precise definition of security requirements, which can be set by 
the business process owner or security expert. However, in the proposed 
approach there is no formal verification process as to whether the specifications 
are correct and comprehensive. For the verification of security requirements, the 
frameworks of other researchers like Herrmann and Herrmann (2006), who used 
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The business process models used for the approach have to be available and up-
to-date, so that they represent current business operations. Any inconsistencies 
between the modelled processes and actual business operations can be identified 
to some degree with the SRA, as the evaluation is based on available 
documentation and interviews. However, if the modelled process does not 
correspond to businesses operations, vulnerabilities cannot be identified correctly. 
But, in an evaluation, discrepancies between the process model and the current 
implementation would at least be indicated, but the vulnerabilities would not 
necessarily be resolved. 
 
The information security model was developed based on those models presented 
in chapter 1.2, and is the foundation of the security requirements-based risk 
definition. This risk definition does not include an event or impact statement, as the 
non-adherence to the security requirements is not intended and is expected to 
cause harm to the organisation. By this definition, the focus is on the correct 
security function implementation protecting information and representing 
vulnerabilities, rather than on identifying scenarios of what could go wrong and 
determining their impact. This also leads to the risk assessment steps, risk 
identification and analysis, being combined. Furthermore, this definition presents a 
hurdle for low-rated vulnerabilities, and as a consequence they will not be 
identified as a risk or vulnerability for the organisation. Therefore, vulnerabilities 
having a low impact may not be completely identified. 
 
The validation of the SRA with testing regarding the criterion result accuracy was 
limited to the insurance business sector with a limited number of business process 
models. No case study with a large number of business process models over 
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different business domains, or any public information about specific security issues 
of business domains, could be identified in the literature. Therefore, the results of 
this thesis are limited to the applied business domain. Furthermore, the risk 
assessment result comparison was limited to a best practice approach based on 
NIST SP 800-30 (Stoneburner et al., 2002b) with assessment steps using COBIT 
(ITGI, 2007) and ISO/IEC 27001 (ISO, 2005d) - security best practices with which 
the assessment teams were familiar. Other developed approaches are likely to 
perform equally as well as the ARA approach, as they are based on information 
security standards using security best practices and vulnerability lists for 
vulnerability identification, but none were tested. In addition, relative accuracy (all 
positives) was defined by the number of identified vulnerabilities in both 
approaches. Using this figure for accuracy might affect result interpretation, as this 
figure for all positives could contain false positives and omit false negatives. 
However, in real world examples it is virtually impossible to determine all 
positive/negative vulnerabilities (or at least all positive vulnerabilities) and in the 
SRA, true positive vulnerabilities were solely determined by asset-specific security 
needs and not by organisation-unspecific security best practices (as in current 
proceedings). 
 
The validity of the quasi-experiment, showing that vulnerability errors occur and 
can be resolved, was threatened by the selection of the experiment group and the 
complexity of the information provided. However, a prerequisite for the experiment 
is that the experiment group has knowledge about information security risk 
analysis, otherwise they would not be able to determine vulnerabilities. The 
experiment group consisted of security professionals working in industry in 
different positions, and within the experiment, the participants received the 
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information on a random basis. Therefore, randomisation was applied to some 
degree. The information provided in the experiment, especially in case C - where a 
security requirements description was provided - could have influenced the results. 
But cases A and B show at least that vulnerability identification errors occur; case 
C provides an indication that security requirements help to resolve errors, as 
vulnerability errors and also the total number of identified vulnerabilities 
decreased. 
7.3. Future work 
In this thesis it was demonstrated that the explicit evaluation of security 
requirements in the business process context can resolve vulnerability 
identification errors. The research contributions and limitations provide several 
points for improvement and future work, which is not unusual for research work. 
These are identified and outlined below.  
 
The evaluation of security requirements in current approaches can improve the 
accuracy of vulnerability identification, as these approaches use techniques such 
as security testing, which only prove the presence of vulnerabilities - not their 
absence (Wang, 2005). One of the questions arising is at what stage of the 
assessment, and based on what information, the evaluation of an asset’s security 
requirements can be performed. The vulnerability identification phase, as defined 
by NIST SP 800-30 (Stoneburner et al., 2002b), would be an appropriate point to 
perform a security requirement evaluation, as assets and possible threats are 
already identified. If no business process models are available for the evaluation, 
an intermediate model like the enterprise architecture of Innerhofer-Oberperfler 
and Breu (2006) could be used for modelling the information flow, business 
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context and dependencies between information assets. In principle, the evaluation 
could also be performed on single assets. However in that case, security 
requirements’ dependencies - with regard to assets or processes - would be lost. 
Whether the joint usage of threat and security requirement evaluation in such an 
approach increases the result accuracy and can provide a statement of security – 
regarding the presence and absence of vulnerabilities - should be further explored. 
More work and verification is necessary to ascertain whether the absence of 
vulnerabilities can really be indicated by security requirements, and whether this 
statement holds. 
 
In this research, tool support and modelling security requirements evaluation were 
not the focus. Automatising the evaluation - for example, by creating constructs in 
modelling languages like BPMN - would increase efficiency. BPMN extensions, 
like the work of Rodriguez et al. (2007), could be used to model security 
requirements. The modelling of process points (EP, PP or CC), security 
requirements and the corresponding evaluation results could be beneficial for the 
automatisation and visualisation of the assessment, as well as for security 
analysis. If process points – the current security implementation – and the security 
requirements are modelled, the evaluation procedure could be automatised and 
thus time saved. Furthermore, the visualisation of the vulnerabilities’ impact on the 
output of the business process, or their effects on process activities could be 
supported. A first step with regard to automatisation is the Prolog program 
implementation for security objective assessments. Future work could focus on 
enhancing the rule base for security requirement and IT process evaluation, as 
well as on the usability and input options for the query interface. But one problem 
still remains: the current security implementation has to be expressed in the model 
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language and the security requirements properly defined by the security expert. 
Therefore, the procedure would still be a subjective process. 
 
Haley et al. (2008) state that security objectives between stakeholders can be 
conflicting, but that they should be consistent. The verification of inconsistencies, 
conflicts and dependencies between security requirements, as well as between 
security goals, was not one of the aims of this research. With the elicitation of the 
information assets’ security requirements, inconsistencies and dependencies 
between business processes for the same information asset can be identified, as 
only one set of security objectives and requirements is used for each asset. 
However, any conflicting security requirement definitions between information 
assets for business processes cannot be identified by the proposed approach. 
Furthermore, whether the security requirement satisfies the security objective of 
an information asset is currently not verified; satisfaction arguments could be used 
for this, as suggested by Haley et al. 
 
Haley et al. define security requirements as “constraints on the functions of a 
system” (Haley et al., 2008, p. 136), while Firesmith describes “a detailed 
requirement that implements an overriding security policy” (Firesmith, 2003, p. 54). 
Tondel et al. (2008) recommend describing what should be achieved by the 
security requirements - not how it should be done. In this thesis, security 
requirements refine security objectives and describe what should be protected by 
a concrete security function implementation, in order that the asset is not harmed 
by any event. Non-adherence to these requirements would potentially cause harm 
to the organisation - defined as “risk” in this thesis. It would be interesting to further 
examine the negative impact aspect (harm to the asset) of our security 
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requirement risk definition, and how this should be reflected in the security 
requirement specification. 
 
IT security processes ensure that systems operate securely and are well 
managed. Best practice IT security processes are proposed by security guidelines, 
like the baseline protection manual (BSI, 2008), or in IT service management best 
practices, such as ITIL (CCTA, 2007). Often vulnerabilities are caused by IT 
security processes that do not operate properly. In the proposed security 
requirements risk assessment approach, the definition and evaluation of IT 
security processes are not formalised; the security expert instead has to select 
and define these processes for the information asset and evaluate them by using 
best practice IT process standards. Process maturity and performance could be 
used as assessment criteria, as proposed by SSE CMM (Paulk et al., 1993). 
However, process maturity and performance evaluation causes additional 
assessment work and adds complexity to therrhe approach. Including process 
maturity in the assessment process is a long way off, and may not be accepted by 
security professionals. It would be interesting to see how the IT process selection 
and evaluation could be automated, and whether process maturity evaluation 
increases complexity or could, in fact, be made to be lightweight.  
  
 




i. Overall summary 
The aim of the confirmatory and exploratory study, "Implementation of IT risk 
assessments and the use of security requirements in practice", is to find out which 
criteria in IT risk assessments are used, how they are used, to identify whether 
data such as process models and security requirements are available in practice, 
and whether data classification is used. The study is based on a survey conducted 
at an information security conference on February 25th, 2011. The survey was 
carried out before a presentation on security requirements and the participants 
had 30 minutes to answer the questionnaire. The study and the questionnaire 
were designed based on the work on a PhD thesis on IT risk assessments with 
business process models and security requirements. In the following, the main 
results of the study are presented. 
Most companies perform IT risk assessments periodically with the focus being on 
systems or specific security issues. The standards and methods used for IT risk 
assessment are usually best-practice methods that specify which security 
measures have to be implemented - such as security processes, controls and 
security measures. The identification and assessment of an asset’s risk is mainly 
carried out using expert knowledge and system testing. Other methods or tools are 
rarely used. About 80 per cent of the participants use a repository in which data on 
assets (data, IT systems), security requirements and threats are documented. As 
part of a risk assessment, it is mainly the security controls of the audited assets 
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with vulnerabilities which are reviewed. Most participants agree that risks cannot 
be determined objectively and risk assessments are influenced by internal issues, 
such as cost savings or management attention, and external media. 
As a driver for business process modelling, regulatory requirements and increase 
of productivity and efficiency were stated. In most companies, about 80 percent of 
critical processes are modelled and models are up-to-date. Risks, controls and 
security requirements are not modelled. At 90 percent of the participants’ 
companies, objects such as IT systems, data or processes are classified 
according confidentiality, integrity and availability, and security requirements are 
documented. Security requirements are partly used in the assets’ risk assessment 
and for identifying threats. In addition, 70 percent of the participants are convinced 
that risks can be identified more accurately and precisely with the evaluation of 
security requirements, and that the assessment of maturity and the performance of 
IT processes could lead to more consistent risk assessments. Most companies do 
not actively measure the security of data; however, they do use security 
requirements to evaluate data security. 
The results of the risk assessment conducted by the participants in the study show 
that the more accurately risks are identified, the more information such as security 
requirements, process models, etc., are available. However, participants did have 
difficulties identifying risk accurately in complex situations. The risk assessment 
results also show that assumptions are made by the assessor if there is either no 
information or the information is not accurate. This directly impacts on the risk 
identification and the risk results. About 90 percent of the respondents rated the 
presentation of risk results based on the data involved, the business process and 
the infringed security requirement as more useful than the presentation of risks 
based on probabilities and consequences. 
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Future developments of the IT risk assessment process should aim to integrate 
risk results with the evaluation process into an enterprise-wide view on risk. Only 
with connection to the enterprise risk management, can a company-wide overall 
risk perspective be created; this is necessary for the fulfilment of regulatory 
requirements. But the integration of procedures and results into the security and 
compliance monitoring should also be pursued - not only for efficiency reasons, 
but also because of the harmonisation of assessments. Furthermore, research 
should try to expand the database within companies and also to objectify the 
evaluation process. Not only should data about assets, security requirements, 
controls and threats be available, but also data about incidents, impacts and 
incident scenarios, as well as the dependencies between assets, processes and 
incidents, in order to analyse and evaluate risks more accurately. Moreover, risk 
assessment procedures should use company-specific information, such as 
security requirements, for information assets that allow for identifying risks in the 
context of business operations. This would reduce assumptions and estimations of 
errors, as well as enforce the consideration of any company-specific requirements. 
Ideally, all risk assessment and monitoring activities in the company would make 
use of the same data. 
ii. Objective of the survey 
IT risk assessments are carried out to identify and assess risks and their impact on 
the company. Based on the risk assessment results, measures for protection are 
derived and the current risk situation evaluated. The identification of threats and 
the assessment of probabilities and impacts are difficult in practice, because 
reliable data is often not available and evaluations are based on expert 
knowledge. Current risk assessment methods are based on the ad-hoc 
identification of threats and vulnerabilities of single selected objects (assets) based 
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on security best practices. This procedure makes it difficult to identify security 
design vulnerabilities or implemented controls in operation, as the security needed 
is not verified. 
The objective of the study was to examine the current practice of risk assessments 
- in particular the procedures and criteria used in risk assessments, the trust in risk 
assessment results, the evaluation of security controls, the usage of security 
requirements, and the availability of process models. 
The results and findings from the study are used a as foundation for developing a 
risk assessment process based on business process models and security 
requirements as part of a PhD thesis. 
iii. Survey design 
The survey has three parts. Parts 1 and 2 consists of a questionnaire which should 
confirm the hypothesis and explore current practices. The questionnaire was 
developed as part of a PhD thesis literature review on IT risk assessment with 
business process models and security requirements. The questionnaire was 
verified in a test run, as to what extent are the questions understood and can the 
responses be evaluated. Part 3 is a quasi-experiment which should test whether 
participants are able to identify vulnerabilities more accurately with different sets of 
information. The design of the quasi-experiment was tested before in a trial run by 
an individual with the same background as the conference participants with regard 
to understandability, time required and the results generated.  
a) Questionnaire 
The questionnaire consists of the following three components: 
‘Part 1 - IT Risk Assessment’ consists of questions about IT risk assessment; in 
particular, what criteria are used and how risk results are valued. 
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‘Part 2 - Business Process Models and Security Requirements’ consists of 
questions concerning the use of business process models, classification of data in 
enterprises and the use of security requirements in risk assessments. 
‘Part 3 - Risk Assessment Example’ consists of a risk assessment task. The study 
participants had to carry out a risk assessment based on the information given. 
b) Survey performance 
In a lecture at an information security conference on February 25th, 2011, the 
participants were interviewed using a questionnaire regarding IT risk assessments 
and the application of security requirements. The survey took place in a closed 
room under supervision. The participants had approximately 30 minutes to answer 
the questionnaire. Interaction with other participants was not allowed and the 
survey instructor’s involvement was limited to answers on how to fill out the 
template. Out of the 55 participants of the meeting, 45 answered part 1 of the 
questionnaire and 46 answered part 2. Part 3 of the questionnaire was answered 
by 36 participants. Multiple answers were allowed for some questions.  
 
iv. Survey results  
a) IT risk assessments (Part 1) 
a. How often per year do you conduct an IT risk assessment in your company 
and will you set any priorities? 
33 percent of the participants perform risk assessments on an ad-hoc basis and 
67 percent on a periodic basis. 
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Figure A-1 Type of risk assessment 
On average, each year 6 risk assessments are carried out. Usually these are done 
on specific security areas. 
 
Figure A-2 Extent of risk assessment 
b. What standards/ methods do you use for risk assessments? 
Most participants use the ISO 27001/27005 standards, COBIT and ISF practices 
as a basis for risk assessment. It is noteworthy that security best practice 
standards are used that specify concrete security or control measures, and no risk 
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Figure A-3 Used standards/ method for risk assessments  
c. Which of the following criteria do you use in the risk assessment? 
Security controls, security requirements and frequencies are used by only some of 
the participants in the risk assessment. 
 
Figure A-4 Criteria’s used in risk assessments 
d. How do you determine or identify: events, vulnerabilities, probabilities, effects? 
Events are mainly determined by using expert knowledge. Other tools such as 
publications and event databases are rarely used. 
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Weaknesses are mainly determined by means of expert knowledge, as well as 
system testing. 
Probabilities are mainly determined by using expert knowledge and scenarios. 
Effects of events are mainly determined by using expert knowledge and scenarios. 
The identification of events, vulnerabilities, probabilities and impacts will be largely 
determined by expert knowledge. The result was as expected, but also shows the 
very high dependency on experts and their assessment of risks. Apart from 
system testing and scenarios other means for identification of events, 
vulnerabilities, probabilities and impacts are rarely used. 
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Figure A-6 Determination of vulnerabilities 
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Figure A-8 Determination of impacts 
 
e. Do you use a repository with the following objects for your risk assessment? 
Approximately 80 percent of the participants use a repository which is used in the 
risk assessment. At most participants’ companies, the evaluation objects (assets) 
and security controls / security concepts are stored in the repository. Security 
requirements, threats and impacts are often also stored in the repository. Potential 
losses or occurred ones are rarely documented. 
 
Figure A-9 Repository objects 
f. Do you evaluate implemented security controls in the risk assessment? 
Most of the participants do not evaluate all implemented security controls, nor do 
they evaluate security controls only for assets with vulnerabilities. Some of the 
participants evaluate controls for the evaluated assets and only a small part 
evaluated the security controls of all assets. 
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Figure A-10 Evaluation of security controls 
 
g. To what extent do you agree with the following statements? 
(1) Risks cannot be determined objectively, because of insufficient data on events, 
probabilities and consequences, as well as statistical data not being available. 
Most participants agree that risks cannot be determined objectively. However, 
there is the view among the participants, that the risk results are verifiable and 
therefore not subjective (see (2)). This would mean that risk results are 
comprehensible, but the data basis used is not verifiable. But how should the risk 
result then be comprehensible? Furthermore, the participants felt that risk 
assessments are influenced by e.g. personal experience or media (see (3)). But 
this raises the question of how risk assessments are really verifiable, as the 
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Figure A-11 Objectivity of risks 
(2) Risk assessments are subjective estimates, which are difficult to verify. 
 
 
Figure A-12 Risk assessments are subjective 
 
(3) Risk assessments (probabilities and consequences) of an assessor are 
influenced by personal experiences, media and business-specific circumstances 
About 80 percent of respondents believe that risk assessments are influenced by 
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Figure A-13 Risk assessments are influenced  
(4) Risks are usually assessed as low or medium; therefore high risks (H) are 
under-represented and low risks (N) are over-represented 
High risks are not seen as under-represented and low risks are not seen as over-
represented. This is interesting since it has been scientifically proven that some 
risk assessment procedures tend to classify risks mainly as medium or low. In a 
separate study carried out in a company it has been identified that low risks are 























Figure A-14 High risks are under-
represented 
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(5) The implementation of security measures by the management is influenced by 
personal, departmental or company-wide cost objectives 
The implementation of security measures is influenced up to 90 percent by the 
management and cost objectives.  
 
Figure A-16 Measure implementation 
(6) Security policies are adjusted when risks are accepted by management  
There is disagreement among the participants about whether security policies are 
adjusted when risks are accepted by the management. Security policies are only 
partially, adapted or may not be adapted at all. 
 
Figure A-17 Adaption of security policies  
  
 
 Page 275 of 394  
 
(7) Current risk assessment processes or methods (see question 4.2) are 
sufficient.  
51 percent of the participants have the opinion that the existing risk assessment 
procedures are sufficient and 49 percent believe they are not. The following issues 
should be considered to improve current methods: risk management and 
compliance, objectivity of assessment procedures, dependencies between risks 
and assets, and the coverage of the assessment process. 
 
Figure A-18 Risk assessment methods 
 
h. Summary - IT Risk Assessment (Survey Part 1) 
Most companies perform IT risk assessments periodically with a focus on key 
assets or specific security areas. On average 6 assessments per year are carried 
out. The standards / methods used for risk assessments are usually best-practice 
methods that specify which concrete security measures such as security 
processes and security controls should be implemented. The most frequently 
mentioned methods were standards such as ISO27001, Cobit and ISF practices. 
Partly self-developed assessment procedures are used that are created from 
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existing best-practice standards. The identification and assessment of risks of 
assets is conducted primarily by expert knowledge. Partially system testing and 
scenarios are used. Other methods or tools such as publications, loss or event 
data play a relatively minor role in risk identification and assessment. 
Approximately 80 percent of the participants have a repository in which data on 
assets (data, IT systems), security requirements and threats are documented. In a 
risk assessment largely implemented controls at assets with vulnerabilities are 
evaluated. However, security controls implemented for all assets of the company 
or for assets assessed are not systematically checked. 
Most participants agree that risks cannot be determined objectively; however, they 
believe that risk assessment results can be verified. In addition, the participants 
agreed that risk assessments are influenced either by the assessor and / or cost 
objectives in the company and vulnerability identification errors occur. To what 
extent security policies are adapted after the risk assessment, and the decisions 
made about risk, are very individual depending on the company. The participants 
have not confirmed that there might be a concentration of risks in specific ranges: 
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b)  Business process models and security requirements (Part 2) 
a. What do you see as a driver for the modelling of business processes? 
As a driver for business process modelling regulatory requirements, increased 
productivity and efficiency are seen. Organisational design and organisational 









































































































































































Figure A-19 Driver for business process modelling 
 
b. Has your company (group or subsidiary) modelled business processes (1), are 
they up-to date (2) and for the most part are important / critical (3) processes 
available? 
In most organisations of the participants critical or important processes are 
modelled and up-to date. 
  
 
 Page 278 of 394  
 
Figure A-20 Business process modelling 
 
c. What information is modelled in the business process models?  
Mostly actors / roles and IT systems are modelled in the business process model. 
Risks, controls and security requirements are usually not modelled. 
 
Figure A-21 Information in business process models 
 
d. Do you classify information objects company-wide according to confidentiality, 
integrity and availability? 
In 90 percent of the participants’ information objects are classified by 
confidentiality, integrity and availability; mainly IT systems and data are classified. 
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e. Do you have defined security risk limits as well as security requirements in 
your company?  
For 60 percent of the participants, limits for security risks and security 
requirements for systems and data are defined.  
f. For which information assets are security requirements defined at your 
company? 
Security requirements are mainly defined for IT systems, data and partly for 
processes. 
 
Figure A-22 Security requirements for objects (assets) 
 
 
g. How are security requirements documented in your company? 
Security requirements are usually documented either in a structured template or 
as free text. 
 
Figure A-23 Documentation of security requirements  
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h. Where are security requirements defined in your company?  
Security requirements at most companies are defined in security policies and / or 































































































Figure A-24 Documentation of security requirements  
 
i. Do you take advantage of security requirements in the risk assessment? 
Security requirements are used for assets and / or for the identification of threats 
and / or the assessment of events.  
 
Figure A-25 Usage of security requirements 
j. To what extent do you agree with the following statements? 
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(1) Security requirements are systematically (for threat identification and the 
assessment) considered in risk assessments. Risks could be determined to be 
more precise/accurate with a systematic evaluation of security requirements.  
In most organisations of the participants (60 percent), security requirements are 
already taken into account in the risk assessment. In addition, 70 percent of the 
participants are convinced that risks can be determined more accurately and 






















Figure A-26 Consideration of security requirements 
(2) Risks can be identified and assessed only on the basis of security 
requirements. 
Most participants do not believe that risks can only be identified and evaluated on 
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Figure A-27 Security requirements as basis for risk assessments  
(3) The additional assessment of maturity (Mat) and Performance (Perf) of IT 
processes could lead to more stable (time-independent) risk assessment results. 
The majority of participants confirmed that the assessment of performance and 























Figure A-28 Maturity und Performance in risk assessments  
(4) Within our company we already systematically check information security by 
means of security requirements (SR) 
Security requirements are used to determine risks. About half of the participants 
systematically evaluate information security with security requirements. 
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Figure A-29 Information security with security requirements 
(5) Our company actively measures information security with security metrics.  
Most companies do not actively measure information security.  
 
Figure A-30 Measurement of information security 
(6) Which representation of risk is more useful for you? 
The presentation of risks associated with the process, the data and the security 
requirement violated, are viewed by about 90 percent of respondents as very 
helpful (Representation 2 and 3). 
Table A-1: Representation of risk results 
Representation 1   (L=Low; M= Medium; H=High) 
Risk Probability (L/M/H) Impact (L/M/H) Risk 
assessment: 
Web server – Not encrypted 
data transmission 
Low Medium Expert 
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Representation 2 
Process  Risk Data affected Risk assessment: 
Sales process Web server – Not encrypted 
data transmission 
Customer data Security requirement infringed 
Representation 3  (SR=Security requirement) 
Process  Risk Data affected Risk assessment: SR + Level (1-3) 
Sales process Web server – Not encrypted 
data transmission 
Customer data Security 
requirement V2 
infringed 
Confidential (V 2) 
Integrity (I 1) 
 
 
Figure A-31 Representation of risk results  
k. Summary – Business Process Models and Security Requirements (Part 2) 
The participants of the study see as a driver for business process modelling 
regulatory requirements and the increase in productivity as well as efficiency 
reasons. Organisational design and organisational documentation play a relatively 
minor role. In most organisations critical and important processes of the company 
are modelled and these processes are up-to-date. Usually actors / roles and IT 
systems are modelled in business processes. Risks, controls and security 
requirements are usually not modelled. 
For 90 percent of the participants, information objects like IT systems, processes 
or data are classified according to confidentiality, integrity and availability. Mainly 
IT systems and data are classified, and for these security requirements are 
defined. Security requirements are documented either in a structured template, or 
as free text. Other forms of documentation for security requirements are not being 
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used. Security requirements are described in security policies and / or security 
standards and / or Security Procedures / Guidelines, and are used in risk 
assessments for identification of threats. 
60 percent of the participants consider security requirements in the risk 
assessment. To what extent and at which risk assessment activity security 
requirements are used could not be determined. In addition, 70 percent of the 
participants are convinced that risks can be determined more accurately and 
precisely with the evaluation of security requirements. The presentation of a risk 
not only by the event, the likelihood and impact, but with the security requirements, 
the processes and data involved is seen as very helpful by approximately 90 
percent of the participants. 
The majority of participants confirmed that the assessment of performance and 
maturity of IT processes could lead to more consistent and time-independent risk 
assessment results. However, most companies do not actively measure 
information security, but use security requirements to verify information security. 
  
 
 Page 286 of 394  
 
c) Risk assessment by hand of a example (Part 3) 
In this study, the participants had to carry out a risk assessment on a real world 
example. For this purpose, three different samples (A, B, C) were distributed 
among the participants. Examples A, B and C contain different amounts of 
information for the risk assessment. In example A (33% of all survey forms) a risk 
situation description was provided, in example C (33% of all survey forms) the risk 
situation description in addition to a business process model was provided and in 
example B (33% of all survey forms) the risk situation description along with 
security requirements and a business process model was provided. 
The following information was provided in the examples: 
Risk situation description: 
A company sells all their goods through an online shop. Approximately 1000 
orders per day are processed and only orders that are higher than € 25 are 
processed and stored in an online CRM system. If the customer wants to pay by 
credit card or by bank transfer, the payment data is forwarded to a bank which 
processes the payment transaction. The online shop is important for the company, 
as all sales are generated through the online portal. In a security analysis it was 
found that via the input fields in the online shop (CRM system) database content 
can be changed. In addition, customer data and payment data transmitted are not 
encrypted. All employees of the ordering process have read access to order data 
in the CRM system. The CRM system was not available in the last 10 days, on two 
occasions for 1 hour, due to a system failure caused by maintenance work. 
Business Process model “Sales”: 
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Security requirements description:  
The business process "sales" is classified as critical for the operation of the 
company. For all customer- order- and payment data, confidentiality and integrity 
of the data must be ensured and IT systems should not exceed 15 minutes per 
day unavailability. In the business process "invoice" it was specified that only 
employees of accounting department may view all order data. Saved transactions 
(orders) in the sales process are to be authorised after saving the order, by a 
member of the sales process and are then to be transmitted to the “invoice” 
process. 
 
In the following the assessment results for the examples A, B, C, of the 
participants are described. The evaluations per sample were carried out as 
follows: 
Average number of risks identified: Number of identified risks of the participants 
divided by the number of evaluable results. 
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Risks: The risks identified by the participants were assigned to pre-defined risks 
(risk 1 - 5), which were described in the examples, or, if this was not possible, as 
other risks (Risk 6) declared but only one per participant. Then the total number of 
each risk (risk 1-5) and the percentage was determined. 
 
a. Example A 
For example A, we got back 17 of the 20 questionnaires distributed, of which 12 
were evaluable. Example A consisted of the risk situation description, a textual 
description of the online sales process with a description of potential security 
vulnerabilities in the process. 
Table A-2: Overview of identified risks in example A  
Average number of identified risks 3,5 
Assessment Probability Impact 
High 23 29 
Medium 14 12 
Low 5 1 
Risks  Number Percentage 
1. Not authorised changes in the database (in 
example A, B and C) 
12 100% 
2. Unencrypted transmission of costumer and 
payment data in example A, B and C) 
8 67% 
3. Read access to order data (only in example 
B) 
1 8% 
4. Non-availability of the system (only in 
example B) 
12 100% 
5. Authorisation of an order (only in example B) 0 0% 
6. Other risks ( identified of the participants) 9 75% 
 
In Example A, the majority of the identified risks were rated as high, which means 
the likelihood and impact of the risks was assessed as high. Only a very small 
portion of the risks have been rated as low. Most of the risks identified by the 
participants could be assigned to the security category availability; this is also 
reflected in the identified risks. The risks identified by the participants were 
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basically correct, except for the availability risk. There was indeed a statement in 
the example that the CRM system was not available for 2 hours in 10 days, but no 
evidence was provided showing that this really represents a risk for the company. 
In addition, three quarters of the participants had identified additional risks. 
b. Example B 
For Example B, we got back 17 of the 20 questionnaires distributed, of which 11 
were evaluable.  
Example B consisted of the risk situation description, a textual description of the 
online sales process with a description of potential security vulnerabilities in the 
process, the associated process model and the description of the security 
requirements.  
Table A-3: Overview of identified risks in example B  
Average number of identified risks 3,82 
Acceptable Risk No Yes 
 37 5 
Risks  Number Percentage 
1. Not authorised changes in the database (in 
example A, B and C) 
8 73% 
2. Unencrypted transmission of costumer and 
payment data in example A, B and C) 
10 91% 
3. Read access to order data (only in example 
B) 
5 45% 
4. Non-availability of the system (only in 
example B) 
11 100% 
5. Authorisation of an order (only in example 
B) 
2 18% 
6. Other risks ( identified of the participants) 6 55% 
 
The risks were identified fairly accurately by the participants. However, the 
participants had difficulty identifying correctly the risks that were associated with 
the design of the sales process (especially risk 5). The identified risks were almost 
all classified as non-acceptable risks, which was correct. Most of the identified 
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risks of the participants could be assigned to the security category confidentiality; 
this is also reflected in the identified risks. 
c. Example C 
For Example C, we got back 13 of the 15 questionnaires distributed, of which 13 
were evaluable. Example C consisted of the risk situation description, a textual 
description of the online sales process with a description of potential security 
vulnerabilities in the process as well as the sales process model. The difference to 
example A was that the process model was available to the participants.  
Table A-4: Overview of identified risks in example C  
Average number of identified risks 3,46 
Assessment Probability Impact 
High 22 27 
Medium 14 15 
Low 9 3 
Risks  Number Percentage 
1. Not authorised changes in the database (in 
example A, B and C) 
13 100% 
2. Unencrypted transmission of costumer and 
payment data in example A, B and C) 
11 85% 
3. Read access to order data (only in example B) 0 0% 
4. Non-availability of the system (only in 
example B) 
11 85% 
5. Authorisation of an order (only in example B) 0 0% 
6. Other risks ( identified of the participants) 10 77% 
 
In Example C, most of the identified risks were rated as high; this means that the 
likelihood and impact of risks have been assessed as high. The identified risks of 
the participants were relatively equally distributed to the assigned security 
categories availability, integrity and confidentiality; this is also reflected in the 
identified risks. The risks were identified correctly with the exception of the 
availability principle. There was indeed a statement in the example that the CRM 
system was unavailable for 2 hours in 10 days, but no evidence was provided 
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showing that this really represents a risk for the company. Remarkable in 
comparison to Example A, which differs only by the additional process model, is 
that the risks number 2 and 4 were evaluated differently. In this example the 
process model has helped the participants to evaluate risks differently due to the 
visualisation of the process sequence. 
d. Summary – Risk assessments by hand of an example (Part 3)  
The average number of identified risks is roughly equal in the examples A, B, C. 
On average, in Examples A and C too many risks are identified and in Example B 
too few risks in relation to the pre-defined risks (risks 1 to 5). In the examples A 
and C, as an additional risk, the availability of the CRM system was mostly 
identified, probably based on the statement that the order process is important for 
the company, but without having a concrete statement on the criticality of 
availability. This shows that information is interpreted and assumptions made 
affecting the identification of significant risks and the correctness of the risk result. 
I.e. if more information about a risk is available, such as security requirements, the 
better the risk assessment results. One can observe this by the decreased 
additional risks identified in example B in contrast to examples A and C. It is also 
noteworthy that in all examples additional risks were identified in addition to the 
predefined risks. The number of additional risks identified decreases when more 
accurate information such as security requirements is available. 
In Example B only a small number of participants managed to identify risks 
correctly that were linked to the design of the ordering process (risk 3 and 5). 
Certainly the abundance of information and the limited time influenced risk 
identification negatively. But in principle, this shows that if a lot of complex issues 
and information needs to be combined, the probability drops of identifying the risks 
correctly. However, it is important to emphasise that the correctness of the results 
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is significantly better than if less information is available. In current risk 
assessments single assets are assessed to reduce complexity, which in turn leads 
to the problem that associated risks are not identified correctly. 
It is also interesting that in examples A and C, the classification of risks based on 
the security categories shows that the focus in example A is on the availability of 
data, whereas in example C the focus is on integrity. In comparison with example 
C the process model has contributed in that the integrity of the data was evaluated 
as more risky by the participants. The participants perceived the risks described in 
the example differently due to the visualisation of the process flow. 
d) Discussion of results 
The objective of the study was to collect information about IT risk assessments 
and the use of security requirements in practice, what, and how criteria and 
objects in IT risk assessments are used, as well to confirm that data such as 
process models, security requirements and data classification are available in 
practice and are used systematically. The aim was to investigate the following 
hypotheses from the perspective of security specialists in the field, and to what 
extent these hypotheses can be confirmed or denied. The confirmation or rejection 
of these hypotheses are used as the basis for the creation of a new risk 
assessment procedure based on business process models and security 
requirements. 
 
Hypothesis 1: Risk assessment procedures are considered inadequate by security 
experts due to the subjectivity of results, insufficient data for assessments, the 
accumulation of risk, lack of systematics (only expert ratings), and inadequate 
consideration of frequencies. 
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Risk assessment procedures are considered in practice as procedures with 
shortcomings, but not completely rejected because of these deficiencies. It was 
reported by the participants that risks cannot be determined objectively and and 
vulnerability identification error occur, because of insufficient data. However, risk 
assessments are not considered as subjective by the participants even when 
assessments are influenced by external events. The accumulation of risk results 
e.g. of medium or high risk, was not identified as a problem or recognised as such 
in practice. The frequency of events is often not considered in risk assessments. 
Of the participants, improvement is seen in assessment procedures, particularly in 
the integration and combination of compliance and risk management and the 
efficiency of the assessment process. The existing assessment procedures are 
largely considered to be adequate by the participants. 
 
Hypothesis 2: All security controls are reviewed in risk assessments based on 
security requirements. 
The study reflects a mixed picture. Security controls are only partially evaluated, 
and only for assets with weaknesses. Several of the participants evaluated 
security controls for assets which are assessed in the context of risk assessment. 
A systematic assessment of security controls for all assets is not conducted. 
 
Hypothesis 3: Business process models are available and up to date in practice. 
The study has confirmed that business process models for critical and important 
processes of an enterprise are available and up-to-date. It is mainly actors, 
activities and IT systems which are modelled in the business process models. 
Risks, security controls and security requirements are not modelled. As a driver for 
  
 
 Page 294 of 394  
business process modelling, efficiency gains and cost reduction as well as 
regulatory requirements are seen by the participants. 
 
Hypothesis 4: Security requirements are in part considered in the risk assessment, 
but not systematically used for the assessment of risks. 
Security requirements are defined for IT systems and data and are usually 
described in the relevant security policies / guidelines. Security requirements are 
usually considered in risk assessments. To what extent security requirements are 
being systematically used in risk assessment, could not be verified. However, due 
to the fact that best practice methods are used and study participants have often 
not mentioned security controls and security requirements as criteria in risk 
assessment, it is unlikely that security requirements are used systematically. 
 
Hypothesis 5: Security requirements are used in risk assessments, are defined for 
assets and used to measure risks. 
Security requirements are used in the risk assessment for assets (IT systems and 
data) and the identification of threats as well as for assets defined. There is no 
active measurement of risk, but security requirements are used to verify data 
security. 
 
Hypothesis 6: Data is classified throughout the company. 
For 90 percent of the participants, companies’ IT systems and / or data are 
classified according confidentiality, integrity and availability. Data classification is 
considered in the description of security requirements and the data classification is 
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Hypothesis 7: The assessment of risks with security requirements leads to better 
risk results, i.e. risks can be determined more correctly. 
The risk assessment task performed by the participants shows that risks are 
identified more correctly, if more information such as security requirements is 
available. However, the participants had problems identifying risks correctly in a 
complex environment. It was also evident that within risk assessment assumptions 
are made, if there is either no information, or not precise information, which has a 
direct impact on the risk identification and result. The presentation of the risk 
assessment results based on the data involved, the process and violated security 
requirements was rated as more helpful than a presentation with probability and 
impact only. These results suggests that security requirements, and process data 
should be used more in the evaluation proceeding. 
e) Conclusion 
IT risk assessment procedures are considered by the participants of the study - 
i.e., IT security experts from industry - as approaches with shortcomings and 
weaknesses. Risk results and the risk assessment process are viewed as 
subjective; they can be influenced by various external issues such as risk 
awareness, cost targets or public media. In addition, existing risk assessment 
methods should be better aligned with enterprise risk and compliance 
management activities, and the effectiveness and efficiency of methods should be 
increased. 
In the focus of future developments and improvements to risk assessment 
procedures should be the integration of risk results with the assessment process, 
in the form of an enterprise-wide risk assessment. Moreover, the integration of risk 
results into enterprise risk management should be enforced as well as the 
evaluation of all operational risks in all divisions, including IT systems, IT 
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processes and data. Only with the integration of decentralised risk assessments in 
the enterprise risk can management take an enterprise-wide view of total risk - 
necessary for the fulfilment of regulatory requirements. Furthermore, the existing 
database of risks and assets should be expanded to objectify the evaluation 
process, as well as to obtain risk results that can be objectively verifiable and are 
not only based on expert opinions. Not only should assets, security requirements, 
security controls and threat data be available, but so should data about incidents, 
damage potentials and scenarios, as well as about dependencies between assets, 
processes and incidents. This would enable managers to analyse and assess risks 
more accurately and precisely. 
It is positive for the future development of risk assessment procedures that in the 
majority of companies, data such as business process models, security 
requirements and an asset repository may become available. This means that 
these data could then be used for risk analysis and assessment and be further 
enriched. Moreover, automated risk analysis and assessment procedures could be 
developed. 
Security monitoring and security measurement is, in most companies, not very 
pronounced. Under these terms, the current and ongoing review of the security of 
information assets is understood. The existing risk analysis data in the company 
could serve as a basis for continuous monitoring; however, these data must be 
enriched and reliable methods should be developed for continuous security 
monitoring and measurement. In the field of compliance monitoring, there are 
already some initiatives in science and research dealing with this topic: business 
processes are used as a basis for verifying compliance with external regulations; 
agents are used to evaluate IT systems to ensure compliance with security 
policies, etc. It also applies to this topic that there should be a close link between 
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risk analysis and security and compliance monitoring - ideally using the same 
databases. 
The risk assessment example in the study shows that risks are identified more 
correctly if more information, such as security requirements, is available. However, 
participants had problems identifying risks correctly in a complex environment. On 
the one hand, one needs more information in the risk analysis to identify risk 
correctly; on the other hand, this information should not increase complexity. 
Methods or tools for the presentation and analysis of information in complex 
environments in the context of risk analysis and assessment should be developed 
to make the assessment more efficient and accurate. Moreover, risk assessment 
procedures should use business context-dependent information for precise 
identification of risks, in order to reduce estimation errors, to eliminate 
assumptions and to reflect company-specific requirements. 
A.2. The approach in UML 
 
In this section, the security requirements risk assessment approach of section 5.2 
is described in the Unified Modelling Language (UML) to demonstrate that the 
approach can be structured and formalised in a modelling language. The input of 
the program is business process models; as a result, the business process, 
information asset and the vulnerability are displayed. The approach’s activities are 
presented within a UML activity diagram. Activity diagrams can describe 
procedural logic, business processes, workflows and can be compared to 
flowcharts, representing the steps as boxes, and their order using arrows.  
Figure A-32 shows the approach’s procedure as an UML activity diagram. 
Partitions are used to indicate the various phases. Within each partition, the 
activities and objects represent the approach steps and information. An object 
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represents information that is created, used or changed by the activities. An 
activity is a task performed by an actor or system that may use an object. Input 
and output objects, which can be attached to activities, are used to indicate that 
the activity needs information (input) to perform the task, or that the activity 
creates information (output) to be handed over to the next activity. Joins are used 
to distribute information to several activities, but do not necessarily indicate a 
parallel activity. Forks are used to merge information as inputs for an activity. An 
arrow indicates the flow between activities, or a sequence. Decisions are used to 
branch the flow, e.g. to restart or skip activities.  
  
 




BPM: Business Process Model 
IA: Information Asset 
SR: Security Requirements 
SO: Security Objective 
EP: Entry Point 
PP: Process Point 
CC: Communication Point 
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A.3. ARA Security checklist – Example 
 
Table A-5: Control objectives at the ARA 
1. General IS awareness  
1.1 User education and training 
Subject: Training organisation, program and performance  
 Example questions: 
Check if employees are regular informed and trained about security topics. 
Check if security training (mandatory, used medium,...) are conducted. 
1.2 User awareness 
Subject: Users awareness regarding information security 
 Example questions: 
Are methods employed to make employees aware of security, i.e., posters, booklets, 
emails...? 
Interview employees about their awareness of security issues. 
2. IT management and IS compliance 
2.1 IT processes, organisation and relationships 
Subject: Organisation chart, services and their descriptions  
 Example questions: 
Check the Organisation chart that functions are segregated and business needs can 
be fulfilled. 
Check description/Implementation of IT Services. 
2.2 Regulatory Compliance 
Subject: National or international tax, data or encryption regulations 
 Example questions: 
Check if a local data protection law is known, in place and adhered to. 
Check if life data exists and is treated properly. 
2.3 Data  - Data ownership, Classification and Handling 
Subject: Regulations and measures for classification, storage and deletion of data 
 Example questions: 
Check if a data lifecycle policy (retention periods) is existent and adhered to. 
Check if a data classification policy is available and adhered to.  
3. Systems security and operation management  
3.1 Service Desk, incidents and problems 
Subject: Help desk activities, performance and service, Problem management 
 Example questions: 
Check the process description for help desk activities. Check if service levels are 
agreed. 
Check if problem solutions are documented,  proper stored and accessible  
3.2 Configuration management - Hard-/Software 
Subject: Software releases, inventory, configuration and license management  
 Example questions: 
Check the appropriateness of the configuration management solution. 
Check if the software documentation for each application is available, current and 
sufficient. 
3.3 IT investment, performance and capacity 
Subject: IT cost monitoring and budget planning processes 
 Example questions: 
Check if a budget and controlling process is in place, documented and approvals are 
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done/available from management. 
Check if a regular reporting (costs) from accounting to IT and from IT to 
management exits.  
3.4 Systems security - Infrastructure 
Audit subject: Infrastructure configuration and administration 
 Example questions: 
Check if systems server, databases, router have been hardened and how system  
and patch status are monitored. 
Check any infrastructure maintenance contracts and their execution. 
3.5 Systems security - desktop  
Subject: Desk Policy, configuration and administration 
 Example questions: 
Check if a clean desk policy exists and is adhered to. 
Check the user access rights on desktops and if they can or have installed software. 
3.6 Solutions and changes - software configuration 
Subject: Program configuration, controls and documentation 
 Example questions: 
Check if appropriate system documentation is available for every application (short 
description, a general overview, a user manual, technical specifications, functional 
specifications, data flow diagrams, data structure diagram, test results and a 
approval and change documentation). 
4. Physical and logical access 
4.1 User and Access Rights Management 
Subject: User access rights and processes 
 Example questions: 
Check the process and documentation to gain and to withdraw access to 
applications and system. 
Check if access permissions to systems are in line with defined job/business 
requirements. Check segregation of duties in important applications and 
infrastructure systems. 
4.2 Site design and access 
Subject: Physical access and maintenance of security measures 
 Example questions: 
Check how access to the buildings is controlled and if access is logged.  
Check if a uninterruptible power supply and a air cooling system is installed, 
operational and sufficient. 
Check if fire detection devices, emergency lights, safety doors and fire extinguishers 
are installed and regularly maintained. 
5. Backup, disaster recovery and BCM  
5.1 Data - backup 
Subject: Data-backup and restore processes and documentation 
 Example questions: 
Check backup procedures (approach, daily tasks), documentation (systems, data, 
tools, approach) and backup equipment. 
Check the backup frequency, backup media tracking, storage of backups and 
retention periods of data.  
5.2 Continuous service - recovery and planning 
Subject: Disaster and Contingency procedures and documentation 
 Example questions: 
Check if a disaster recovery plan exists and whether the restore of systems (critical 
ones) and types of outages are described 
Check if business departments where involved in the disaster recovery tests. Check 
the conducted tests and the documentation of the tests. 
6. Software development and projects  
6.1 Project management 
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Subject: project management, plan and controlling 
 Example questions: 
Check the overall management and planning of all projects  
Check project steering (PM and steering committee) and communication (team and  
business).  
6.2 Software development 
Subject: Specifications, change management, test, data migration and conversion 
and release 
 Example questions: 
Check the available procedures/processes for change, approval, test, quality 
assurance and release of developed software. 
Check test (test cases, test approach) and development (customization, change and 
defect solutions) approach. 
 
A.4. Company assessments with the SRA and ARA 
 
IT security risk assessments are performed by two security experts at subsidiaries 
of a global insurance company. The ARA and the SRA were both applied to 
processes (claims, accounting and underwriting) and systems of three distinct 
insurance entities. At the first entity, the ARA and SRA were applied successively, 
twice, by one assessor. At the second and third, the ARA and SRA were 
performed by the same people - now acting as a team. The information assets’ 
security requirements were reused at each entity because the security needs for 
the assets did not change. Due to confidentiality reasons, the original business 
process models could not be presented. Remodelled business process models 
were used to show the results for the three areas examined – underwriting, 
accounting and claims - at the three entities. The same models are presented as, 
at the examined companies, business and the business segment (insurance non-
life) are the same. Furthermore, global process blueprints were used for 
organising the business processes at these companies which differ only marginally 
from one another. In the following, the results of the assessors/teams at each 
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i. SRA Company 1 results – Assessor one 
In this section the SRA assessment result of the 1st assessor at company one are 
presented. 
Claims process evaluation (Company 1) 




Figure A-33 Claims evaluation process  
Table A-6: Claims evaluation results company 1 assessor 1 









AC A D I C A EP PiSys Org Phy 
EP(1): none  n/a n/a n/a n/a   n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 
PP 
      
PP  
   
PP(1): claims system AC2 A4 D1 nok ok ok nok nok ok ok 
PP(2): claims system AC2 A4 D1 nok ok ok nok nok ok ok 
PP(2): acc system AC2 A3 D1 ok ok ok ok nok ok ok 
PP(3): claims system AC2 A4 D1 nok ok ok nok nok ok ok 
CC A E 
    
CC 
   
CC(1): client / letter C1 E2   ok ok n/a ok n/a ok ok 
CC(2): client / letter C1 E2   ok ok n/a ok n/a ok ok 
CC(3): legal / email C3 E1   ok ok ok ok ok ok ok 
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Result explanation: The PP1, PP2 and PP3 processing related to the claims 
system as well as the ‘PiSys’, at all PPs, was rated as nok because of the access 
authorisations and claims limits. The claims specialist has unrestricted access 
rights in the system; no claims limits are set up; and no authorisation activity is 
established in the system. 
 
 
Figure A-34 Claims notification process  
Table A-7: Claims notification results company 1 assessor 1 








EP AC A D I C A EP PiSys Org Phy 
EP(1): claims system   AC2 A4 D1 ok   ok ok ok ok ok 
PP 
      
PP 
   
PP(1): claims system AC2 A4 D2 ok ok ok ok ok ok ok 
PP(2): acc system AC2 A3 D2 ok ok ok ok ok ok ok 
CC A E 
    
CC 
   
CC(1): cust. data  C1 E0   nok nok n/a nok n/a nok ok 
CC(2): cust. data  C1 E0   nok nok n/a nok n/a nok ok 
Result explanation: CC1 and CC2 processing and organisation were rated as 
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Figure A-35 Claims payments process  
Table A-8: Claims payment results company 1 assessor 1 








EP AC A D I C A EP PiSys Org Phy 
EP(1): none  n/a n/a n/a n/a   n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 
PP 
      
PP 
   
PP(1): claims system AC2 A2 D1 ok ok ok ok ok ok ok 
PP(2): acc system AC2 A3 D1 ok ok ok ok ok ok ok 
CC A E 
    
CC 
   
CC(1): literally / email C3 E0   ok ok n/a ok n/a nok nok 
Result explanation: Organisation and physical were rated nok at CC1, because 
documents were not locked away. In particular, there was no policy regarding the 
confidentiality of paper documents in the claims area. Furthermore, the claims 
manager’s security awareness on the confidentiality of data was not very distinct. 
Accounting process evaluation (Company 1) 
Table A-9, Table A-10, Table A-11 and Table A-12 show the assessment results of 
the accounting sub-processes:  
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Figure A-36 Accounting claims payments process 
Table A-9: Accounting payment results company 1 assessor 1 








EP AC A D I C A EP PiSys Org Phy 
EP(1): none  n/a n/a n/a n/a   n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 
PP 
      
PP 
   
PP(1): acc system AC2 A3 D4 ok ok ok ok nok nok ok 
PP(2): acc system AC2 A2 D0 ok ok ok ok nok ok ok 
PP(3): acc system AC2 A3 D4 ok ok ok ok nok nok ok 
CC A E 
    
CC 
   
CC(1): bank service C1 E1   nok nok ok nok ok ok n/a 
CC(2): acc system C1 E1   nok nok ok nok nok ok ok 
Result explanation: The communication (CC1 and CC2) between the company 
and the bank was rated as nok because of the weak encryption. Because of 
wrongly implemented authorisations for the accounting manager, ‘PiSys’ was rated 
as nok at PP1 to PP3; likewise for organisation, expect at PP2. Accountants were 
able to authorise bookings in the system - not only the accounting manager. 
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Figure A-37 Accounting commission payment process 
Table A-10: Accounting commission payments results company 1 assessor 1 








EP AC A D I C A EP PiSys Org Phy 
EP(1): acc sys AC2 A3 D1 ok   ok ok ok ok ok 
PP 
      
PP 
   
PP(1): acc sys AC2 A2 D3 ok ok ok ok ok ok ok 
PP(2): acc sys AC2 A3 D4 ok ok ok ok nok nok ok 
CC A E 
    
CC 
   
CC(1): bank service C1 E1   nok nok ok nok ok ok ok 
CC(1): bank service C1 E1   nok nok ok nok ok ok ok 
Result explanation: The communication (CC1) between the company and the 
bank was rated as nok due to the weak encryption. Because of wrongly 
implemented authorisations, ‘PiSys’ and ‘Org’ were rated as nok at PP2. 
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Figure A-38 Accounting booking of new premiums process 
Table A-11: Accounting booking of new premiums results company 1 assessor 1 








EP AC A D I C A EP PiSys Org Phy 
EP(1): acc sys AC2 A3 D1 ok   ok ok ok ok ok 
PP 
      
PP 
   
PP(1): acc sys AC2 A2 D0 ok ok ok ok ok ok ok 
PP(2): acc sys AC2 A3 D4 ok ok ok ok ok ok ok 
CC A E 
    
CC 
   
CC(1): bank service C1 E1   nok nok ok nok ok ok ok 
Result explanation: The communication (CC1) between the company and the 
bank was rated as nok because of the weak encryption. 
 
 
Figure A-39 Accounting booking of changes in premiums process 
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Table A-12: Accounting booking of changes in premiums results company 1 assessor 
1 








EP AC A D I C A EP PiSys Org Phy 
EP(1): acc sys AC2 A3 D1 ok   ok ok ok ok ok 
PP 
      
PP 
   
PP(1): acc sys AC2 A2 D0 ok ok ok ok ok ok ok 
PP(2): acc sys AC2 A3 D4 ok ok ok ok ok ok ok 
CC A E 
    
CC 
   
CC(1): bank service C1 E1   nok nok ok nok ok ok ok 
Result explanation: The communication (CC1) between the company and the 
bank was rated as nok because of the weak encryption. 
Underwriting process evaluation (Company 1) 
Table A-13, Table A-14 and Table A-15 show the assessment results of the 
underwriting sub-processes: 
 
Figure A-40 Insurance/contract request process 
Table A-13: Underwriting contract request and offer results company 1 assessor 1 








EP AC A D I C A EP PiSys Org Phy 
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EP(1): contract sys AC2 A3 D1 ok   ok ok ok ok ok 
EP(2): contract sys AC2 A3 D1 ok   ok ok ok ok ok 
PP 
      
PP 
   
PP(1): contract sys AC2 A3 D3 ok ok ok ok ok ok ok 
PP(2): contract sys AC2 A3 D3 ok ok ok ok ok ok ok 
CC A E 
    
CC 
   
CC(1): customer C1 E0   nok nok ok nok ok nok ok 
Result explanation: The communication (CC1) between the company and the 
customer was rated as nok, because they used email and post, and that the 
organisation (Org) was unaware of this.  
 
 
Figure A-41 Contract negotiation process 
Table A-14: Underwriting contract negotiation results company 1 assessor 1 








EP AC A D I C A EP PiSys Org Phy 
EP(1): none  n/a n/a n/a n/a   n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 
PP 
      
PP 
   
PP(1): contract sys AC2 A3 D3 ok ok ok ok nok ok ok 
PP(2): contract sys AC2 A3 D3 ok ok ok ok nok nok nok 
PP(3): contract sys AC2 A3 D3 ok ok ok ok nok nok nok 
CC A E 
    
CC 
   
CC(1): customer C1 E0   nok nok ok nok ok ok ok 
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Result explanation: The communication (CC1) between the company and the 
customer was rated as nok at processing, because of the use of email and post. 
The contract system was rated as nok at ‘PiSys’ at PP1 to PP3, because the treaty 
verification is not implemented as specified. The organisation (Org) was rated as 
nok at these PPs where underwriters work on contracts; they are not aware of the 
confidentiality of data. This was identified in interviews. Furthermore, health data 
was found not securely locked away in our walkthrough, resulting in nok for ‘Phy’ 
at PP2 and PP3. 
 
Figure A-42 Broker business process 
Table A-15: Underwriting broker business results company 1 assessor 1 








EP AC A D I C A EP PiSys Org Phy 
EP(1): none  n/a n/a n/a n/a   n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 
PP 
      
PP 
   
PP(1): contract sys AC2 A3 D3 ok ok ok ok nok ok ok 
PP(2): contract sys AC2 A3 D3 ok ok ok ok nok ok ok 
CC A E 
    
CC 
   
CC(1): broker C1 E1   nok nok ok nok n/a ok ok 
CC(2): broker C1 E1   nok nok ok nok n/a ok ok 
CC(3): broker C1 E1   nok nok ok nok n/a ok ok 
CC(4): broker C1 E1   nok nok ok nok n/a ok ok 
  
 
 Page 312 of 394  
Result explanation: The communication (C1 to CC4) between the underwriter 
and the broker was rated as nok at processing, because of the use of email and 
post. ‘PiSys’ at PP1 and PP2 was rated as nok because the treaty verification is 
not implemented as specified at the contract system. 
 
Security process evaluation (Company 1 – assessor one) 
The patch issue and the missing business continuity documentation were 
identified by checking the patch management and disaster recovery/business 
continuity processes. An analysis of the patch level revealed that the operating 
system of the accounting system misses several patches. In addition, some of the 
documentation referenced in the business continuity plan was not available and 
not up-to-date. 
Table A-16: Security process assessment company 1 
IT process 
name 





Service Strategy Service Portfolio 
Management 
no   
Financial Management no   
Service Design Service Catalogue 
Management 
no   
Service Level Management no   
Risk Management no   
Capacity Management yes all None 
Availability Management yes all None 
IT Service Continuity 
Management 
yes all Documentation was not 
up to date and not all 
applications were 
tested 
IT Security Management yes all Patch issues were 
identified in this 
process as there were 
no current reports of 
the patch status. A 
conducted patch report 
revealed the patch 
issue 
Compliance Management no   
IT Architecture Management no   
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Supplier Management no   
Service 
Transition 
Change Management yes all None 
Project Management no   
Release and Deployment 
Management 
no   
Service Validation and  Test no   
Application Development 
and Test 
no   
Service Asset and 
Configuration Management 
no   
Knowledge Management no   
Service 
Operation 
Event Management no   
Incident Management no   
Request Fulfilment no   
Access Management yes all None 
Problem Management no   
IT Operations Management yes all None 
IT Facilities Management yes all None 
Continual Service 
Improvement 
Service Evaluation no   
Process Evaluation no   
Definition of Process 
Improvements 
no   
Tracking of Improvements  no   
 
Table A-17: Result presentation company 1 assessor 1 







Claims processes     
The claims specialist has unrestricted access to 
the claims system. X   
High 




There is no authorisation activity in the process. 
   
High 
Paper documents were not securely stored in the 
Claims department. X   
Medium 
Internal oral communication in the claims 
process was identified as not secure. X   
Low 
Accounting processes 
   
 
Accountants can authorise bookings in the 




Data transfer between the bank and the company 





   
 
There is no treaty data verification in the treaty 




 Page 314 of 394  
Staff are not aware about IS threats.  
  
X Low 
IT Security processes 
   
 
There is no appropriate disaster recovery and 
business continuity documentation. X X X Medium 
The operating system of the accounting system 





ii. SRA Company 1 results – Assessor two 
In this section, the SRA assessment result of the second assessor at company 
one are presented.  
Claims process evaluation (Company 1) 
Figure A-43 Claims evaluation process  
Table A-18: Claims evaluation results company 1 assessor 2 









AC A D I C A EP PiSys Org Phy 
EP(1): none  n/a n/a n/a n/a   n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 
PP 
      
PP 
   
PP(1): claims 
system 
AC2 A4 D1 nok ok ok nok nok ok ok 
PP(2): acc/claims 
system 
AC2 A4 D1 nok ok ok nok nok ok ok 
PP(3): claims 
system 
AC2 A4 D1 nok ok ok nok nok ok ok 
CC A E 
    
CC 
   
CC(1): client / letter C1 E2   ok ok n/a ok n/a ok ok 
CC(2): client / letter C1 E2   ok ok n/a ok n/a ok ok 
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Result explanation: The claims specialist has unrestricted access (full control) to 
the claims system without any further validation step of the changes made (thus, 
PP1 to PP3 processing result is nok). There are no claims limits set up, which 
means the claims specialist can create claims and payments of any amount 
(‘PiSys’ at PP1, PP2 and PP3 rated as nok). 
 
Figure A-44 Claims notification process  
Table A-19: Claims notification results company 1 assessor 2 








EP AC A D I C A EP PiSys Org Phy 
EP(1): claims system   AC2 A4 D1 ok   ok ok ok ok ok 
PP 
      
PP 
   
PP(1): claims system AC2 A4 D2 ok ok ok ok ok ok ok 
PP(2): acc system AC2 A3 D2 ok ok ok ok ok ok ok 
CC A E 
    
CC 
   
CC(1): cust. data  C1 E1   nok nok n/a ok n/a ok nok 
CC(2): cust. data  C1 E1   nok nok n/a ok n/a ok ok 
 
Result explanation: Claims data received is not stored securely, as observed in 
the claims area at CC1 ‘Phy’. The communication between the claims specialist 
and the customer via phone and post was rated as secure. Therefore, the CC1 
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Figure A-45 Claims payments process  
Table A-20: Claims payment results company 1 assessor 2 








EP AC A D I C A EP PiSys Org Phy 
EP(1): none  n/a n/a n/a n/a   n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 
PP 
      
PP 
   
PP(1): claims system AC2 A2 D1 ok ok ok ok ok ok ok 
PP(2): acc system AC2 A3 D1 ok ok ok ok ok ok ok 
CC A E 
    
CC 
   
CC(1): literally / email C3 E2   ok ok n/a ok n/a ok ok 
 
Result explanation: No issues identified.  
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Figure A-46 Accounting claims payments process 
Table A-21: Accounting payment results company 1 assessor 2 








EP AC A D I C A EP PiSys Org Phy 
EP(1): none  n/a n/a n/a n/a   n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 
PP 
      
PP 
   
PP(1):acc system AC2 A3 D4 ok ok ok ok ok ok ok 
PP(2):acc system AC2 A2 D0 ok ok ok ok ok ok ok 
PP(3):acc system AC2 A3 D4 ok ok ok ok ok ok ok 
CC A E 
    
CC 
   
CC(1): bank 
service 
C1 E1   nok nok ok nok ok ok n/a 
CC(2): acc system C1 E1   nok nok ok nok ok ok ok 
 
Result explanation: Weak encryption is used between the accounting system 
and the bank service. The requirements are not met by the encryption algorithm 
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Figure A-47 Accounting commission payment process 
Table A-22: Accounting commission payments results company 1 assessor 2 








EP AC A D I C A   PiSys Org Phy 
EP(1): acc sys AC2 A3 D1 ok   ok ok ok ok ok 
PP 
          
PP(1): acc sys AC2 A2 D3 ok ok ok ok ok ok ok 
PP(2): acc sys AC2 A3 D4 ok ok ok ok ok ok ok 
CC A E 
        
CC(1): bank service C1 E1   nok nok ok nok ok ok ok 
CC(2): bank service C1 E1   nok nok ok nok ok ok ok 
 
Result explanation: Weak encryption is used between the accounting system 
and the bank service. The requirements are not met by the encryption algorithm 
used (rated as E1 at CC1 and CC2), resulting in nok at the processing stage. 
 
Figure A-48 Accounting booking of new premiums process 
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Table A-23: Accounting booking of new premiums results company 1 assessor 2 








EP AC A D I C A EP PiSys Org Phy 
EP(1): acc sys AC2 A3 D1 ok   ok ok ok ok ok 
PP 
      
PP 
   
PP(1): acc sys AC2 A2 D0 ok ok ok ok ok ok ok 
PP(2): acc sys AC2 A3 D4 ok ok ok ok ok ok ok 
CC A E 
    
CC 
   
CC(1): bank service C1 E1   nok nok ok nok ok ok ok 
 
Result explanation: Weak encryption is used between the accounting system 
and the bank service. The requirements are not met by the encryption algorithm 
used rated as E1 at CC1; this results in nok at processing. 
 
Figure A-49 Accounting booking of changes in premiums process 
Table A-24: Accounting booking of changes in premiums results company 1 assessor 
2 








EP AC A D I C A   PiSys Org Phy 
EP(1): acc sys AC2 A3 D1 ok   ok ok ok ok ok 
PP 
          
PP(1): acc sys AC2 A2 D0 ok ok ok ok ok ok ok 
PP(2): acc sys AC2 A3 D4 ok ok ok ok ok ok ok 
CC A E 
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Result explanation: Weak encryption is used between the accounting system 
and the bank service. The requirements are not met by the encryption algorithm  
rated as E1 at CC1. 
 
Underwriting process evaluation (Company 1) 
 
Figure A-50 Insurance/contract request process 
Table A-25: Underwriting contract request and offer results company 1 assessor 2 








EP AC A D I C A EP PiSys Org Phy 
EP(1): contract sys AC2 A3 D1 ok   ok ok nok ok nok 
EP(2): contract sys AC2 A3 D0 nok   ok nok nok ok ok 
PP 
      
PP 
   
PP(1): contract sys AC2 A3 D3 ok ok ok ok nok ok ok 
PP(2): contract sys AC2 A3 D3 ok ok ok ok nok ok nok 
CC A E 
    
CC 
   
CC(1): customer C1 E1   nok nok ok ok ok ok ok 
 
Result explanation: Even if the security objectives of CC1 are rated as nok, the 
overall rating for CC1 is ok as other encryption possibilities are not deemed as 
feasible. Underwriters and Assistants do not have documents locked away (Phy 
nok at EP1 and PP2). Underwriters have not always verified the details in the 
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system with the contract request (nok at EP2 processing). Furthermore, the 
contract system does not provide any data verification functionality to identify any 
missing contract data during entry or processing of the data (PiSys rated nok at 
EPs and PPs).  
 
 
Figure A-51 Contract negotiation process 
Table A-26: Underwriting contract negotiation results company 1 assessors 2 








EP AC A D I C A EP PiSys Org Phy 
EP(1): none  n/a n/a n/a n/a   n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 
PP 
      
PP 
   
PP(1): contract sys AC2 A3 D1 ok ok ok ok nok ok ok 
PP(2): contract sys AC2 A3 D1 ok ok ok ok nok ok ok 
PP(3): contract sys AC2 A3 D1 ok ok ok ok nok ok ok 
CC A E 
    
CC 
   
CC(1): customer C1 E0   nok nok ok ok ok ok ok 
 
Result explanation: Even if the security objectives of CC1 are rated as nok, the 
overall rating for CC1 is ok as other encryption possibilities are not deemed as 
feasible. The contract system does not provide any data verification functionality 
(PiSys rated nok at PP1 to PP3). 
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Figure A-52 Broker business process 
Table A-27: Underwriting broker business results company 1 assessor 2 








EP AC A D I C A EP PiSys Org Phy 
EP(1): none  n/a n/a n/a n/a   n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 
PP 
      
PP 
   
PP(1): contract sys AC2 A3 D3 ok ok ok ok nok ok ok 
PP(2): contract sys AC2 A3 D3 ok ok ok ok nok ok ok 
CC A E 
    
CC 
   
CC(1): broker C1 E1   nok nok ok ok n/a ok ok 
CC(2): broker C1 E1   nok nok ok ok n/a ok ok 
CC(3): broker C1 E1   nok nok ok ok n/a ok ok 
CC(4): broker C1 E1   nok nok ok ok n/a ok ok 
 
Result explanation: Even if the security objectives are rated as nok at CC1 to 
CC4, the overall rating for all CCs is ok, as other encryption possibilities are not 
deemed as feasible. The contract system does not provide any data verification 
functionality (PiSys rated nok at PP1 and PP2). 
 
Security process evaluation (Company 1) 
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Table A-28: Security process evaluation results 
IT process 
name 





Service Strategy Service Portfolio Management no   
Financial Management no   
Service Design Service Catalogue 
Management 
no   
Service Level Management no   
Risk Management no   
Capacity Management No   
Availability Management No   
IT Service Continuity 
Management 
yes all The BCM documentation 
did miss some important 
details, e.g. the restore of 
systems was not described 
IT Security Management yes all The patch report showed 
that not all servers had the 
most current patches 
applied. Some of the 
patches were rated high 
Compliance Management no   
IT Architecture Management no   
Supplier Management no   
Service 
Transition 
Change Management yes all None 
Project Management no   
Release and Deployment 
Management 
no   
Service Validation and  Test no   
Application Development and 
Test 
no   
Service Asset and 
Configuration Management 
no   
Knowledge Management no   
Service 
Operation 
Event Management no   
Incident Management no   
Request Fulfilment no   
Access Management yes all None 
Problem Management no   
IT Operations Management yes all None 
IT Facilities Management yes all None 
Continual Service 
Improvement 
Service Evaluation no   
Process Evaluation no   
Definition of Process 
Improvements 
no   
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Table A-29: Results of company 1 assessor 2 







Claims processes     
Unrestricted access in the claims system. (Claims 
evaluation process) X   
High 
Claims limits are not reflected in the system or 
process. (Claims evaluation process)  X   
High 
No secure storage of documents. (Claims 
notification process) X   
Low 
Accounting processes 
   
 






   
 
Treaty data is not verified in the system. (All 
underwriting processes)   
X Low 
Information is insecurely treated by staff. (Contract 
request process)   
X Low 
IT Security processes 
   
 
Disaster recovery and business continuity 
documentation insufficient. X X X Low 






iii. SRA Company 2 results 
Claims process evaluation (Company 2) 
 
 
Figure A-53 Claims evaluation process  
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Table A-30: Claims evaluation results company 2 









AC A D I C A EP PiSys Org Phy 
EP(1): none  n/a n/a n/a n/a   n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 
PP 
      
PP 
   
PP(1): claims system AC2 A4 D2 ok ok ok ok nok ok ok 
PP(2): claims system AC1 A4 D2 nok nok ok ok nok ok ok 
PP(2): acc system AC2 A3 D2 ok ok ok ok nok ok ok 
PP(3): claims system AC2 A4 D2 ok ok ok ok ok ok ok 
CC A E 
    
CC 
   
CC(1): client / letter C1 E2   ok ok n/a ok n/a ok ok 
CC(2): client / letter C1 E2   ok ok n/a ok n/a ok ok 
CC(3): legal / email C3 E1   ok ok ok ok ok ok ok 
 
Result explanation: For the calculation of claims and the loss history, 
spreadsheets are used without any access and change controls. Therefore, PiSys 
(claims and accounting system) was rated as nok at PP1 and PP2. 
 
 
Figure A-54 Claims notification process  
Table A-31: Claims notification results company 2 








EP AC A D I C A EP PiSys Org Phy 
EP(1): claims system   AC2 A4 D0 nok   ok nok nok nok ok 
PP 
      
PP 
   
  
 
 Page 326 of 394  
PP(1): claims system AC2 A4 D2 ok ok ok ok ok ok ok 
PP(2): acc system AC2 A3 D2 ok ok ok ok ok ok ok 
CC A E 
    
CC 
   
CC(1): cust. data  C1 E3   ok ok n/a ok n/a nok ok 
CC(2): cust. data  C1 E3   ok ok n/a ok n/a nok ok 
 
Result explanation: Claims data entry is not checked for completeness and 
misses information with regard to the claim occurred (EP1 processing rated nok). 
Furthermore, PiSys and Org were rated as nok at EP1, as the claims data were 
not checked accordingly and further data not requested.  
 
 
Figure A-55 Claims payments process  
Table A-32: Claims payment results company 2 








EP AC A D I C A EP PiSys Org Phy 
EP(1): none  n/a n/a n/a n/a   n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 
PP 
      
PP 
   
PP(1): claims system AC2 A2 D1 ok ok ok ok ok ok ok 
PP(2): acc system AC2 A3 D1 ok ok ok ok ok nok ok 
CC A E 
    
CC 
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Result explanation: The claims specialist is able to release claims payments in 
the accounting system without any authorisation in the system. Therefore, Org at 
PP2 was rated as nok. 
 
Accounting process evaluation (Company 2) 
 
Figure A-56 Accounting claims payments process 
Table A-33: Accounting payment results company 2 








EP AC A D I C A EP PiSys Org Phy 
EP(1): none  n/a n/a n/a n/a   n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 
PP 
      
PP 
   
PP(1): acc system AC2 A3 D4 ok ok ok ok ok ok ok 
PP(2): acc system AC2 A2 D1 ok ok ok ok ok ok ok 
PP(3): acc system AC2 A3 D4 ok ok ok ok ok ok ok 
CC A E 
    
CC 
   
CC(1): bank service C1 E2   ok ok ok ok ok ok n/a 
CC(2): acc system C1 E2   ok ok ok ok ok ok ok 
 
Result explanation: No issues found. 
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Figure A-57 Accounting commission payment process 
Table A-34: Accounting commission payments results company 2 








EP AC A D I C A EP PiSys Org Phy 
EP(1): acc sys AC2 A3 D1 ok   ok ok ok ok ok 
PP 
      
PP 
   
PP(1): acc sys AC2 A2 D3 ok ok ok ok ok ok ok 
PP(2): acc sys AC2 A3 D4 ok ok ok ok ok ok ok 
CC A E 
    
CC 
   
CC(1): bank service C1 E2   ok ok ok ok ok ok ok 
CC(1): bank service C1 E2   ok ok ok ok ok ok ok 
Result explanation: No issues found. 
 
Figure A-58 Accounting booking of new and changes in premiums 
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Table A-35: Accounting booking of new and changes in premiums results company 2 








EP AC A D I C A EP PiSys Org Phy 
EP(1): acc sys AC2 A3 D1 ok   ok ok ok ok ok 
EP(2): acc sys AC2 A3 D1 ok   ok ok ok ok ok 
PP 
      
PP 
   
PP(1):acc sys AC2 A2 D1 ok ok ok ok ok ok ok 
PP(2):acc sys AC2 A3 D4 ok ok ok ok ok ok ok 
CC A E 
    
CC 
   
CC(1): bank service C1 E2   ok ok ok ok ok ok ok 
 
Result explanation: No issues found. 
 
Underwriting process evaluation (Company 2) 
 
Figure A-59 Contract negotiation process 
Table A-36: Underwriting contract negotiation results company 2 








EP AC A D I C A EP PiSys Org Phy 
EP(1): none  n/a n/a n/a n/a   n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 
PP 
      
PP 
   
PP(1): contract sys AC2 A4 D1 nok ok ok nok nok nok ok 
PP(2): contract sys AC2 A4 D1 nok ok ok nok nok ok ok 
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PP(3): contract sys AC2 A4 D1 nok ok ok nok nok ok ok 
CC A E 
    
CC 
   
CC(1): customer C1 E1   ok ok ok ok ok ok ok 
 
Result explanation: There is no alignment between Underwriting and Actuarial 
services. There are cases where the Underwriter has to contact Actuarial services 
for guidance. Furthermore, deviations to the Corporate Underwriting policy, for 
example, have to be authorised. However, this is not appropriately modelled. The 
model and the systems used do not fully reflect this. Therefore, the PiSys at PP1 
to PP3 and Org at PP1 were rated as nok. In addition, the integrity of contract 
information is endangered as there is full control access in the contract system 
without a proper data validation activity, resulting in a rating of nok at the integrity 
security objective and PP1 to PP3 processing result. 
 
 
Figure A-60 Customer and broker business process 
Table A-37: Underwriting customer and broker business results company 2 








EP AC A D I C A EP PiSys Org Phy 
EP(1): contract sys  AC2 A3 D1 ok   ok ok ok ok ok 
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EP(1): contract sys  AC2 A3 D1 ok   ok ok ok ok ok 
PP 
      
PP 
   
PP(1): contract sys AC2 A3 D3 ok ok ok ok nok nok ok 
PP(2): contract sys AC2 A3 D3 ok ok ok ok nok nok ok 
CC A E 
    
CC 
   
CC(1): customer C1 E2   ok ok ok ok n/a ok ok 
 
Result explanation: There is no authorisation activity for entering and release of 
customer and broker business. PiSys and Org were rated as nok at PP1 and PP2. 
There is no alignment between Underwriting and Actuarial services. There are 
cases where the Underwriter has to contact Actuarial services for guidance. 
However, this is not appropriately modelled. 
 
Security process evaluation (Company 2) 
Table A-38: Security process evaluation results 
IT process 
name 





Service Strategy Service Portfolio Management no   
Financial Management no   
Service Design Service Catalogue 
Management 
no   
Service Level Management no   
Risk Management no   
Capacity Management yes all None 
Availability Management yes all None 
IT Service Continuity 
Management 
yes all The disaster recovery 
documentation misses 
testing scenarios 
IT Security Management yes all Interviews revealed that 
people are not aware of 
their responsibilities 
Compliance Management no   
IT Architecture Management no   
Supplier Management no   
Service 
Transition 
Change Management yes all None 
Project Management no   
Release and Deployment 
Management 
no   
Service Validation and  Test no   
Application Development and 
Test 
no   
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Service Asset and 
Configuration Management 
no   
Knowledge Management no   
Service 
Operation 
Event Management no   
Incident Management no   
Request Fulfilment no   
Access Management yes all The access rights process 
for systems was not 
followed in several cases. 
Access to claims system 
was unrestricted because 
of a deficiency in the role 
model 
Problem Management no   
IT Operations Management yes all BCM/DR plans were not 
tested. The daily 
procedures checklist used 
for server operation 
management was not 
followed and checked 
accordingly 
IT Facilities Management yes all During the walkthrough 
unsecured information was 




Service Evaluation no   
Process Evaluation no   
Definition of Process 
Improvements 
no   
Tracking of Improvements  no   
 
Table A-39: Result presentation company 2 





Claims processes     
The claims specialist is able to release claims 





Process of claims data entry is inappropriate 





Used spreadsheets for claims calculation - no 





Claims data received were not properly 




Underwriting processes     
Missing alignment between Underwriter and 
Actuarial services for contract pricing. 
(Customer and broker business process) 
  X Medium 
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Broker approval process was to work as 
designed. (Customer and broker business 
process) 
X  X Medium 
Missing authorisation for underwriting policy 
deviations. (Contract negotiation process) 
  X High 
IT security processes     
There is no updated disaster recovery plan. X X X Low 
The BCM/DR activities were not tested 
appropriately.  
X X X Medium 
The system access approval process for claims 
system was not adequate as unlimited access 
was granted immediately. (Contract 
negotiation process and security processes 
X   Medium 
The daily procedures in the system operation 
centre were not processed as required. 
   Medium 
In interviews it was found that data owners are 
not aware of their responsibilities with regard 
to applications and the system access. 
   
Low 
Some paper documents which contained 
confidential information were not stored in 
locked cabinets. 





 Page 334 of 394  
 
iv. SRA Company 3 results 
Claims process evaluation (Company 3) 
 
 
Figure A-61 Claims evaluation process  
Table A-40: Claims evaluation results company 3 









AC A D I C A EP  PiSys Org Phy 
EP(1): none  n/a n/a n/a n/a   n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 
PP 
      
PP 
   
PP(1): claims system AC2 A4 D2 ok ok ok ok ok ok ok 
PP(2): acc system AC2 A3 D2 ok ok ok ok ok ok ok 
PP(3): claims system AC2 A4 D2 ok ok ok ok ok ok ok 
CC A E 
    
CC 
   
CC(1): client / letter C1 E2   ok ok n/a ok n/a ok ok 
CC(2): client / letter C1 E2   ok ok n/a ok n/a ok ok 
CC(3): legal / email C3 E1   ok ok ok ok ok ok ok 
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Figure A-62 Claims notification process  
Table A-41: Claims notification results company 3 








EP AC A D I C A EP PiSys Org Phy 
EP(1): claims system   AC2 A4 D1 ok   ok ok ok ok ok 
PP 
      
PP 
   
PP(1): claims system AC2 A4 D2 ok ok ok ok ok ok ok 
PP(2): acc system AC2 A3 D2 ok ok ok ok ok ok ok 
CC A E 
    
CC 
   
CC(1): cust. data  C1 E3   ok ok n/a ok n/a ok ok 
CC(2): cust. data  C1 E3   ok ok n/a ok n/a ok ok 
 
Result explanation: No issues found. 
 
 
Figure A-63 Claims payments process  
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Table A-42: Claims payment results company 3 








EP AC A D I C A EP PiSys Org Phy 
EP(1): none  n/a n/a n/a n/a   n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 
PP 
      
PP 
   
PP(1): claims system AC2 A2 D1 ok ok ok ok ok ok ok 
PP(2): acc system AC2 A3 D1 ok ok ok ok nok nok ok 
CC A E 
    
CC 
   
CC(1): literally / email C3 E0   ok ok n/a ok n/a ok ok 
 
Result explanation: Claims are not authorised accordingly by the claims 
manager. PiSys and Org are thus rated as nok at PP2. 
 
Accounting process evaluation (Company 3) 
 
 
Figure A-64 Accounting claims payments process 
Table A-43: Accounting payment results company 3 








EP AC A D I C A EP PiSys Org Phy 
EP(1): none  n/a n/a n/a n/a   n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 
PP 
      
PP 
   
PP(1): acc system AC2 A3 D4 ok ok ok ok ok ok ok 
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PP(2): acc system AC2 A2 D1 ok ok ok ok nok ok ok 
PP(3): acc system AC2 A3 D4 ok ok ok ok ok ok ok 
CC A E 
    
CC 
   
CC(1): bank service C1 E2   ok ok ok ok ok ok n/a 
CC(2): acc system C1 E2   ok ok ok ok ok ok ok 
 
Result explanation: For the processing of payments and reconciliation of 
accounts between the accounting and bank transaction services, system accounts 
are used. In addition, also a shared user account was found; it was used by 




Figure A-65 Accounting commission payment process 
Table A-44: Accounting commission payments results company 3 








EP AC A D I C A EP PiSys Org Phy 
EP(1): acc sys AC2 A3 D1 ok   ok ok ok ok ok 
PP 
      
PP 
   
PP(1): acc sys AC2 A2 D3 ok ok ok ok nok ok ok 
PP(2): acc sys AC2 A3 D4 ok ok ok ok ok ok ok 
CC A E 
    
CC 
   
CC(1): bank service C1 E2   ok ok ok ok ok ok ok 
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Result explanation: For the processing of payments and reconciliation of 
accounts between the accounting and bank transaction services, system accounts 
are used. In addition, also a shared user account was found; it was used by 




Figure A-66 Accounting booking of new and changes in premiums 
Table A-45: Accounting booking of new and changes in premiums results company 3 








EP AC A D I C A EP  PiSys Org Phy 
EP(1): acc sys AC2 A3 D1 ok   ok ok ok ok ok 
EP(2): acc sys AC2 A3 D1 ok   ok ok ok ok ok 
PP 
      
PP 
   
PP(1): acc sys AC2 A2 D1 ok ok ok ok ok ok ok 
PP(2): acc sys AC2 A3 D4 ok ok ok ok ok ok ok 
CC A E 
    
CC 
   
CC(1): bank service C1 E2   ok ok ok ok ok ok ok 
 
Result explanation: No issues found. 
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Underwriting process evaluation (Company 3) 
 
 
Figure A-67 Insurance/contract request process 
Table A-46: Underwriting contract request and offer results company 3 








EP AC A D I C A EP PiSys Org Phy 
EP(1): contract sys AC2 A3 D1 ok   ok ok ok ok ok 
EP(2): contract sys AC2 A3 D1 ok   ok ok ok ok ok 
PP 
      
PP 
   
PP(1): contract sys AC2 A3 D0 nok ok ok nok nok ok ok 
PP(2): contract sys AC2 A3 D3 ok ok ok ok ok nok ok 
CC A E 
    
CC 
   
CC(1): customer C1 E1   nok nok ok ok ok ok ok 
 
Result explanation: There is no system-supported authorisation process for the 
release of quotations at PP2 (Org rated as nok). Inaccurate expected loss ratio 
data is used at PP1 (thus the PP1 processing result of nok). Spreadsheets are 
used for the calculation of premiums, which are not secured and verified at PP1 
(PiSys nok). The local actuarial model used at PP1 for premium calculation is not 
in line with the central model and guidelines. The encryption issue at CC1 was 
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accepted, as a letter is deemed as secure. Therefore the CC1 processing result 
was set to ok. 
 
 
Figure A-68 Contract negotiation process 
Table A-47: Underwriting contract negotiation results company 3 








EP AC A D I C A EP PiSys Org Phy 
EP(1): none  n/a n/a n/a n/a   n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 
PP 
      
PP 
   
PP(1): contract sys AC2 A4 D1 nok ok ok nok ok ok ok 
PP(2): contract sys AC2 A4 D1 nok ok ok nok nok ok ok 
PP(3): contract sys AC2 A4 D1 nok ok ok nok ok ok ok 
CC A E 
    
CC 
   
CC(1): customer C1 E1   nok nok ok ok ok ok ok 
 
Result explanation: Inaccurate expected loss ratio data is used at PP2 (PiSys 
reated nok). Furthermore, full control in the system and the missing verification of 
data (only manual) leads to non-adherence of integrity security objective (PP1 to 
PP3 processing result nok). The encryption issue at CC1 was accepted, as a letter 
is deemed as secure. Therefore the CC1 processing result was set to ok. 
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Figure A-69 Customer and broker business process 
Table A-48: Underwriting customer and broker business results company 3 








EP AC A D I C A EP PiSys Org Phy 
EP(1): contract sys  AC2 A3 D1 ok   ok ok ok ok ok 
EP(1): contract sys  AC2 A3 D1 ok   ok ok ok ok ok 
PP 
      
PP 
   
PP(1): contract sys AC2 A3 D0 nok ok ok nok nok nok ok 
PP(2): contract sys AC2 A3 D3 ok ok ok ok ok nok ok 
CC A E 
    
CC 
   
CC(1): customer C1 E1   nok nok ok nok n/a nok ok 
 
Result explanation: There is no system-supported authorisation process for the 
release of quotations at PP2 (Org nok). Inaccurate expected loss ratio data is used 
at PP1, which is not verified further (PP1 processing result nok). Spreadsheets are 
used for the calculation of premiums; these are not secured and verified at PP1 
(PiSys nok). The local actuarial model used at PP1 (Org nok) for premium 
calculation is not in line with the central model and guidelines. The encryption 
issue at CC1 was accepted, as a letter is deemed as secure. However, in further 
interviews, Underwriters confirmed that from time to time, both claims and profit 
and loss data is exchanged with brokers via the internet. No encryption is applied 
to these data (CC1 Org rated nok and CC1 processing result left as nok). 
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Security process evaluation (Company 3) 
Table A-49: Security process evaluation results 
IT process 
name 








Service Strategy Service Portfolio Management no   
Financial Management no   
Service Design Service Catalogue 
Management 
no   
Service Level Management no   
Risk Management no   
Capacity Management yes all None 
Availability Management yes all None 
IT Service Continuity 
Management 
yes all The BCM and DR 
documentation is insufficient, it 
does not contain all applications 
IT Security Management yes all Missing security patches were 
found as identified in the patch 
report.The security incident 
process was not followed in the 
case a virus was spotted or 
when equipment was lost 
Compliance Management no   
IT Architecture Management no   
Supplier Management no   
Service 
Transition 
Change Management yes all None 
Project Management no   
Release and Deployment 
Management 
no   
Service Validation and  Test no   
Application Development and 
Test 
no   
Service Asset and 
Configuration Management 
yes all In general, there is no 
configuration management 
database established 
Knowledge Management no   
Service 
Operation 
Event Management no   
Incident Management no   
Request Fulfilment no   
Access Management yes all An user access list (who has 
access to what data) for the 
different applications and 
folders could not be provided 
immediately 
Problem Management no   
IT Operations Management yes all None 
IT Facilities Management yes all During the walkthrough 
unsecured information was 
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Continual Service 
Improvement 
Service Evaluation no   
Process evaluation no   
Definition of process 
improvements 
no   
Tracking of improvements  no   
 
Table A-50: Result presentation company 3 







Claims processes     
There is no authorisation activity in the claims 
process. (Claims payment process) 
X   
Medium 
Underwriting processes     
Review and release of quotations in the system 
were not in line. There is no system-supported 
authorisation process. (Underwriting contract 
request/ offer and customer/broker business ) 
  X 
High 
Inaccurate data from systems are used in the 
expected loss ratio studies. (Underwriting 
contract request/ offer and customer/broker 
business and contract negotiation) 
  X 
High 
Inappropriate use of spreadsheets for the 
calculation of premiums. (Underwriting 
contract request/ offer and customer/broker 
business ) 
  X 
High 
Local actuary model not aligned with central 
model. (Underwriting contract request/ offer 
and customer/broker business ) 
  X 
Medium 
IT security processes     
Shared accounts were found, e.g. for the bank 
service (accounting payment processes) 
 X  Medium 
The security patch report revealed that some 
patches were missing. 
X X X Medium 
The business continuity and disaster recovery 
documentation was missing applications. 
X X X Medium 
IT was not able to provide user access lists for 
applications. 
   Low 
Paper documents were stored in unsecured 
lockers. 
X X X Low 
It was found that a configuration management 
system did not exist. 
   Medium 
In a few cases where viruses were identified as 
well as equipment was lost; the security 
incident process was not followed. 
   
Medium 
Confidential information was exchanged via 
the internet (Underwriting customer and 
broker business process). 
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v.  ARA Company 1 results 
Scope: The scope of the assessment was to assess compliance with internal 
guidelines and regulations, the adequacy and transparency of documentation, as 
well as the expediency, effectiveness, efficiency and security of the core IT 
processes. The results were verified by random samples, security scanning and by 
a “walkthrough” of the premises. 
Subjects of evaluation: The subjects of evaluation were critical business 
systems, infrastructure systems, and IT operation processes. Furthermore, the 
security awareness of users was examined, as well as any existent documentation 
regarding the fulfilment of IT processes. 
Table A-51: Questionnaire with results of company 1 assessor 1  
1. General IS awareness  
1.1 User education and training 
Subject: Training organisation, program and performance  
1.2 User awareness 
Subject: Users’ awareness regarding information security 
 Employees interviewed were not aware of current security threats and the content of the local 
information security policy, or even where to find it. 
 In the Claims department, sensitive data is handled which is in most cases handled in a 
secure manner. There are “Compactus”-units (archives) which the last leaving employee has 
to lock. One Compactus unit was not locked after office hours.  
A "secure desk policy" is in place, which means confidential documents have to be locked in 
drawers after office hours. As seen on the walkthrough, the policy is not always adhered to 
as some data was lying on the desk, in open cabinets or on the printer after office hours. 
2. IT management and IS compliance 
2.1 IT processes, organisation and relationships 
Subject: Organisation chart, services and their descriptions  
2.2 Regulatory Compliance 
Subject: National or international tax, data or encryption regulations 
2.3 Data  - Data ownership, Classification and Handling 
Subject: Regulations and measures for classification, storage and deletion of data 
3. Systems security and operation management  
3.1 Service Desk, incidents and problems 
Subject: Help desk activities, performance and service, problem management 
3.2 Configuration management - Hard-/Software 
Subject: Software releases, inventory, configuration and license management  
3.3 IT investment, performance and capacity 
Subject: IT cost monitoring and budget planning processes 
3.4 Systems security - Infrastructure 
Audit subject: Infrastructure configuration and administration 
 Active directory naming conventions, structure and group conventions were not adhered to. 
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Unused and active administrative accounts were found in some of the AD groups. 
 The local testing was performed on the firewall. The test revealed that websites such as 
Gmail are not blocked, causing a security threat for the company. 
 While patch levels across workstations were generally very good, patch levels on servers 
were not. Most servers are missing on average 40 patches, e.g. the server for the accounting 
system. Many of these missing patches are rated "High" at the Security Patch Database. 
3.5 Systems security - desktop  
Subject: Desk policy, configuration and administration 
3.6 Solutions and changes - software configuration 
Subject: Program configuration, controls and documentation 
 There is secure processing between the accounting and the online banking software. 
Furthermore, there is a chart of systems available showing applications and their interfaces. 
We spotted that some financial data and payments are processed by sending information via 
email to the bank. This communication channel is insecure. 
4. Physical and logical access 
4.1 User and Access Rights Management 
Subject: User access rights and processes 
 Permissions in the business applications were mainly set properly. There was only one 
system identified - the claims system - where claims specialist users have unrestricted 
access to data. 
4.2 Site design and access 
Subject: Physical access and maintenance of security measures 
5. Backup, disaster recovery and BCM  
5.1 Data - backup 
Subject: Data backup and restore processes and documentation 
5.2 Continuous service - recovery and planning 
Subject: Disaster and contingency procedures and documentation 
 There is a disaster recovery plan and a business continuity plan in place, however important 
details (like the restore order) are missing. Furthermore, the responsible IT person is not 
familiar with the concept and its detail; the plan is not tested. 
6. Software development and projects  
6.1 Project management 
Subject: Project management, plan and controlling 
6.2 Software development 
Subject: Specifications, change management, test, data migration and conversion 
and release 
 
Table A-52: Company 1 results assessor 1 
Company 1 Results – Assessor 1 Significance 
1. Permissions in the claims system are not properly set. Medium 
2. The transmission of data between the bank and the company is insecure. Medium 
3. Most servers are missing several patches. High 
4. Some websites rated as insecure are not blocked at the firewall.  Low 
5. Unused and active administrative accounts in MS Active Directory. Low 
6. Employees are not aware about IS threats and policies. Low 
7. The disaster recovery and business continuity documentation misses important 
information and was not tested. 
Medium 
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Table A-53: Questionnaire with results of company 1 assessor 2 
1. General IS awareness  
1.1 User education and training 
Subject: Training organisation, program and performance  
1.2 User awareness 
Subject: Users’ awareness regarding information security 
 A policy is in place to keep confidential documents locked in drawers after office hours. 
Interviewed people on both management and operational levels showed differing 
sensitiveness about the confidentiality requirements of life/medical information. 
As seen on the walkthrough after business-hours, the policy is not always adhered to. We 
found claims data lying on the desk and in open lockers; audit reports were left on the table. 
Confidential strategic planning information was easily accessible in open cabinets. We found 
USB sticks lying on employees’ desks. 
 The ISC conducted an awareness and security training program to upper management and 
new employees. Other employees received only an awareness presentation by email. The 
security awareness training was not mandatory and the attendance was not tracked. 
Interviews showed that people without face-to-face training had little knowledge about IS 
threats. 
2. IT management and IS compliance 
2.1 IT processes, organisation and relationships 
Subject: Organisation chart, services and their descriptions  
2.2 Regulatory Compliance 
Subject: National or international tax, data or encryption regulations 
2.3 Data  - Data ownership, Classification and Handling 
Subject: Regulations and measures for classification, storage and deletion of data 
3. Systems security and operation management  
3.1 Service desk, incidents and problems 
Subject: Helpdesk activities, performance and service, Problem management 
3.2 Configuration management - Hard-/Software 
Subject: Software releases, inventory, configuration and license management  
3.3 IT investment, performance and capacity 
Subject: IT cost monitoring and budget planning processes 
3.4 Systems security - Infrastructure 
Audit subject: Infrastructure configuration and administration 
 A significant number of servers are behind on a very large number of security patches. Many 
of these are rated "High" in the Security Patch Database.  
 Webmail sites like Hotmail, Gmail, Yahoo are accessible through the proxy server which is 
not allowed by Group policy. 
3.5 Systems security - desktop  
Subject: Desk Policy, configuration and administration 
3.6 Solutions and changes - software configuration 
Subject: Program configuration, controls and documentation 
 In the claims system, there were still users which left the company. In addition, the claims 
specialists’ role, assigned to several users, had unrestricted user rights in the claims system.  
 The banking and accounting application use a secure https data transmission. However, 
there is financial data and payroll master-data that are exchanged via email to the bank.  
4. Physical and logical access 
4.1 User and Access Rights Management 
Subject: User access rights and processes 
4.2 Site design and access 
Subject: Physical access and maintenance of security measures 
5. Backup, disaster recovery and BCM  
5.1 Data - backup 
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Subject: Data backup and restore processes and documentation 
5.2 Continuous service - recovery and planning 
Subject: Disaster and contingency procedures and documentation 
 Procedures for backup, disaster recovery as well as a business continuity were not properly 
defined and documented. A business continuity test involving business departments is 
outstanding. 
6. Software development and projects  
6.1 Project management 
Subject: Project management, plan and controlling 
6.2 Software development 
Subject: Specifications, change management, test, data migration and conversion 
and release 
 
Table A-54: Company 1 results assessor 2 
Company 1 Results – Assessor 2 Significance 
1. Unrestricted user rights in the claims system. Medium 
2. Insecure data transmission via email. Medium 
3. Security patches are missing on several servers. High 
4. Websites are not blocked at the proxy server. Medium 
5. Staff had little knowledge about IS threats. Low 
6. No appropriate documentation for disaster recovery and business continuity. Medium 
7. Confidential information was not securely stored, e.g. Claims data. Low 
 
Consolidated results  
Table A-55: Company 1 consolidated results 
Company 1 Results Assessor 1 Assessor 2 Significance 
1. The claims specialist has unrestricted access in the 
claims system. 
Yes Yes Medium 
2. Data transfer between the bank and the company is 
insecure as only a weak encryption is used. 
Yes Yes Medium 
3. The operating systems e.g. of the accounting system 
misses several patches. 
Yes Yes High 
4. The firewall is not properly configured; websites are 
not blocked.  
Yes Yes Medium 
5. Unused and active administrative accounts in MS 
Active Directory. 
Yes No Low 
6. Staff are not aware about IS threats. Yes Yes Low 
7. There is no appropriate disaster recovery and business 
continuity documentation. 
Yes Yes Medium 
8. Documents/information were not securely stored e.g. 
in the Claims Department. 
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vi. ARA Company 2 results 
Scope: The scope of the assessment was to assess compliance with internal 
guidelines and regulations, the adequacy and transparency of documentation, as 
well as the expediency, effectiveness, efficiency and security of the core IT 
processes. The results were verified by random samples, security scanning and by 
a “walkthrough” of the premises. 
Subjects of evaluation: The subjects of evaluation were critical business 
systems, infrastructure systems and IT operation processes. Furthermore, the 
security awareness of users was examined, as well as any existent documentation 
regarding the fulfilment of IT processes. 
Table A-56: Questionnaire with results of company 2 
1. General IS awareness  
1.1 User education and training 
Subject: Training organisation, program and performance  
1.2 User awareness 
Subject: Users’ awareness regarding information security 
 During the walkthrough, we found not properly locked notebooks, confidential life claim data 
on desks after business hours, and an unlocked secure paper bin. 
2. IT management and IS compliance 
2.1 IT processes, organisation and relationships 
Subject: Organisation chart, services and their descriptions  
2.2 Regulatory Compliance 
Subject: National or international tax, data or encryption regulations 
2.3 Data  - Data ownership, Classification and Handling 
Subject: Regulations and measures for classification, storage and deletion of data 
 A policy/list for data/system ownership from a business point of view was non-existent, 
delineating responsibilities for data/systems. The business managers of the departments 
had no current list of employees with access to their department applications or folders. 
Data owners are not aware of their responsibilities.  
3. Systems security and operation management  
3.1 Service Desk, incidents and problems 
Subject: Help desk activities, performance and service, problem management 
3.2 Configuration management - Hard-/Software 
Subject: Software releases, inventory, configuration and license management  
3.3 IT investment, performance and capacity 
Subject: IT cost monitoring and budget planning processes 
3.4 Systems security - Infrastructure 
Audit subject: Infrastructure configuration and administration 
 There is an Internet PC used by both IT staff and business staff for miscellaneous browsing 
purposes. The VPN connection details were found on the internet PC used by IT; as also, 
  
 
 Page 349 of 394  
corporate data was found saved to the desktop of this computer. IT uses the VPN 
connection for remote support purposes that does not require dual-factor authentication. 
 We found that the "daily checklist" listing activities and processes to verify each day was not 
filled out correctly or consistently, or at all in some cases. Additionally, references to 
documents were not up-to-date. The checklist is used to verify that all tasks for IT 
infrastructure operation has been performed successfully and certified as complete. 
 DBA activities are not logged (via audit logging) when they logon and perform any changes 
to systems used by the business. There is also a single DBA user account that does not 
follow the naming conventions of other DBA user accounts. 
3.5 Systems security - desktop  
Subject: Desk policy, configuration and administration 
3.6 Solutions and changes - software configuration 
Subject: Program configuration, controls and documentation 
4. Physical and logical access 
4.1 User and Access Rights Management 
Subject: User access rights and processes 
 Access rights revocation or adjustment does not routinely occur when users move between 
departments or job functions, and does not follow a defined process. Managers may 
communicate such access changes to the helpdesk or corporate systems; however, they 
may just as easily forget or ignore sending such notifications. Access rights for applications 
are not revoked properly, as, for example, in the HR application. 
 We found several administrative accounts in Active Directory that should not be active any 
longer. In addition, some of these users also had an active DBA account. 
 The entity has described the process as one to request, approve software and hardware 
installations. The data owner or the management has to approve the access request or 
installations. However, approvals were not always available and it was not mandatory that 
the process was followed. System access was provided not following the defined process.  
4.2 Site design and access 
Subject: Physical access and maintenance of security measures 
5. Backup, disaster recovery and BCM  
5.1 Data - backup 
Subject: Data backup and restore processes and documentation 
5.2 Continuous service - recovery and planning 
Subject: Disaster and contingency procedures and documentation 
 Dependencies and the order of the recovery of systems were not specified and updated. In 
case of an incident, the recovery of systems might fail as the dependencies and restore 
order are not known. 
 The Business Contingency Planning (BCP) documentation describes common scenarios, 
and most critical systems have been identified However, the BCP has never been tested 
partially or completely. Furthermore, batteries used are regularly maintained but there was 
no power shutdown test at the disaster recovery site. 
6. Software development and projects  
6.1 Project management 
Subject: Project management, plan and controlling 
6.2 Software development 
Subject: Specifications, change management, test, data migration and conversion 
and release 
 
Table A-57: Company 2 results 
Company 2 Results Significance 
1. Weak VPN connection used by IT staff. Medium 
2. No updated disaster recovery plan. Medium 
  
 
 Page 350 of 394  
3. No testing of the BCM/DR activities.  Medium 
4. System access approval process not adequate.  Medium 
5. Daily data centre operations procedure not adhered to. Medium 
6. Unused and active administrative accounts in MS Active Directory. Low 
7. Data owner not aware of responsibilities. Low 
8. Unused and active accounts in the HR application. Medium 
9. Paper documents were not securely stored. Low 
10. No audit trail logging activated on database level. High 
 
vii. ARA Company 3 results 
Scope: The scope of the assessment was to assess compliance with internal 
guidelines and regulations, the adequacy and transparency of documentation, as 
well as the expediency, effectiveness, efficiency and security of the core IT 
processes. The results were verified by random samples, security scanning and by 
a “walkthrough” of the premises. 
Subjects of evaluation: The subjects of evaluation were critical business 
systems, infrastructure systems and IT operation processes. Furthermore, the 
security awareness of users was examined, as well as any existent documentation 
regarding the fulfilment of IT processes. 
Table A-58: Questionnaire with results of company 3 
1. General IS awareness  
1.1 User education and training 
Subject: Training organisation, program and performance  
1.2 User awareness 
Subject: Users’ awareness regarding information security 
 During our walkthrough we found: confidential information (claims reports with personal 
data) on desks, at the photocopier as well as in unlocked cabinets. 
2. IT management and IS compliance 
2.1 IT processes, organisation and relationships 
Subject: Organisation chart, services and their descriptions  
2.2 Regulatory Compliance 
Subject: National or international tax, data or encryption regulations 
2.3 Data  - Data ownership, Classification and Handling 
Subject: Regulations and measures for classification, storage and deletion of data 
3. Systems security and operation management  
  
 
 Page 351 of 394  
3.1 Service Desk, incidents and problems 
Subject: Help desk activities, performance and service, Problem management 
 A laptop was lost. Its hard disk was not encrypted, and this incident was not reported 
immediately. 
3.2 Configuration management - Hard-/Software 
Subject: Software releases, inventory, configuration and license management  
 An overview of applications used was existent; it clearly showed the interaction with other 
applications and their interfaces. However, an overview of configuration, the quantity and 
the description of software and hardware was not existent. Hardware and software is 
configured by the administrators, but not in a structured way, and the configuration is not 
documented. 
3.3 IT investment, performance and capacity 
Subject: IT cost monitoring and budget planning processes 
3.4 Systems security - Infrastructure 
Audit subject: Infrastructure configuration and administration 
 A number of systems have been identified as missing patches by the security monitoring 
scan. 
 Some of the AD user groups used for granting access to folders and applications contained 
unused and active administrative accounts. Some of these administrative user accounts 
were MS-standard administrative accounts. Furthermore, the Domain Admin group 
contained regular user accounts; this is not allowed by the AD administration policy. 
3.5 Systems security - desktop  
Subject: Desk policy, configuration and administration 
3.6 Solutions and changes - software configuration 
Subject: Program configuration, controls and documentation 
4. Physical and logical access 
4.1 User and Access Rights Management 
Subject: User access rights and processes 
 Application owners are fairly well identified. However, application owners do not receive any 
reports or verification processes governing application access. Therefore, access right 
revocation or adjustment does not routinely occur. 
 HR department uploads payment files to a bank. A user account and password is necessary 
to access that function. A shared user account/password is used. A single person can do 
this without a second authorisation. The upload files are not encrypted and can be modified 
by a simple text editor before the upload.  
 In a user list of the HR application, we found active user accounts of terminated users, as 
well as generic accounts. Furthermore, the generic accounts had simple and plaintext 
readable passwords. 
4.2 Site design and access 
Subject: Physical access and maintenance of security measures 
5. Backup, disaster recovery and BCM  
5.1 Data - backup 
Subject: Data backup and restore processes and documentation 
 Authenticated users can connect and modify the configuration of the disk arrays, part of the 
virtual tape backup system, without authentication.  
5.2 Continuous service - recovery and planning 
Subject: Disaster and contingency procedures and documentation 
 There is a draft BCM plan existing, but not approved and in operation yet. The BCM plan is 
missing some of the critical applications as identified by the business owners. 
6. Software development and projects  
6.1 Project management 
Subject: Project management, plan and controlling 
6.2 Software development 
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Table A-59: Company 3 results 
Company 3 Results Significance 
1. Shared account used for the online banking system. High 
2. The operating systems for various servers are missing several patches. High 
3. No business continuity and disaster recovery plan in place. Medium 
4. Unused and active administrative accounts in MS Active Directory. Medium 
5. No user access lists for local applications. Low 
6. Unused and active accounts in the HR application. Medium 
7. Paper documents were not securely stored. Low 
8. No configuration management existent. Medium 
9. Weak passwords for the backup recovery tool. Medium 
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A.5. Security objective ratings – Rule set  
Security Objective Integrity Confidentiality Availability   
Level 1  Level 2  Level 3 Level 1 Level 2  Level 3     Level 3 Level 2 Level 1 
Security Concept                       
Access Control               Performance         
unauthenticated 
user 
AC0 EP and 
>= D2 
PP 
EP and D4 
PP and <= 
A1 
EP failed 




PP failed PP failed Never met P1 Failed Failed Failed 
internal user AC1 EP and 
>= D1 
PP 
EP and >= 
D2 
PP and <= 
A2 
EP failed 






PP failed Partially met P2 Failed Failed Failed 
authenticated user  AC2 EP and 
>= D1 
PP 
EP and >= 
D1 
PP and A3 
and >=D1 
EP and >= 
D2 
PP and (A3 
or A4 and 
D4)  































Authorisation               Measures         
none A0 PP PP PP PP PP failed PP failed none M0 Failed Failed Failed 




Cold standby M1 Failed Failed M1 and 
P3 or 
P4 
Execute/process A2 PP  PP >= AC1 PP and >= 
AC2   










Write/update A3 PP and 
>= D3 
PP and D4  
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Full control A4 PP and 
>= D3 
PP  and D4 
or (AC2 and 
D2) 



















Data validation                         
None D0 EP failed EP failed EP failed n/a n/a n/a 
     Manual D1 EP and 
>= AC1 
EP and AC2 EP failed n/a n/a n/a 
     Downstream 
resonableness 
validation 
D2 EP EP and >= 
AC1 
EP and AC2 n/a n/a n/a 
     Value verification D3 EP EP and AC2 EP and AC2 n/a n/a n/a 
     Value verification 
and completeness 
D4 EP EP EP and AC2 n/a n/a n/a 
     Communication               
     External 
unauthenticated 
partner 
C0 CC and 
>= E1 





     External 
authenticated 
partner 
C1 CC CC and >= 
E2 






     Internal network 
partner 
C2 CC CC CC and >= 
E2 
CC CC CC and 
>= E2 
     Internal 
authenticated 
partner 
C3 CC CC CC CC CC CC 
     Encryption               
     none E0 CC failed CC failed CC failed CC and 
>=C2 
CC failed CC failed 
     weak encryption E1 CC CC failed CC failed CC CC failed CC failed 
     Standard 
encryption 
E2 CC CC CC failed CC CC CC failed 
     strong encryption E3 CC CC CC CC CC CC 
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A.6. Security objective assessment with Prolog 
 
In the following the (SWI-) Prolog (available at http://www.swi-prolog.org/)  
program used for the security objective assessment is described. A rule base was 
defined that determines whether the security objective is adhered to as facts and 
rules in Prolog. For each security rating with regard to the process points rules are 
defined with regard to the assessment criteria’s that have to be adhered to. If one 
likes to determine whether the security rating – confidentiality, integrity and 
availability - for a EP, PP, CC process point complies with the rules defined for 
confidentiality, integrity and availability with regard to the assessment criteria’s – 
access control, authorisation, data validation, encryption, communication, 
availability level and measures -  one has to start the programm by assess. 
providing the requested information.  
The program consists of three main parts – the facts which represent single 
conditions for security objectives and process points, the assessment rule for 
security objectives and process points and the query interface to request the 
information needed for the assessment from the user. 
1. Query interface 
The program starts with assess. by asking for the security objective (X = 
confidentiality, integrity or availability) and rating (Lev = level 1 to 3). Next the 
process point type (Pp = ep, pp or cc) is asked by the rule so(X,Lev) and 
dependent of the security objective the rule integrity(Pp, Lev), 
confidentiality(Pp, Lev) or availability(Lev) called. At 
integrity(Pp, Lev) and confidentiality(Pp, Lev) the EPs and PPs 
security functions ratings are asked for access control (Ac = ac0 to ac3), 
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authorisation (A = a1 to a4) and data validation (D = d1 to d4). For CCs only the 
ratings for encryption (E = e0 to e3) and communication (C = c0 to c3) are asked. 
At availability(Lev) the performance (P = p1 to p4) and measures (M = m1 
to m4) rating of systems of an EP, PP and CC is asked. The input has to be 
provided for each EP, PP and CC subsequently. The input of a security function 
can be omitted if not available (e.g. by ‘[]’) or asked to be resolved by Prolog by 
using a variable (e.g. ‘Result’). After then the corresponding assessment rules for 
availability, integrity or confidentiality with regard to the process point type are 
called. 
2. Assessment rules 
The assessment rules are called after the user specified the security functions for 
an EP, PP or CC to evalaute the adherence of the security objective. 





The EP security function ratings are checked whether the ratings for data 
validation (ep_int_data) or access control (ep_int_access) or a combination 
of both (ep_int_data_access) correspond with the facts defined for the 




The PP security function ratings are checked whether the ratings for access 
control (pp_int_access) or authorisation (pp_int_auth) or a combination of all 
three (pp_int_access_auth) including data validation correspond with the facts 
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The CC security function ratings are checked whether the ratings for 
communication (cc_int_com) or encryption (cc_int_enc) or a combination of 
both (cc_int_com_enc) correspond with the facts defined for the specified 
integrity level (Lev). In addition, it is checked that some security function rating do 
not become true with cc_int_com_enc_no(Lev,C,E). 
 Confidentiality is only evaluated at PPs and CCs as for EP no confidentiality 






The PP security function ratings are checked whether the ratings for access 
control (pp_conf_access) or authorisation (pp_conf_auth) or a combination of 
both (pp_conf_access_auth) correspond with the facts defined for the specified 





The CC security function ratings are checked whether the ratings for 
communication (cc_conf_com) or encryption (cc_conf_enc) or a combination 
of both (cc_conf_com_enc) correspond with the facts defined for the specified 
confidentiality level (Lev). In addition, it is checked that some security function 
rating do not become true with cc_conf_com_enc_no(Lev,C,E). 
Availability is evaluated without distinction of EPs, PPs and CCs and therefore 
directly by the facts defined. The rule availability_EPPPCC(Lev,P,M) 
verifies the ratings for performance and measure with regard to the facts defined 
for an availability level. Lev contains the security objective level and is only used to 
distinguish between the facts defined for the different security objective levels. 
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3. Facts 
The facts defined describe a true condition for an EP, PP and CC for integrity, 
confidentiality and availability with regard to the implementation of security 
functions. The facts are used by the assessment rules to verify whether the 
statement for an EP,PP or CC is true. The facts were constructed like the following: 
Name_of_the_fact(Security objective level, security function 
ratings).The security function rating can be only one argument or more. E.g. 
ep_integrity(level1, ac0, d1). represents a fact with two arguments 






































































pp_conf_access_auth(level1, ac0, a0). 
pp_conf_access_auth(level1, ac1, a3). 
pp_conf_access_auth(level1, ac2, a3). 
pp_conf_access_auth(level1, ac3, a3). 
pp_conf_access_auth(level1, ac2, a4). 
pp_conf_access_auth(level1, ac3, a4). 
pp_conf_access_auth(level2, ac1, a2). 
pp_conf_access(level2,ac2). 
pp_conf_access(level2,ac3). 
pp_conf_access_auth(level2, ac1, a0). 
pp_conf_access_auth(level2, ac1, a1). 
pp_conf_access_auth(level2, ac1, a2). 
pp_conf_access_auth(level2, ac1, a3). 
pp_conf_access(level3,ac3). 
pp_conf_access_auth(level3, ac2, a1). 
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pp_conf_access_auth(level3,ac2,a4). 

















































































/*Start the the assessment and query security objective and the security objective 
level */ 
assess:- write('Please type SO integrity, confidentiality, 
availability:'),nl,read(X),write('Please type level 1 to 3:'),nl,read(Lev),so(X,Lev). 
 
/* Query process point type*/ 
so(X,Lev):- ('integrity'=X, write('Please type 
ep,pp,cc'),nl,read(Pp),integrity(Pp,Lev));('confidentiality'=X, write('Please type 
ep,pp,cc'),nl,read(Pp),confidentiality(Pp,Lev));('availability'=X,availability(Lev)). 
 
/* Query the security function ratings for evaluating integrity for EP or PP or CC*/ 
integrity(Pp,Lev):- (('ep'=Pp;'pp'=Pp),write('Access rating(ac0-
ac3)?'),nl,read(Ac),write('Authorisation rating (a0-a4)?'),nl,read(A),write('Data 
validation rating(d0-
d4)'),nl,read(D),('ep'=Pp,integrity_EP(Lev,Ac,D);'pp'=Pp,integrity_PP(Lev,Ac,A,D)))
;('cc'=Pp,write('Communication rating (c0-c3)'),nl,read(C), write('Encryption rating 
(e0-e3)?'),nl,read(E),integrity_CC(Lev,C,E)). 
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rating (c0-c3)'),nl,read(C), write('Encryption rating (e0-
e3)?'),nl,read(E),confidentiality_CC(Lev,C,E)). 
 
/*Query the security functions ratings for evaluating availability */ 
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Glossary 
In the following, definitions for terms used in this thesis are provided. 
 
Availability 
ensures that resources are accessible and usable on demand by authorised 
entities (ISO, 2004b). 
 
Confidentiality  




is the occurrence or change of a particular set of circumstances (ISO, 2009a) 
caused by a threat. 
 
Information security  
is the preservation of confidentiality, integrity and availability of information (ISO, 
2005c). 
 
Information security risk  
is the combination of the probability of an event and its consequence (ISO, 2012), 
which would result in the violation of security objectives. 
 
Integrity 
is the protection of the accuracy and completeness of assets (ISO, 2004b).  
 
Impact  
is an adverse change to the level of business objectives achieved (ISO, 2012).  
 
Risk analysis 
is the process to comprehend the nature of risk and to determine the level of risk 
(ISO, 2009a). 
 
Risk assessment  




is the application of process and procedures to the activities of identifying, 
analyzing, evaluating, treating, monitoring, communication and reviewing of risk 
(adopted from ISO, 2009a). 
 
Risk treatment 
is the process of selection and implementation of security functions to modify risk 
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Risk 
is the effect of uncertainty on objectives (ISO, 2009a). 
 
Security objective 
is a statement of intent to counter identified threats and/or satisfy identified 
organisation security policies and assumptions (ISO, 2005f).  
 
Security requirements 
are constraints on the functions of the system, where these constraints 
operationalize one or more security objectives (Haley et al., 2008). 
 
Threat 
is a potential cause of an unwanted incident (exercising a vulnerability), which may 
result in harm to a system or organization (ISO, 2012). 
 
Vulnerability 
is a weakness of an asset or control that can be exploited by a threat (ISO, 2012) 
violating the security objective. 
 
Vulnerability identification errors 
are unidentified vulnerabilities or identified vulnerabilities that are not, in fact, 
vulnerabilities (Taubenberger et al., 2013). 
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